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INTRODUCTION 
Religion is often singled out for special legal treatment in Western societies. This is 
certainly true in the United States where religion enjoys a special place in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. Specifically, the guidelines for state interaction with 
religion are expressed in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”1 
Through Free Exercise guarantees, for example, the Supreme Court held in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder (1972) that Amish children were entitled to an exemption from compulsory school 
attendance laws after the eighth grade, emphasizing that this was a uniquely “religious” 
exemption that did not apply to everyone.2 Religion enjoys special legal treatment in other 
ways too. Both the US federal government and 21 individual states have passed Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts3 that protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs 
substantially burdened, barring some compelling governmental interest that cannot be met 
by less restrictive means. Nonreligious persons, to the contrary, fail to possess equal or 
similar RFRA-like protections for their sincerely held beliefs. Consider also the example of 
legal exemptions to otherwise mandatory vaccination laws. In the United States, 47 states 
currently offer nonmedical exemptions to persons who object to these mandatory vaccine 
                                                          
1 The U.S. Constitution, Amendment I 
2 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) 
3 RFRAs contain a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors. If the objector can answer “yes” to all 
of the following conditions, then they can receive a legal accommodation: (a) Substantial Burden: Does the 
individual have a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened? (b) Compelling Interest: Does the 
government have a very good reason (e.g. health or safety) to interfere? (c) Least Restrictive Means: Is there a 
reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest? 
2 
 
 
laws for religious reasons. 29 of these states offer legal exemptions to religious objectors 
only while the other 18 states offer legal exemptions to nonreligious conscientious 
objectors as well.4 So if both an Atheist and a Christian conscientiously object to some 
mandatory vaccine law in New York, a legal exemption may be granted to the Christian but 
not the Atheist under New York’s current legal framework. 
The special treatment of religious beliefs is similarly at the heart of an important 
thought-experiment raised by Brian Leiter.5 He asks us to imagine the following: a young 
rural boy enters his school classroom on the first day of the year wearing – as usual – a 
family knife that has been passed down to him from his father. This knife is a family 
heirloom that designates the arrival of maturity for the males in his family such that, to be a 
“man” is to receive that dagger from one’s father, just as he received it from his, and so on. 
The boy’s identity as a man in his familial community turns on his carrying the family knife, 
both marking his maturity and bond with the past. Now, consider a young Sikh boy 
entering his school classroom on the first day of the year wearing – as usual – his kirpan. 
The kirpan is a small dagger or knife given to young men in the Sikh religion as a symbol of 
their religious devotion. As was the case with the rural boy, carrying these small knives 
similarly demarcates the Sikh boy’s maturity, strengthens his bond with the past, and 
constitutes at least part of his communal, familial, or religious identity. This thought-
                                                          
4 For a more detailed analysis of these vaccine exemptions, see Mark Navin (2018). 
5 Brian Leiter (2013), 1-3 
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experiment raises an interesting question: why might it be permissible for the Sikh boy to 
carry his dagger in school but impermissible for the rural boy?6  
In fact, all of the above cases, both real and imagined, raise an important question: 
what, if anything, is “special” about religious conscience beliefs that justifies their special legal 
treatment? That is the central question this dissertation seeks to answer. Overall, I’m not 
interested in answering the broad version of the specialness question – that is, whether or 
not conscience beliefs more broadly, like religious beliefs, should receive a defeasible 
special status before the law. The broad version of the specialness question asks us to 
broadly compare and contrast religious beliefs with conscience beliefs in order to see 
whether one set of beliefs deserves special legal solicitude over the other set of beliefs. 
Instead, I am interested in answering the narrow version of the specialness question – that 
is, whether or not religious conscience beliefs in particular should receive comparatively 
special legal treatment over and above nonreligious conscience beliefs. The narrow version 
of the specialness question asks us to narrowly compare and contrast religious conscience 
beliefs with nonreligious conscience beliefs in order to see whether one kind of conscience 
belief deserves special legal solicitude over the other kind of conscience belief.  
Additionally, I am not necessarily interested in whether the state should grant legal 
exemptions – for I assume that it is morally permissible to grant at least some 
conscientious objections. Nor is my focus centrally on how the state decides which requests 
for accommodation should be granted either. Just how the state should decide whether or 
not to grant conscientious exemptions is a related though separate question that varies in 
                                                          
6 Brian Leiter (2013): “There is no Western democracy, at present, in which the [rural] boy … has prevailed or 
would prevail in a challenge to a general prohibition on the carrying of weapons in the school.” (3) 
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answer. For example, some approaches deemphasize the particular content of the 
conscientious objection and may grant equal protections to religious and nonreligious 
conscientious objectors as a result. Approaches in this vein emphasize relevant extrinsic 
features (e.g., the infringement of rights or harm caused to third-parties) over relevant 
intrinsic features (e.g., the uniquely religious content of the objector’s conscience) when 
determining whether granting a legal exemption is justified. Other approaches consider the 
particular content of a conscientious objection as significant and, in some way, 
determinative of whether or not a legal exemption is justified. Approaches in this vein may 
consider the religiosity of the objector’s conscience as a relevant and good reason for 
permitting a legal exemption. Conversely, approaches in this vein may also consider the 
religiosity of the objector’s conscience as a relevant and good reason for withholding a legal 
exemption.7 
In this dissertation, I offer an Egalitarian Response to the narrow question about 
religion’s “specialness” before the law. My central claim is that, because religious and 
nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar in nature, there is no good reason to 
treat them differently before the law. Put another way, I contend that there are no salient 
features of the religious conscience that justifies affording it special legal treatment. As 
noted above, this central claim is separate from the question of whether a state should 
grant legal exemptions to conscientious objectors and separate from the question of how a 
state should determine whether to grant exemptions if permitted.  
                                                          
7 See Yossi Nehushtan (2011a) for a more detailed analysis of the varying approaches to answering the 
question concerning how the state should decide which requests for accommodation should be granted. 
5 
 
 
Of course, it’s possible to address these further questions by combining the central, 
egalitarian claim with further premises. If the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible 
positive special legal status to all conscience beliefs, for example, and we believe that there 
is good reason to adopt the Egalitarian Response, then the state would thus have good 
reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to both religious and secular 
conscience beliefs. The same is true if the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible 
negative special legal status to all conscience beliefs as well. Though my considered view is 
that the state has good reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to 
conscience beliefs, the aim of my dissertation is to defend an Egalitarian Response to the 
narrow question about religion’s “specialness” before the law – leaving these further 
questions open for further research. Surely the arguments and claims within this 
dissertation may be useful in support of further arguments for one of these positions. 
Nevertheless, my aim is to establish the narrower egalitarian conclusion. As I understand it, 
even this narrow conclusion may be attractive to the religious and secular alike – for 
granting equal protections to both kinds of conscience beliefs under the broader umbrella 
of conscience rights could make “religionists and secularists into partners in developing a 
workable theory of the limited state.”8 
In the first chapter, my aim is to highlight a few historical discussions concerning 
religion’s specialness. I begin by detailing the account of how we ended up with 
Constitutional protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to 
show that the historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explain that once religion 
was afforded special legal protections, it only made sense that we ended up with Court 
                                                          
8 Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle (2014), 180 
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cases like Seeger and Welsh – where conscientious objectors to military service were 
granted religious exemptions even after denying that their objections were religious in the 
traditional sense. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging 
religious conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious 
conscientious objectors, the Yoder case – which came after Seeger and Welsh – would 
incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These seemingly inconsistent verdicts 
only serve to bring our primary question back to center stage. I end the chapter by giving 
an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of this question in order to set up an 
evaluation of his claims in a later chapter. 
My goal in the second chapter is to develop and defend an account of conscience 
against competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness 
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed, 
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji – a key historian of philosophy working 
within the history of ethics. The account that I defend is not an attempt to define a neat and 
tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an attempt to 
capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I formulate an 
account of ‘conscience,’ I then compare, contrast, and defend this account of conscience 
against common, competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion 
of the concept. I end the chapter by comparing and contrasting this historically grounded 
account of conscience with a more conservative Christian account of conscience given that 
the majority of religious individuals in the United States engaging with these pertinent 
questions are Christian. 
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In chapters three and four, I provide support for my central claim by analyzing 
several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be legally 
relevant by theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held by either 
kind of conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response to the 
original specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between the two 
kinds of conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response to the 
specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature.  
In the third chapter in particular, I narrow in on two of Brian Leiter’s main features 
of the religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from evidence respectively. After 
initially interacting with Leiter’s categoricity feature, I turn my attention to Leiter’s 
arguments that religious beliefs are insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not 
worthy of special legal treatment. I argue that he fails to show that religious conscience 
beliefs are both in principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more 
insulated from this evidence than secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then 
Leiter fails to sufficiently distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience 
and fails to answer the “central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? Second, I look at 
whether or not it is plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from 
other forms of evidence. Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I 
argue that, typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a 
relevant kind of evidence – namely, moral argumentation. I also show that, while it seems 
as though the religious conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when 
compared to the secular conscience, this should make no legal difference overall. Lastly, I 
consider whether religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly 
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to private evidence. In response, I conclude the chapter by offering a few cursory 
arguments why we might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete 
case – hopefully curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence. 
In the fourth chapter, I narrow in on three further, possibly delineating features of 
the religious conscience that theorists take to be legally relevant. First, I investigate 
whether religious conscience beliefs are more central to our identity – and relatedly, 
whether they are more central to our moral integrity. Ultimately, I argue that both religious 
and nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently central to our identity and moral 
integrity such that there is no obvious reason to grant preferential legal treatment to one 
over the other. Second, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are more 
primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I contend that granting legal exemptions on the 
grounds that the belief or practice in question is primordial or non-voluntary is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argue that non-voluntariness should not be 
classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal exemption. Second, I argue that 
non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption either. And third, I argue that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient 
condition, it should not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption. 
As I end chapter four, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are uniquely 
linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice so that differential treatment before the law 
is warranted. I argue that, because both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs have 
similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance, their differential treatment 
before the law is plausibly unwarranted. First, I argue that unjustified prejudice and 
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intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar 
as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by 
both kinds of conscience. Second, I argue that we should be skeptical that religious 
conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and 
intolerance. If these claims are right, then it seems like we should accept an anti-
intolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach. And if the anti-
intolerance approach is adopted, then we have no reason to treat religious conscientious 
objectors with special, negative treatment. Nevertheless, I conclude by highlighting a 
further problem for both the anti-religious approach and the anti-intolerance approach: 
just how relevant or how weighty should content-based reasons be in the exemption 
calculus if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief, 
practice, or ideology? 
Having argued for the Egalitarian Response, in the last chapter I address several 
lurking objections to this position. In the first section, I address the multifaceted critique of 
the Egalitarian Response advanced by Kathleen Brady. In particular, I address her claims 
that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special legal treatment because they enjoy a 
distinct relationship with the divine; that accepting the Egalitarian Response results in 
weaker protections for both religious and secular conscience beliefs; and that accepting the 
Egalitarian Response limits liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. In the 
second section, I address the Feasibility Objection which worries that the implications of 
accepting this response may be pragmatically or legally unworkable – possibly leading to 
something like legal anarchy. There, I discuss responses to this objection raised by Douglas 
Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offer two responses to the 
10 
 
 
Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May – which just claims that there is no 
principled moral reason to grant legal accommodations to conscience beliefs that are not 
equally good reason to grant legal accommodations to non-moral projects. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE SPECIALNESS OF RELIGION 
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders thought so. The proper 
relation between religion and government was a subject of great debate in the founding 
generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses that apply to religion and do not apply 
to anything else. This debate and these clauses presuppose that religion is in some way a 
special human activity, requiring special rules applicable only to it.  
– Douglas Laycock, “The Remnants of Free Exercise,” p. 16 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, my aim is to highlight a few historical discussions concerning 
religion’s specialness. I begin by detailing the account of how we ended up with 
Constitutional protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to 
show that the historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explain that once religion 
was afforded special legal protections, it only made sense that we ended up with Court 
cases like Seeger and Welsh – where conscientious objectors to military service were 
granted religious exemptions even after denying that their objections were religious in the 
traditional sense. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging 
religious conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious 
conscientious objectors, the Yoder case – which came after Seeger and Welsh – would 
incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These seemingly inconsistent verdicts 
only serve to bring our primary question back to center stage. I end the chapter by giving 
an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of this question in order to set up an 
evaluation of his claims in a later chapter. 
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II. Religion’s Specialness in the Framing Era 
In the United States, the “specialness” of religion dates back to its very founding – 
and as we will see later – sets the stage for cases like Seeger, Welsh, and Yoder that affect us 
even in our contemporary era. When New Hampshire became the ninth and last necessary 
state to ratify the Constitution on June 21, 1788, that document officially became the law of 
the land. Somewhat surprisingly, that original Constitution contained “no provision 
protecting the general freedom of religion.”9 The absence of such a protection became one 
of the major points of contention and debate not only during the ratification process, but 
after the ratification process as well. The Baptist General Committee, for example, opposed 
the proposed Constitution solely on the grounds that it had not “made sufficient provision 
for the secure enjoyment of religious liberty.”10 Thus, part of the intention of adding a Bill 
of Rights thereafter was to ameliorate this problem.  
Seven states ended up drafting proposals for amendments to the Constitution, and 
five of them contained religious freedom guarantees.11 Some also contained protections for 
general conscience. For example, New Hampshire proposed that “Congress shall make no 
laws touching religion, or to infringe on the rights of conscience.”12 Virginia’s proposal, 
modeled after its own Declaration of Rights, also included protections for “religion” and 
“the dictates of conscience” – though, given its language, it is not clear how they differ:  
                                                          
9 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
10 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
11 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
12 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
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That religion, or the duty to which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence: and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.13 
In the First Congress, James Madison was the primary draftsman of a Bill of Rights.14 
Among his several proposals were two amendments relevant to religious liberty and the 
rights of conscience in particular:  
Art. I, § 9: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious 
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the 
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, 
infringed. 
Art, I, § 10: No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the 
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.15 
Madison’s proposals were first sent to a select committee, and then, on August 15, 1789, 
the House of Representatives met as a Committee of the Whole to consider the select 
committee’s original proposal.16 Five days later, the House adopted a motion to alter the 
wording of Madison’s above amendment (Art. I, § 9) as follows: 
                                                          
13 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
14 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 58 
15 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 60 
16 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 60 
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Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free 
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.17 
Once in the Senate, Madison’s proposal was amended once again. Unlike the House 
debates, Senate debates were, unfortunately, not recorded at that time.18 This means that 
the particular reasons as to why certain motions passed or failed are unknown; we only 
know whether they were passed or not. On September 3, 1789, a first motion was made to 
amend Madison’s proposal to read: “Congress shall not make any law infringing the rights 
of conscience, or establishing any religious sect of society.”19 This proposed amendment 
passed in the negative and was rejected. A second motion was given that same day to 
amend the proposal to read: “Congress shall make no law establishing any particular 
denomination of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, 
nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed.”20 This second motion was likewise rejected 
– and like the previous defeated motion, for unknown reasons. 
On September 9, 1789, after an unsuccessful session on September 3, the Senate 
finally amended Madison’s proposal to read:  
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of 
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom 
                                                          
17 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62 
18 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62 
19 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62 
20 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62 
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of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
petition to the government for the redress of grievances.21 
Notice that the original language concerning “the rights of conscience” was excluded 
in Senate debates, but that the passed motion included protections for speech, press, 
assembly, and petition. Unfortunately, Senate journal records for September 9 only indicate 
that the above amendment was passed in the affirmative, and fails to give any sort of 
detailed account of the debate and conversations surrounding the motion. Shortly 
thereafter, the proposal was sent back to the House where it was further amended to read 
as follows: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.22 
On September 25, 1789, the Senate agreed with the House’s proposal, and the amendment 
was approved for transmission to the States for ratification.23 Following ratification by the 
state of Virginia on December 15, 1791, the first 10 amendments to the Constitution – 
which included the final amendment detailed above – were added to the law of the land.  
This historical account raises an important question: why did the Senate exclude the 
rights of conscience to the proposed amendment? And why did the House agree with the 
Senate if its original proposal included protections for conscience? One possible 
                                                          
21 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 62-3 
22 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63 
23 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63 
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explanation is that, while the rights of conscience may have been seen as altogether 
separate from the other rights, they were nevertheless unnecessary to protect 
constitutionally. Another possible explanation is that perhaps it was believed that 
protecting all these other rights – and the freedom of religion in particular – was sufficient 
for protecting the rights of conscience, thus making an additional protection for the rights 
of conscience superfluous.  
The first explanation seems comparably less plausible than the second for the 
simple reason that the “rights of conscience” were not likely seen as unnecessary to 
protect. In a House debate over Madison’s second proposal (Art, I, § 10), Madison himself 
argued that this amendment was “the most valuable amendment in the whole list.”24 Not 
only so, but contrary to the claims made by his debate interlocutors in the House, Madison 
thought that “if there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from 
infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured 
against the State Governments.”25 Thus, these statements give us good reason to believe 
that the rights of conscience were seen both as “essential” and necessary to protect from 
both Federal and State Governments.  
Perhaps Congress excluded the rights of conscience because they believed that 
protecting religious freedom was sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience. That is, 
perhaps conscience was understood to be limited to religious beliefs or convictions, so 
protecting religious freedom was sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience. The 
Virginia Declaration of Rights might serve as a good example of this view making its way 
                                                          
24 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63 
25 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 63  
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into legislation. While this second explanation seems comparably more plausible than the 
first, it nevertheless falls short important ways. First, if protecting religious freedom was 
sufficient for protecting the rights of conscience, then why did states like New Hampshire 
propose that “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe on the rights of 
conscience” separately? Likewise, why did so many of the drafts of what would become the 
First Amendment explicitly and often differentiate between the “free exercise of religion” 
and the “rights of conscience” if they were just going to protect the same sorts of things? 
Why, for example, would Madison originally propose an amendment (Art. I, § 9) protecting 
the rights of “religious belief or worship” in addition to protecting “the full and equal rights 
of conscience?” Using language that separates religion and conscience strongly suggests 
that these two concepts were understood to be different and to apply to different things, 
and that one could not simply be subsumed under the other. 
Perhaps there was no official view during the framing era about the relationship 
between religion and conscience. Clearly, some people (e.g., George Mason in Virginia 
Declaration of Rights) seemed to have more of an encompassing view in that they seemed to 
think that ‘conscience’ was encompassed by ‘religion’ – conceptually, legally, and so on. 
Other people (e.g., Roger Williams or even James Madison in Art. I, § 9) seemed to have 
more of  an overlapping view in that they seemed to think that ‘religion’ and ‘conscience’ 
were not completely encompassed by each other, but rather that they shared conceptual 
overlap. The best explanation might just be that, as a historical fact, we happened to get 
protections for religion but not for conscience because something like the encompassing 
view was adopted after the conceptual waters had been waded in Congress. 
18 
 
 
It’s worth noting, however, that if the explanation for why we ended up with 
protections for religion but not for conscience is that the encompassing view was 
ultimately adopted in Congress, then Madison seems to be an enigma. Remember that 
Madison proposed rights of conscience as separate from religious freedoms in his 
amendment proposals and had the opportunity to re-amend his proposals when the Senate 
sent what was to become the First Amendment back to the House. Nevertheless, he didn’t 
seem to fight the Senate’s exclusion of conscience rights when he had the opportunity to. 
Why didn’t he fight their exclusion? As noted above, he seems to be an example of someone 
who held an overlapping view given the language of his amendments and the recorded 
arguments he made for the essentiality of conscience rights and the necessity of protecting 
them. So why did he concede to the Senate’s exclusion of conscience? Madison’s lack of 
action is an enigma if he, in fact, held something like the overlapping view. Madison’s lack 
of action might make sense if he instead held something like the encompassing view, but 
the evidence that suggests he held this latter view seems comparatively weaker than the 
evidence that suggests he held the overlapping view.26 
Whatever views Madison might have held, the reasons why Congress would include 
the “free exercise of religion” and exclude the “rights of conscience” are simply unclear. In 
the end, the surprising omission of religious freedom in the original Constitution had been 
                                                          
26 There may be other evidences pointing to the fact that Madison may have actually held a more 
encompassing view – e.g., his co-authorship on the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and the fact that he began 
the argument in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments by quoting the definition of 
‘religion’ found in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. But George Mason – not Madison – was the primary 
author of the Virginia Declaration of rights, and the amendments that Madison himself crafted suggest that he 
held something like the overlapping view instead.  
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corrected. Yet, the omission of the rights of conscience in the Constitution remains to this 
day.27 We should not be surprised, then, when we see religion afforded special protections 
over and above their nonreligious counterparts in other legal spaces even to this day. After 
all, when religion is considered special constitutionally, it only makes sense that religion 
would be considered special in other legal ways. But just as it was important to question 
why religion was afforded special constitutional protections, it will be important to 
question why religion is afforded special treatment in other legal spaces as well.  
III. Religion’s Specialness in Conscription Cases 
As noted above, the “specialness of religion” question would continue to come up in 
other legal spaces – such as statutory jurisprudence – as well. For example, in United States 
v. Seeger (1965), the US Supreme Court attempted to navigate through some of these tough 
questions concerning the comparative protections for religion and conscience. In this case 
in particular, Mr. Seeger claimed an exemption from the armed forces as a conscientious 
objector, declaring that he was conscientiously opposed to participating in war in any form 
by reason of his “religious belief” even though he preferred to leave the question as to his 
belief in a Supreme Being open, “rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.”28 Seeger claimed that his 
“skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God [did] not necessarily mean lack of faith in 
anything whatsoever” and that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for 
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.”29 He cited such persons as 
                                                          
27 For a further analysis of this historical point, see Michael McConnell (1990) and Noah Feldman (2002).  
28 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 769 
29 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 769 
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Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral 
integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.”30  
Seeger’s exemption claim was initially denied solely because it was not based upon a 
“belief in a relation to a Supreme Being” as required by § 6(j) of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §456(j).31 The phrase “belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being” was understood to involve “duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation,” but did not include “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical 
views or a merely personal moral code.”32 Additionally, between 1940 and 1948, two 
courts of appeals upheld the view that the phrase “religious training and belief” as written 
in the statute did not include political, social, or philosophical beliefs.33 The original statue 
and the two subsequent court cases upheld the view that the only sorts of objections or 
beliefs that are eligible for legal exemptions are those that clearly possess religious content.  
The court ended up overturning Seeger’s initial denial, claiming that “a sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by 
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory 
definition.”34 In short, the exemption was found not to cover those who oppose war from a 
merely “personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of 
essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief” 
                                                          
30 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 769 
31 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 769 
32 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 769 
33 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 770. See also United States v. Kauten, 
133 F2d 703, 708 (2d Cir 1943) and Berman v. United States, 156 F2d 377, 380- 81. (9th Cir 1946). 
34 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 771 
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but would cover those who had a “sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the 
exemption.” Overturning the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal 
exemptions are those that are religious in content, the ruling in Seeger instead supported 
the view that beliefs that function like traditional religious beliefs in the life of their 
possessor are eligible for legal exemptions as well. 
Five years later, in Welsh v. United States (1970), Elliott Ashton Welsh II was 
convicted by a United States District Judge for refusing to submit to induction into the 
Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. §462(a).35 Like Seeger, Mr. Welsh was unable to 
sign the statement printed within the Selective Service form that stated “I am, by reason of 
my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form.”36 Whereas Seeger could only sign after striking the words ‘training and’ and putting 
quotation marks around the term ‘religious,’ Welsh could only sign after striking the words 
‘my religious training and.’37 Neither definitively affirmed nor denied that they believed in 
a “Supreme Being,” yet both affirmed on their applications that they harbored deep moral 
scruples and conscientious objections against war, believing that killing in war was wrong, 
immoral, and unethical.38 As in Seeger, the exemption claim made by Welsh was initially 
denied because his belief was in some sense insufficiently “religious” to qualify for 
                                                          
35 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777 
36 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777 
37 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777 
38 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777 
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conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of § 6(j) – though Welsh was far more 
insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were uniquely religious.39  
Moreover, Welsh was further distinguished from Seeger in that Welsh’s views were 
more easily identified as “political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code.”40 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the initial denial because of the 
“broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in § 6(j)” and because they did not think that § 
6(j)’s “exclusion of those persons with ‘essentially political, sociological, or philosophical 
views or a merely personal moral code’ should be read to exclude those who hold strong 
beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection 
to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public 
policy.”41 On the basis of these claims and the conclusion from the Court of Appeals that 
Welsh held his beliefs “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions,” the 
Court ended up granting Welsh the conscientious objector exemption that he originally 
sought.42 Thus, Welsh also supported the view that beliefs that function like traditional 
religious beliefs in the life of their possessor are eligible for legal exemptions as well.43 
The verdicts of Seeger and Welsh are admittedly confusing in their own right. So, 
when the Yoder v. Wisconsin (1972) decision came down only two years later, the confusion 
was only amplified. In this case, the Court held that Amish children were entitled to an 
                                                          
39 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 777-78 
40 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778 
41 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778 
42 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 778-79 
43 For a good overview of cases in the U.S. involving exemptions from military service, see Kent Greenawalt 
(2016), Chapter 2: “Exemptions for Military Service,” 23-46. 
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exemption from compulsory school attendance laws after the eighth grade, emphasizing it 
as a uniquely “religious” exemption that did not apply to everyone.44 The Court wrote: 
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a 
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely 
secular considerations…Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of 
their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values 
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his 
time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a 
religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than 
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religious 
Clauses.45 
Given the Court’s words here, how different, really, were Thoreau’s beliefs 
from Welsh’s? Ironically, Thoreau is being used as a contrast to the Amish in Yoder 
as a paradigmatic example of what isn’t “religious.” Yet it seems obvious that his 
“philosophical and personal” beliefs are functionally equivalent to those held by the 
conscientious objector in Welsh whose beliefs were found by the Court two years 
earlier to be religious enough to fall under the exemption statute. In Yoder, then, we 
                                                          
44 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 783 
45 Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey, and Thomas C. Berg (2011), 783; emphasis added. The position 
upheld in Yoder (1972) was unanimously reaffirmed later in Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 
833 – 34 (1989). See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983), Justice Brennan dissenting: “[I]n one 
important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause, 
religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other strongly-held 
beliefs do not.” 
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see a return back to the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal 
exemptions are those that are religious in content. 
In Seeger, the Court decided to exempt those who had a sincere and meaningful 
belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those 
admittedly qualified for the exemption. In Welsh, the Court decided to further exempt those 
who opposed war from a merely personal moral code, or those who decide that war is 
wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological, philosophical, or economic 
considerations, rather than just religious belief. And in Yoder, the Court decided that the 
beliefs and values that motivated Thoreau’s choice to live at Walden Pond were too 
philosophical and personal to be considered sufficiently religious like the claims made by 
the Amish even though his claims mirror those made by the objectors in Seeger and Welsh. 
If there was some sort of principled precedent that the courts were trying to set 
here, it is altogether unclear. Nevertheless, a few points are clear. First, these cases and 
their seemingly inconsistent verdicts highlight just how difficult it is to determine what 
exactly it might mean for some conscientious claim to be uniquely ‘religious.’ In order to be 
‘religious,’ must a belief have religious content or is religious functionality enough? Not 
only so, but even when some conscientious claim is categorized as ‘religious,’ the further 
issue of whether or not it is sufficiently religious is also nearby. This elusive line of religious 
demarcation is in question in all these cases, and one’s eligibility for these exemptions is 
always determined by where these lines end up being drawn. Second, these cases all seem 
to be operating under the same general assumption that we saw in the framing era: that 
religion and religious objections deserve special legal protections above their nonreligious 
counterparts. The central question in Seeger and Welsh was not whether or not their 
25 
 
 
conscientious objections deserved legal accommodations in their own right, but whether or 
not they were sufficiently “religious” – either in content or function – in order to qualify for 
a statutory exemption that was only allotted to religious objectors. The important question 
concerning religion’s specialness raised in the framing era is present in these cases too. 
IV. Religion’s Specialness in Contemporary Scholarship 
On today’s scene, one of the best examples of a contemporary author aiming to bring 
clarity to the sticky problem of religion’s specialness is Brian Leiter. In his book Why 
Tolerate Religion? Leiter contends – alongside other notable voices in the contemporary 
scholarship46 – that there are no good reasons to treat religious beliefs with special legal 
solicitude. His argument for this conclusion is that “[i]f there is a special reason to tolerate 
religion it has to be because there are features of religion that warrant toleration…that all 
or only religious beliefs have… [or] that other beliefs have…but [whose] possession…would 
not warrant principled toleration.”47 His argument can be summarized as follows: 
(1) If we should treat religious beliefs with comparatively special legal 
treatment, then it is because there are features of religious beliefs that 
distinguish them from other kinds of belief that warrant such treatment.  
(2) But there are no features of religious beliefs that distinguish them from 
other kinds of belief that warrant such treatment. 
(3) Therefore, we should not treat religious beliefs with comparatively 
special legal treatment.  
                                                          
46 Ronald Dworkin (2013), Micah Schwartzman (2013), Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager 
(2007); Anthony Ellis (2006) 
47 Brian Leiter (2013), 26-7 
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As other contemporary writers have done,48 Leiter advances his own account of 
‘religion’ and discusses at length what he takes to be the three most distinctive features of 
religion that “single out ‘religious’ states of mind from others.”49 The first distinctive 
feature of religion is what he calls the categoricity of religious commands, meaning that 
demands on action “must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent desires 
and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.”50 The second 
distinctive feature of religion, which he calls the insulation from evidence feature, is that 
religious beliefs generally “do not answer ultimately to evidence and reasons.”51 He calls 
the last feature of religion the existential consolation feature, which refers to the fact that 
there are some beliefs in religion that “render intelligible and tolerable basic existential 
facts about human life, such as suffering and death.”52  
With these three features of religion in place, Leiter spends the rest of his time 
looking at whether there are principled arguments, either moral or epistemic, for tolerating 
or respecting religion as such. By tolerance, Leiter doesn’t mean the practice of one group 
simply being indifferent to another group, but rather the practice of one group putting up 
with the perceivably wrong, mistaken, or undesirable beliefs, actions, etc. of another 
group.53 Moreover, his concern is with the principled grounds of state toleration as 
opposed to just interpersonal or group toleration. As noted above, Leiter concludes that 
                                                          
48 Ronald Dworkin (2013) 
49 Brian Leiter (2013), 33 
50 Brian Leiter (2013), 34 
51 Brian Leiter (2013), 34 
52 Brian Leiter (2013), 52 
53 Brian Leiter (2013), 8 
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there are no principled arguments, either moral or epistemic for specially tolerating or for 
specially respecting religious beliefs as he understands them.54 
How does he reach such a conclusion? He begins by noting that moral arguments for 
toleration usually either claim that there’s a right to the liberty to believe and practice that 
which must be tolerated, or that toleration of those beliefs and practices is “important to 
the realization of morally important goods.”55 As is the case with other moral arguments, 
these predictably divide up into Kantian and utilitarian forms. Standing in as the 
representative for the Kantian position, John Rawls explains that “toleration…follows from 
the principle of equal liberty,” which is one of the two fundamental principles of justice that 
rational persons would choose in the “original position.”56 As Leiter points out, nothing in 
Rawls’ argument, however, seems to be specific to religion such that religious beliefs would 
receive any special protection over other beliefs more generally. In fact, Leiter shows that 
Rawls’ argument is about securing the “liberty of conscience,” which would actually include 
protecting both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs.57  
                                                          
54 Brian Leiter (2013): “There are, to be sure, principled arguments for why the state ought to tolerate a 
plethora of private choices and conscientious commitments…but none of these single out religion for 
anything like the special treatment it is accorded in existing Western legal systems. So why tolerate religion? 
The answer in this book is: not because of anything that has to do with it being religion as such…” (7) 
55 Brian Leiter (2013), 15 
56 Brian Leiter (2013), 15 
57 Brian Leiter (2013): “Indeed, Rawls repeatedly lumps religious and moral categoricity together, so that it is 
fair to say that the only thing individuals behind the veil of ignorance know is that they will accept some 
categorical demands, not that they will accept distinctively religious ones…” (55) 
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Leiter argues further that utilitarian arguments don’t obviously single out religious 
beliefs for special protection either. These kinds of arguments all share “in one form or the 
other, the core idea that it maximizes human well-being – however exactly that is to be 
understood – to protect liberty of conscience against infringement by the state.”58 As was 
the case with the Kantian argument, the liberty given to conscience would here include 
both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs.  
On the other hand, epistemic arguments for toleration emphasize the contribution 
that tolerance makes to knowledge.59 Leiter here draws from J.S. Mill, who argues that 
toleration is necessary because (a) truth-discovery (or believing what is true in the right 
kind of way) contributes to overall utility [moral premise]; and (b) truth discovery is only 
possible when differing beliefs and practices are permitted to flourish [epistemic 
premise].60 The justification Mill provides for (b) is: (i) we are fallible when it comes to 
truth-discovery; (ii) if our beliefs are partially true, then exposure to differing beliefs will 
help us to discover other parts of the whole; and (iii) if our beliefs are completely true, then 
exposure to differing beliefs will help us hold them for the right kinds of reasons and better 
confront false beliefs too.61 Via Mill, Leiter argues that tolerating this wide of a range of 
beliefs and practices as a means to truth discovery would likely not be limited to just 
religious beliefs.   
                                                          
58 Brian Leiter (2013), 17; emphasis added 
59 Brian Leiter (2013), 19 
60 Brian Leiter (2013), 19 
61 Brian Leiter (2013), 20 
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In light of his particular account of religion, Leiter wonders whether there is really 
any reason to think that the expression of beliefs that are insulated from epistemically 
relevant considerations like evidence and reasons will actually promote knowledge of the 
truth. After all, religious belief, on his account “is marked by its insulation from the only 
epistemically relevant considerations.”62 He notes that even if there was a viable epistemic 
argument for tolerating beliefs that are insulated from the “familiar standards of evidence 
reasons,” it would nonetheless fail to “help single out religious belief for special 
protection.”63 
He later becomes concerned about how potentially harmful and liberty-infringing 
these insulated categorical moral demands of religion could be to society if we continue not 
only to tolerate them, but to treat them with legal privilege as well. On this point, he writes: 
If what distinguishes religious beliefs from other important and meaningful 
beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are both insulated from 
evidence and issue in categorical demands on action, then isn’t there reason 
to worry that religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far 
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty? And might that not even 
form the basis of an argument for why there are special reasons not to 
tolerate religion?64 
If it is true that beliefs that support categorical demands that are insulated from evidence 
have potential (perhaps even a special potential) for harms to well-being, then that would 
                                                          
62 Brian Leiter (2013), 57 
63 Brian Leiter (2013), 58  
64 Brian Leiter (2013), 59 
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be reason to doubt whether any utilitarian argument for tolerating religion qua religion 
will succeed.65 
As Leiter sees it, the only possible utilitarian rationale for tolerating religion as such 
would come if we’d be willing to bite what he calls the “speculative bullet.”66 Biting this 
bullet would entail asserting both the claim that the “existential consolation functions” of 
religion would ultimately produce more utility than the harm produced by the insulated 
categorical moral demands of religion and the claim that the “preceding net gain in utility” 
would be greater than some other possible alternative way of producing existential 
consolation that doesn’t involve the “conjunction of categoricity and insulation from 
evidence.”67 “It’s not obvious,” Leiter writes “why one would bite the speculative bullet, 
absent an antecedent bias in favor of religion.”68 
Interestingly, the above points made by Leiter actually seem to lean him toward the 
conclusion that we should treat religion with special legal treatment – but in this case, with 
negative legal treatment, not positive legal treatment. Leiter stops just short of actually 
claiming that we should treat religion with some sort of special scrutiny, but it’s clear that 
he leans this direction. Remember that he accepts the antecedent to the above conditional, 
namely, that what “distinguishes religious beliefs from other important and meaningful 
beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are both insulated from evidence and 
issue in categorical demands on action.” As such, he thinks that there is, in fact, at least 
                                                          
65 Brian Leiter (2013), 61 
66 Brian Leiter (2013), 63 
67 Brian Leiter (2013), 63 
68 Brian Leiter (2013), 63 
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some reason to “worry that religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far 
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty,” and that this might “form the basis of an 
argument for why there are special reasons not to tolerate religion” barring one’s 
willingness to bit his “speculative bullet.” Leiter stops just short of the conclusion that we 
should treat religion with special scrutiny because he never takes a position on biting the 
speculative bullet – though his view is nevertheless implied. 
Regardless, if there’s no reason to tolerate religion as such, then perhaps there is 
reason to respect it. As Leiter points out,69 the term ‘respect’ can have two different senses: 
a more affirmative notion of respect70 and a more minimalistic notion of respect.71 The 
minimalistic notion of respect is satisfied when, roughly, one person gives the minimally 
appropriate consideration that is contextually required to another person. Understood in 
this way, this notion doesn’t seem to help morally differentiate religious and nonreligious 
claims of conscience any better than tolerance did. On the other hand, the affirmative 
notion of respect is satisfied when, roughly, one person admires, esteems, praises, or highly 
regards another person, their work, etc. Given these definitions, Leiter then asks whether 
there is any reason to uniquely respect religious beliefs in the affirmative sense.  
The difficulty with respect as such is that there are conceivable cases where 
someone’s religious beliefs are morally praiseworthy72 as well as cases where someone’s 
                                                          
69 Brian Leiter (2013), 68-9 
70 As in “I really respect her creativity as expressed in her photographs.”  
71 As in “You should really show some respect for them in their time of grief.”  
72 For example: when someone opposes the unfair treatment of women on uniquely religious grounds. 
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nonreligious beliefs are morally praiseworthy.73 Moreover, there are conceivable cases 
where both are morally blameworthy.74 In other words, there are times when the reasons 
for respecting religious beliefs will apply equally to nonreligious beliefs and times when 
the reasons for disrespecting religious beliefs will apply equally to nonreligious beliefs. 
Accordingly, there does not seem to be an obvious reason why we should respect one and 
not the other. 
Leiter concludes his project by considering what we should legally do if there is no 
“principled argument that picks out distinctively religious conscience as an object of special 
moral and legal solicitude.”75 “One obvious solution,” he writes, “would be to extend the 
breadth of exemptions from generally applicable laws to all claims of conscience, religious 
or not.”76 According to this commonly proposed solution – what Leiter calls the Universal 
Exemptions View – both the Sikh and rural boy from Leiter’s fictitious story could file for a 
legal exemption. Likewise, under such a legal regime, both the Christian and the Atheist in 
New York could file for an exemption from mandatory vaccine laws as well.  
Ultimately, Leiter rejects the Universal Exemptions View in favor of what he calls the 
No Exemptions View for three reasons. First, he offers a practical objection, arguing that 
instantiating a legal regime with universal exemptions for any claim of conscience – 
religious or otherwise – would “be tantamount to constitutionalizing a right to civil 
                                                          
73 For example: when someone opposes the unfair treatment of women on uniquely deontological grounds. 
74 For example: when either of them support mass infanticide on their own, unique grounds. 
75 Brian Leiter (2013), 92 
76 Brian Leiter (2013), 93 
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disobedience, a posture it is hard to imagine any legal system adopting.”77 He says that 
from a principled point of view, “there may be no difference among all the preceding claims 
of conscience, but it seems unlikely that any legal system will embrace this capacious 
approach to liberty of conscience that would involve according all these claims of 
conscience equal legal standing.”78 
Second, Leiter thinks that the Universal Exemptions View suffers from an epistemic 
problem as well. Specifically, “the specter that haunts any legal regime governing liberty of 
conscience,” Leiter thinks, is that “courts must adjudicate whether a claim of conscience is 
really a claim of conscience.”79 Whereas religions “typically have texts, doctrines, and 
commands, either written or passed down orally among many adherents” that help serve 
as a proxy for authenticity, claims of conscience usually fail to be in an analogous epistemic 
and evidential position.80 Leiter suggests that, given the unequal epistemic and evidential 
position of religious and nonreligious claims of conscience, “we should simply extend legal 
protection for liberty of conscience only to claims of conscience that are rooted in 
communal or group traditions and practices that mimic, from an evidential point of view, 
those of religious groups.”81 The objection then becomes that, under a legal regime with 
universal exemptions for all claims of conscience, we might suffer from the unacceptable 
                                                          
77 Brian Leiter (2013), 94 
78 Brian Leiter (2013), 94 
79 Brian Leiter (2013), 95-6 
80 Brian Leiter (2013), 95 
81 Brian Leiter (2013), 96. In this way, Leiter actually supports something roughly close to the view that 
beliefs that function like traditional religious beliefs in the life of their possessor are eligible for legal 
exemptions as well. 
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consequence of “treating genuine claims of conscience unequally before the law, simply 
based on how practicable it is for courts to adjudicate their genuineness, and nothing 
else.”82 
Lastly, Leiter offers a sort of third-party harm objection to the Universal Exemptions 
View, calling it the “Rousseauian worry about exemptions.”83 He explains that “exemptions 
from generally applicable laws often impose burdens on those who have no claim of 
exemptions,” and that “if general compliance with laws is necessary to promote the ‘general 
welfare’ or the ‘common good,’ then selective exemptions from those laws is a morally 
objectionable injury to the general welfare.”84 In particular, Leiter is not so much 
concerned with those exemptions that would fail to shift any sort of burden onto a third-
party, but rather on burden-shifting exemptions like those found in the conscription cases 
above. In those sorts of cases, “if those with claims of conscience against military duty are 
exempted from service, then the burden (and all the very serious risks) will fall upon those 
who either have no conscientious objection or cannot successfully establish their 
conscientious claim.”85 
Given these objections to the Universal Exemptions View, Leiter asks the following 
question: 
If there is no good moral reason to treat religious conscience as special – 
indeed, no reason (except practical and evidential) to treat communally 
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83 Brian Leiter (2013), 99 
84 Brian Leiter (2013), 99 
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sanctioned claims of  conscience as special – and if there are Rousseauian 
reasons pertaining to the general welfare for the state to enact and enforce 
its laws, then perhaps we should simply abandon the idea that there should 
be exemptions from generally applicable  laws, except when no burden-
shifting is involved?86 
So, the force of the above objections, in conjunction with his slightly amended claim that 
there is no good moral reason to treat “community sanctioned claims of conscience” as 
special, leads Leiter to believe that the best legal response is to abandon the idea that there 
should be exemptions at all from generally applicable laws – expect in cases where no 
burden is shifted to some third party. Of course, this No Exemptions position doesn’t 
necessarily imply that states could therefore pass laws silencing claims of conscience, and 
its conclusion is consistent with states pursuing neutral objectives like the safety, health, 
and well-being of its people through legislation. While it may be true that a No Exemptions 
legal regime might impose an unfortunate and unfair burden on matters of minority 
conscience, Leiter thinks that the legal alternative of Universal Exemptions is still worse. He 
remarks: “At least generally applicable laws unintentionally burden minority claims of 
conscience, whereas a regime of exemptions intentionally privileges religious claims of 
conscience, to the exclusion of others, even though there is no moral reason to do so.”87 
Lastly, Leiter considers one more passing worry about the No Exemptions View. He 
asks, “[A]re not religious claims of conscience especially resilient and fierce, especially 
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likely to provoke backlash, disobedience, and the proverbial ‘blood in the streets?’”88 In 
essence, this last worry just cites as the possible reason for uniquely tolerating religious 
claims of conscience the likeliness that they are the very ones “least likely to accede to a No 
Exemptions regime.”89 Leiter responds by simply noting that the categoricity of conscience 
beliefs are not unique to religious claimants, so anyone caught in the snares of a strong 
conscience – religious or otherwise – is likely to be the kind of person who doesn’t accede 
to this regime. That there might be some especially conscientious individuals within a 
society “constitutes no argument against the No Exemptions approach,” especially when we 
“can as little justify exemptions from generally applicable laws to ‘those most likely to 
make trouble’ as we can justify exemptions from those laws to ‘those who have religious 
claims of conscience.’”90 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I highlighted a few historical discussions concerning religion’s 
specialness. I began by detailing the account of how we ended up with Constitutional 
protections for religion but not explicitly for conscience in the US – only to show that the 
historical account is inconclusive at best. I then explained that once religion was afforded 
special legal protections, it made sense that we ended up with Court cases like Seeger and 
Welsh. While these cases would try to reverse the trend of legally privileging religious 
conscientious objectors by extending equal protections to nonreligious conscientious 
objectors, the Yoder case would incidentally end up defending the opposite position. These 
                                                          
88 Brian Leiter (2013), 131 
89 Brian Leiter (2013), 131 
90 Brian Leiter (2013), 132 
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seemingly inconsistent verdicts only served to bring our primary question back to center 
stage. I ended the chapter by giving an overview of Brain Leiter’s contemporary analysis of 
this question in order to set up an evaluation of his claims in a later chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE 
I know I’ve got a face in me / Points out all my mistakes to me / You’ve got a face on the inside 
too / Your paranoia is probably worse / I don’t know what set me off first but I know what I 
can’t stand / Everybody acts like the fact of the matter is I can’t add up to what you can / But 
everybody has a face that they hold inside / A face that awakes when I close my eyes / A face 
that watches every time they lie / A face that laughs every time they fall / It watches 
everything / So you know that when it’s time to sink or swim / That the face inside is 
watching you too / Right inside your skin / It’s like I’m paranoid lookin’ over my back / It’s 
like a whirlwind inside of my head / It’s like I can’t stop what I’m hearing within / It’s like the 
face inside is right beneath my skin. 
– Lyrics from “Papercut” by Linkin Park 
I. Introduction 
My goal in this chapter is to develop and defend an account of conscience against 
competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness 
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed, 
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji – a key historian of philosophy working 
within the history of ethics. The account that I defend is not an attempt to define a neat and 
tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an attempt to 
capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I formulate an 
account of ‘conscience,’ I then compare, contrast, and defend this account of conscience 
against common, competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion 
of the concept. I end the chapter by comparing and contrasting this historically grounded 
account of conscience with a more conservative Christian account of conscience given that 
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the majority of religious individuals in the United States engaging with these pertinent 
questions are Christian. 
II. The Birth of Conscience: The First 600 Years 
Accounts detailing the historicity of the concept of conscience within the Western 
tradition have often begun with the Hebrew Old Testament, citing stories involving well-
known figures such as King David.91 Though the Ancient Hebrews lacked a specific word 
for conscience, it is nevertheless evident that they had the concept.92 In Psalm 51, for 
example, we see David caught up in the snares of a guilty conscience, lamenting his sinful 
decision to both commit adultery with Bathsheba and order the wrongful death of her 
husband Uriah: 
Be gracious to me, O God, according to Your lovingkindness; according to the 
greatness of Your compassion blot out my transgressions. Wash me 
thoroughly from my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin. For I know my 
transgressions, and my sin is ever before me. Against You, You only, I have 
sinned and done what is evil in Your sight, so that You are justified when You 
speak and blameless when You judge. Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, 
and in sin my mother conceived me. Behold, You desire truth in 
the innermost being, and in the hidden part You will make me know wisdom. 
Purify me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter 
than snow. Make me to hear joy and gladness, let the bones which You have 
broken rejoice. Hide Your face from my sins and blot out all my iniquities. 
                                                          
91 Richard Sorabji (2014), 11; John Cottingham (2013), 731 
92 Modern Hebrew has since introduced the term ‘matzpun’ to denote the concept of conscience. 
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Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me. Do 
not cast me away from Your presence and do not take Your Holy Spirit from 
me. Restore to me the joy of Your salvation and sustain me with a willing 
spirit. Then I will teach transgressors Your ways, and sinners 
will be converted to You. Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God, the God of 
my salvation; then my tongue will joyfully sing of Your righteousness. O 
Lord, open my lips, that my mouth may declare Your praise. For You do not 
delight in sacrifice, otherwise I would give it; You are not pleased with burnt 
offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite 
heart, O God, You will not despise.93  
As historian of philosophy Richard Sorabji points out, most of the examples highlighted 
from the Hebrew Old Testament, including Psalm 51, “used for conscience only the general 
word for heart, the seat of many different emotions.”94  
 John Cottingham argues that three key features of conscience can be readily gleaned 
from a reading Psalm 51. “First,” he claims that conscience involves “a directing inwards by 
the subject of the kind of disapproval characteristically felt at the untoward behavior of 
another.”95 As the language of the Psalm demonstrates, David is directing a disapproving 
attitude toward his own self once he reflects upon the behaviors done to both Bathsheba 
and Uriah. “Second, it is linked to remorse and repentance, which is in turn made possible 
                                                          
93 Psalm 51:1-17, NASB. For more on the story of David, Bathsheba, and Uriah see 2 Samuel 11.  
94 Richard Sorabji (2014), 11 
95 John Cottingham (2013), 731 
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by a deepening both of self-awareness and empath.”96 Cottingham notes that, once David is 
confronted for his by the prophet Nathan, his “previously shallow grasp of the significance 
of his actions was altered under the imaginative stimulus of being presented with a vivid 
analogue of his own conduct, which made him start to appreciate how being treated in such 
a way would feel for the victim.”97 Lastly, Cottingham notes that “the required response is 
not simply implanted from the outside by the prophet’s condemnation but is partly elicited 
from within.”98 Once the prophet Nathan lifts some of David’s “emotional and cognitive 
barriers” by having him identify with the characters of a parable, “it is David’s own 
conscience that convicts him.”99 
Just like the Ancient Hebrews, the Early Greeks likewise failed to have a specific 
term for conscience, but this did not mean that they lacked the concept. In fact, Sorabji 
contends that early Greeks “equally have supplied examples of moral conscience without 
[invoking] the word.”100 The basic conceptual expression that eventually came to be the 
standard term for conscience began to appear earliest in the Greek playwrights of the fifth 
century BC.101 This basic expression involved the metaphor of one sharing knowledge with 
oneself, usually of a moral defect, as though one were split into two. The metaphor explains 
that when we possess knowledge of a moral defect, or possess a guilty conscience, it feels 
                                                          
96 John Cottingham (2013), 731 
97 John Cottingham, (2013), 731. See 2 Samuel 12:1-23 for the rebuke that Nathan gives to David. 
98 John Cottingham, (2013), 731 
99 John Cottingham, (2013), 731 
100 Richard Sorabji (2014), 11; 15-30 contains examples from Aristophanes, Euripides, Sophocles, Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Cicero. 
101 Richard Sorabji (2014), 11-12 
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like we’re split in two and composed of two people: “one of them knows of the defect but is 
keeping it a secret; the other shares the secret – in cases of moral conscience, a guilty 
one.”102 Another common expression similarly detailing the nature of a guilty conscience is 
found in the phrase “I could not live with myself.”103 Over time, who or what it is that the 
guilty knowledge was shared with would predictably vary. Despite this, Sorabji argues that 
the meaning of the conscience metaphor “is at first unambiguous” and standardly “involves 
one’s own knowledge of one’s own fault.”104  
By contrast, possessing a clear conscience implies not sharing knowledge with 
oneself of a moral defect, or simply failing to possess guilty knowledge altogether. This, 
however, shouldn’t be confused with the idea of sharing knowledge with oneself of a moral 
merit, or “sharing knowledge with ourselves of being practitioners of noble and good 
works.”105 So, we might say that there are three basic states of conscience: sharing 
knowledge with oneself of a moral defect (the guilty conscience), failing to share 
knowledge with oneself of a moral defect (the clear conscience), and sharing knowledge 
with oneself of a moral merit (the joyful conscience).106  
As noted above, this basic metaphor was eventually expressed terminologically – 
“by a particular form of the [Greek] verb for knowing, suneidenai, to share (sun-) 
knowledge (eidenai), coupled with the reflexive pronoun in the dative (e.g., heautoi 
                                                          
102 Richard Sorabji (2014), 12  
103 James F. Childress (1979), 315-35  
104 Richard Sorabji (2014), 12; C.A. Pierce (1955), 38 
105 Richard Sorabji (2014), 15 
106 Richard Sorabji (2014), 30. Sorabji points out that when Cicero speaks of sharing knowledge of merit, he 
also speaks of a correspondingly joyful conscience. 
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[oneself]).”107 This Greek idiom concerning conscience would fortunately translate 
seamlessly into Latin. The con- in the Latin noun conscientia is a simple translation of the 
Greek sun- and the scientia is a simple translation of the Greek eidesis. Thus, in Latin: con + 
scientia = conscientia (sharing knowledge with oneself). As Sorabji points out, it was “[b]y 
strange good fortune [that] a literal translation, not a paraphrase, of the Greek term was 
used.”108 And with such a seamless translation, Latin thus “avoided importing its own 
presuppositions into the very choice of word.”109 
As with most concepts, conscience would develop, mature, and be pruned through 
time. For example, though the concept of conscience started off as merely sharing 
knowledge with oneself of a past moral defect, it would later include knowledge of what 
would put one at fault in the future as well. Some like St. Paul argued that the conscience 
was intimately tied, though not identical to, a general moral law existing in our hearts. The 
conscience would draw from this moral law in order to accuse or excuse our behaviors in 
the present and would also act as the agency responsible for witnessing to God concerning 
our fidelity to this law after death.110 Moreover, the conscience was normally understood, 
especially in Christian circles, as fallible in its endeavors. Thus, in being open to error, 
conscience is best understood as a belief that may or may not amount to genuine 
                                                          
107 Richard Sorabji (2014), 12 
108 Richard Sorabji (2014), 14 
109 Richard Sorabji (2014), 14 
110 Richard Sorabji (2014), 34 
44 
 
 
knowledge.111 In time conscience became “a belief about what it was, or would be, wrong 
or not wrong for one to do or not to do” – and this applied to one’s past or future attitudes 
as well.112 Additionally, the conscience came to be ascribed with motivating force even 
though it was admittedly a belief, and thus cognitive in nature. Sorabji explains that we can 
understand this marriage of affection and cognition in the beliefs of conscience if we 
understand how “rational knowledge of evaluative propositions about what is or is not 
wrong can itself be motivating, for example, if I know that some action to which I am 
tempted or which I have performed is wrong.”113  
In summary, Sorabji thinks that the “first six hundred years of the development of 
the idea of moral conscience identified some attributes which remained comparatively 
stable features over the next two thousand years.”114 These eight, core features – some of 
which clearly overlap with the features of Cottingham’s analysis of Psalm 51 – are as 
follows:115 
                                                          
111 Richard Sorabji, (2014), 35. Sorabji defines the conscience as “a person’s belief about what actions or 
attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the future, wrong for him to adopt or not adopt in a particular 
situation.” However, he also claims that conscience could just be “the capacity for such beliefs. The beliefs 
may be the things believed or the believing of them.” (215) In the remainder of the dissertation, I aim to split 
the difference between these two approaches by understanding conscience as the capacity that produces such 
beliefs and identifying conscience beliefs with such beliefs.  
112 Richard Sorabji (2014), 35 
113 Richard Sorabji (2014), 35 
114 Richard Sorabji (2014), 36 
115 Richard Sorabji (2014), 36 
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(1) Conscience is a form of personal self-awareness that is not invariably an 
awareness of others. 
(2) Conscience draws on values not necessarily shared by others. 
(3) Conscience originally involved the idea of a person split into two, with one 
self-hiding a guilty secret, and the other self-sharing it. The idea of conscience 
as involving a split person was to recur in different forms and with different 
rationales in Adam Smith, in Kant, and in Freud, and is found in the 
expression “I could not live with myself.” 
(4) The original function of the conscience was retrospective, but very soon 
prospective functions developed and all of these were retained.  
(5) Although conscience drew on general values, it was very much concerned 
with what was or would be wrong for the particular individual in a particular 
context.  
(6) The concept of conscience started off secular, originating in the Greek 
playwrights of the fifth century BCE, and remains capable of being secular. 
(7) Conscience was traditionally viewed in Christianity as fallible.  
(8) Though a belief and hence cognitive in character, conscience nonetheless 
had motivating force. 
III. Two Major Deviations 
Sorabji contends that, even though the concept of conscience has been subject to 
various interpretations since its genesis – including “the recent secularization of 
conscience,” – it nevertheless does “not necessarily require all that many revisions” from 
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the original picture.116 Though the history of the concept of conscience reveals two 
“prolonged deviations” from its basic structure in the first 600 years, these deviations 
fortunately “did not last indefinitely.”117 
A. Conscience and Synderesis 
The first deviation was “the need to accommodate synderesis alongside conscience, 
which made one difference if synderesis took over the motivational role from conscience, or 
another difference if it relegated conscience to the act of drawing a conclusion rather than 
holding a belief.”118 The second deviation “was the idea that conscience was a sentiment of 
approval or disapproval, or even a sensation of pain, rather than a belief or capacity for 
belief about what conduct or attitude was or would be wrong for one, a belief that might 
cause sentiments or pain.”119 
 The first deviation was most prominent in the Middle Ages and arguably stemmed 
from Origen’s interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision of the four-faced creatures in Ezekiel 
1:10.120 The creatures in this passage are described as having the face of a human, lion, ox, 
and eagle – and Origen interpreted the first three faces as corresponding to the three parts 
of Plato’s tripartite soul (rational, spirited, and appetitive parts).121 Whereas Origen 
interpreted the fourth part as “the human’s spirit (spiritus) presiding over the other 
                                                          
116 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215 
117 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215 
118 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215 
119 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215 
120 Ezekiel 1:10 NASB – 10 Their faces looked like this: Each of the four had the face of a human being, and on 
the right side each had the face of a lion, and on the left the face of an ox; each also had the face of an eagle. 
121 Richard Sorabji (2014), 59 
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three,”122 Jerome would later “refer the eagle to a fourth part, for which the Greeks have a 
name, and which is the ‘spark of conscience’ by which we recognize that we are sinning.”123 
So Jerome, likely drawing upon Origen and his followers, mistakenly distinguished between 
conscience (conscientia) and the spark of conscience (synderesis).  
 Bonaventure would later distinguish between conscientia and synderesis as well, 
where the basis of his distinction was that conscience played a more cognitive role and 
synderesis played a more affective role. Similarly, Aquinas would distinguish between 
conscience and synderesis, but would give them different functions. For Aquinas, 
synderesis supplied universal premises from the natural law and was “never mistaken, but 
in effect infallible.”124 Conscience, on the other hand, was simply the “act of applying the 
universal premise to a particular situation.” 125 As opposed to Bonavanture, Aquinas would 
grant conscience “no less than synderesis motivational force,” believing that synderesis 
“warns, inclines, incites, and deters” and that conscience “can prospectively prod, urge, or 
bind, and retrospectively accuse or cause remorse.”126 Ultimately, William of Ockham 
would later dispense of synderesis on the basis of his famous Ockham’s Razor – a trend that 
was upheld by the Protestant reformers Luther (at least beyond 1519) and Calvin.127 
                                                          
122 Richard Sorabji (2014), 59 
123 Richard Sorabji (2014), 59 
124 Richard Sorabji (2014), 63 
125 Richard Sorabji (2014), 63-4 
126 Richard Sorabji (2014), 64 
127 Richard Sorabji (2014), 66. Luther never mentioned synderesis after 1519 and Calvin never mentioned it in 
his Institutes.  
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 Sorabji thinks that “the division of labor” between synderesis and conscience is 
simply “not needed for the purpose of explaining motivation.”128 He writes:  
For knowledge or belief is itself motivating, provided it is the knowledge or 
belief that some action would, or would not, be wrong for one to perform in 
an expected situation calling for decision. Bonaventure has found a task for 
synderesis to perform, but if I am right, the task could have been performed 
without it.129 
For this reason, Sorabji thinks that St. Paul’s simpler distinction between “the law in our 
hearts with its general knowledge of right and wrong [and] the conscience that accused or 
excused us as individuals” had supplied all that was needed.130 Additionally, Sorabji objects 
to Aquinas’ account insofar as it is just not true that “we have a disposition to recognize the 
law infallibly.”131 St. Paul, Origen, nor Augustine “thought that conscience made us 
infallible,” and Sorabji agrees alongside them that “humans are not infallible.”132 
Unfortunately, Aquinas’ account implies this, though narrowly. 
B. Conscience as Sentiment 
The second deviation was “the idea that conscience was a sentiment of approval or 
disapproval, or even a sensation of pain, rather than a belief or capacity for belief about 
what conduct or attitude was or would be wrong for one, a belief that might cause 
                                                          
128 Richard Sorabji (2014), 61 
129 Richard Sorabji (2014), 61. See Paul Thagard and Tracy Finn (2012) where conscience is described as “a 
kind of moral intuition” that is “both cognitive and emotional.” (156, 168) 
130 Richard Sorabji (2014), 65-6 
131 Richard Sorabji (2014), 65-6 
132 Richard Sorabji (2014), 66 
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sentiments or pain.”133 This deviation can trace its roots back to the views of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century moral sentimentalists like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume – in 
addition to the later English philosopher Mill. Shaftesbury, for example, argued that we 
have “a natural sense of right and wrong,” emphasizing that “our sense of right and wrong 
is a sense.”134 Hutcheson would agree with Shaftesbury, commonly speaking of “moral 
sentiment, and of the moral sense, which is pleased or displeased by good or evil.”135 
Likewise, Hume also spoke of a “moral sense and connected conscience with passion instead 
of reason.”136 Mill would end up defining “the essence of conscience” as a “feeling in our own 
mind; a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty,” implying that Mill also 
thought about conscience as a sensation.137 
                                                          
133 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215 
134 Richard Sorabji (2014), 168-69. Sorabji also points out here that “Shaftesbury thinks it horridly offensive 
and odious to a rational creature to have the ‘Reflection in his Mind of any unjust Action or Behaviour, which 
he knows to be naturally odious or non-deserving,’ and this state of mind is what he thinks it properly called 
conscience.” (168) 
135 Richard Sorabji (2014), 168-69 
136 Richard Sorabji (2014), 169. See David Hume (2007): “Reason is wholly inactive and can never be the 
source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.” (295; bk. 3, pt. 1, sec. 1, par. 10) 
137 Richard Sorabji (2014), 169. See Mill (1998): “The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty 
may be, is one and the same – a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of 
duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an 
impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with 
some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of 
Conscience;…[Conscience’s] binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must 
be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate 
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 Contrary to the sentimentalists and Mill, Sorabji sees this position – that conscience 
is essentially a sentiment or sensation, not a belief or capacity for beliefs – as not only a 
derivation from the original concept, but a misguided view in its own right. Sorabji argues 
that a “sensation can indeed motivate, but if conscience is only a sensation, it will 
presumably be produced by value judgments about wrong, which are now no longer 
incorporated within conscience itself.”138 From Antiquity through the Middle Ages, the 
“bites of conscience” were understood as a mere “effect of bad conscience, with bad 
conscience itself being a belief about one’s wrongdoing.”139 Thus, relegating conscience to a 
mere sensation would amount to equating it with what was once understood as an effect 
that it produced. Even if one believes that conscience gives rise to sentiments and 
sensations of approval or disapproval (as Sorabji does) “such a sentiment will presumably 
be an effect of value judgments about wrong or not wrong which caused the sentiments.”140 
 It’s worth noting that in the eighteenth century, especially through Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, our moral sense was understood as independent of our knowledge of God.141 In 
this way, the concept of conscience started to become, as it was with the early Greeks, an 
areligious, secular concept once again. Shaftesbury argued, for example, that our moral 
sense is “not due to knowledge of God, but is in us before we acquire any knowledge of God, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we 
have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it.” (74-75; ch. 3, sec. 4) 
138 Richard Sorabji (2014), 169 
139 Richard Sorabji (2014), 169 
140 Richard Sorabji (2014), 169 
141 Richard Sorabji (2014), 168, 185 
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or of his rewards and punishments.”142 Hutcheson followed suit, arguing that our moral 
sense senses moral good and evil, and responds to it “independently of any self-interest, 
including self-interest in God’s reward or punishment, and independently of any desire to 
follow his will.”143 Sorabji notes that these were some of the earliest steps toward the 
resecularization of the concept of conscience – though Hutcheson “allowed that religious 
reading and belief can confirm our moral sense.”144 While Joseph Butler and Adam Smith 
utilized arguments in the rehabilitation of conscience that secularists could adopt, they 
were themselves not secularists.145 “By the end of the [eighteenth] century,” Sorbaji notes, 
the resecularization was basically complete insofar as “Kant was able to describe 
conscience independently of God’s objective existence.”146 
IV. The Core Concept of Conscience 
“The core conception of conscience,” Sorabji writes, “which I have found to be most 
influential contains the following ideas:” 
(1) It is a person’s belief about what actions or attitudes had been in the past, 
or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt 
in a particular situation. It could also be the capacity for such beliefs. The 
beliefs may be the things believed or the believing of them. 
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144 Richard Sorabji (2014), 168 
145 Richard Sorabji (2014), 185 
146 Richard Sorabji (2014), 168 
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(2) The beliefs require personal self-awareness and are in the first instance 
beliefs about what would be wrong for oneself. 
(3) Conscience is motivating because it is a value belief about what was or 
would be wrong for oneself. It can therefore cause both sentiments of 
approval or disapproval and painful or comforting sensations. 
(4) This connection with being in the wrong accounts for the force of, and 
respect for, conscience of others, for no one wants to be in the wrong. We do 
not have to look for something contingently and variably connected, such as 
its sometimes being central to people’s identity, or causing intensity of 
feeling, or contributing to self-direction. 
(5) Conscience is acquired, not innate, not present from birth. 
(6) It draws on values which need not take the form of laws, but which are in 
danger of reflecting merely local convention, and therefore require constant 
reflection and awareness of other values. 
(7) It is not the voice of God, and its value does not depend on whether the 
values derive from God. 
(8) It is not infallible. 
(9) Conscience creates an obligation, but not always an overriding obligation, 
since there can be counter-obligations, so that one is in a double bind, wrong 
if one does follow conscience and wrong if one does not. 
(10) Freedom of conscience is the absence, within limits, of forcible 
constraint by authority not only on one’s value beliefs, but also on the actions 
which those value beliefs forbid or require. 
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(11) Freedom of conscience is a narrower term than toleration. Toleration 
can be recommended on many grounds besides the desirability of freedom of 
conscience, such as the need for peace. 
(12) Freedom of religion is not the same as freedom of conscience, but the 
two overlap and many of the same arguments can be given for both. 
Conscience, however, can be secular, and there are some advantages in its 
being so. 
(13) Freedom of conscience has different meanings.147 
Other chapters will focus more on the above features that relate to conscience’s 
value and legal status. In what follows, I will focus on the features that have more to 
do with conscience’s particular nature, focusing on the legal implications of its 
nature in later chapters.  
 First, Sorabji argues that we should understand conscience not as the supplier of our 
values, but instead as the applier of our values.148 In this way, conscience is actually a value-
neutral capacity insofar as it applies our values – whatever they might be and however we 
came to hold them – to our actions or attitudes to produce beliefs about how they measure 
                                                          
147 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215-16 
148 Richard Sorabji (2014): “It is not conscience (at least not conscience in the core sense) that has to supply 
our values in the first place. St. Paul ascribes the inner law to God; a secular view should agree that conscience 
is never the original source of our values, even though particular decisions of conscience can lead to new 
reflection on general values, without being their original source. Conscience rather applies values to the 
conduct and thoughts of the individual.” (218) 
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up to those values.149 If this is true, then perhaps a differentiating feature of the religious 
conscience is that is applies different or else additional values typically emphasized in or 
derived from religious texts, institutions, or traditions in order to produce beliefs about our 
actions or attitudes. In short, a religious conscience may be demarcated by its application of 
uniquely religious values to produce uniquely religious conscience beliefs. An example of a 
uniquely religious value might be maintaining a positive relationship with the divine. The 
corresponding religious conscience beliefs would therefore reference the rightness of 
corresponding actions and attitudes. Thus, a basic account of the religious conscience likely 
involves a conscience applying uniquely religious values to our actions and attitudes in 
order to produce beliefs about how our actions and attitudes measure up to the standards 
that the values seemingly imply.  
 You might suspect that the values emphasized in religious texts, institutions, or 
traditions are not necessarily that different from those emphasized in nonreligious texts, 
institutions, or traditions. That is, you might think that religious and nonreligious values 
are not altogether that dissimilar. For example, both a Quaker and a Pacifist would be 
objecting to the draft on conscientious grounds if they did so because they believed that 
being drafted would force them to participate in violence and that participating in violence 
would be wrong for them to do. However, though their norms are evidently the same – i.e., 
                                                          
149 Yossi Neushtan (2011a) points out the following concerning conscientious objections to laws: “…the 
conscientious objector seeks an exemption from the law not because of his status (as is sometimes the case 
with ‘general’ constitutional exemptions). Rather he seeks an exemption from the law because he holds and 
alternative set of basic values or an alternative way of balancing basic values that derive from his conscience 
and conflicts with the ends, the means, or the values of a specific law.” (143-44) 
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that one shouldn’t participate in or facilitate violent actions – the equivalence of their 
underlying values remains open. Where their values may differ could be in how they are 
conceived: the Quaker would likely understand the value underlying their actions as having 
its origin in some religious source, narrative, or worldview whereas the Pacifist might 
understand the value underlying their actions as having its origin in some altogether 
different source, narrative, or worldview. Functionally, these values might produce the 
same sort of actions and behaviors from different people, and this may lead us to 
understand the values as more or less the same. But I think this would be mistaken: while 
the norms of the Quaker and Pacifist might be indistinguishable, the values are simply not 
in virtue of the fact that each person conceives of their value differently. The separate 
question of whether or not this difference, if true, should amount to differential treatment 
before the law will be addressed in a later chapter. 
 Second, the values that conscience applies need not “take the form of laws” – in the 
way that they do with St. Paul, for example150 – but are nevertheless “in danger of reflecting 
local convention, and therefore require constant reflection and awareness of other values.” 
Incidentally, Sorabji thinks that this is the greatest criticism against conscience: that the 
values it applies to our actions are derived from custom or superstition.151 In response to 
this proposed criticism, we can say two things. First, we can highlight the fact that the value 
of conscience – especially its legal value – need not be tied to the truthfulness of the beliefs 
                                                          
150 Romans 2:14-15 NASB – 14 For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the 
Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, 15 in that they show the work of the Law written in 
their hearts, their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them. 
151 Richard Sorabji (2014), 220 
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it produces. Instead, the value of conscience could just lie in merely possessing the capacity. 
The content-independent value of conscience is supported when we stop to consider not 
whether conscience reliably produces the right beliefs, but rather when we stop and think 
about someone who altoghether fails to possess the capacity to form any such beliefs.152 
Second, we can recommend education and cultural exposure to help us reflect upon – and 
hopefully correct – our accustomed and superstitious values. Without free discussion, even 
our true opinions remain accustomed or superstitious, and even when we retain our views 
after education and exposure, our understanding of them will transform.153 In this way, 
then, “it is up to us” whether or not our moral values depend on custom or superstition.154 
 Third, Sorabji argues that “freedom of religion is not the same as freedom of 
conscience, but the two overlap and many of the same arguments can be given for both.” 
This means that Sorabji straightforwardly adopts something like the overlapping view – and 
given the historical account of conscience articulated above – perhaps for good reason. We 
should consider, then, that a general freedom of conscience would only protect conscience 
beliefs – religious or otherwise – but would fail to likewise protect non-conscience beliefs. 
Crucially, this means that a separate freedom of religion would also be necessary if we 
wanted to protect the other kinds of religious beliefs; after all, not all religious beliefs are 
religious conscience beliefs. Of course, there are religious beliefs that are not conscience 
beliefs, but instead something like ontological beliefs concerning the sorts of things that are 
                                                          
152 Richard Sorabji (2014): “When we consider such an absence of the capacity to make judgments of right 
and wrong…we can hardly doubt that it is a desirable capacity for humans.” (220) 
153 Richard Sorabji (2014), 223 
154 Richard Sorabji (2014), 223 
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real,155 epistemological beliefs concerning the sorts of things we can know,156 and so on. 
Therefore, given their difference in scope, “freedom of conscience should therefore be 
recognized as a claim independent of freedom of religion.”157 
 Because conscience is a secular concept whose scope includes both religious and 
nonreligious beliefs, it is right to understand religion and conscience as two separate 
concepts that can sometimes overlap. Accordingly, it is plausible to adopt the overlapping 
view, which claims neither religious beliefs nor conscience beliefs – and thus freedom of 
religion nor freedom of conscience – are conceptually contained within the other. Instead, 
they should be understood as two separate sets of beliefs that sometimes overlap.158 
Relatedly, Sorabji thinks that emphasizing the secularity of conscience – and thus its 
conceptual distinctiveness from religion – can actually be advantageous for both 
conscience and religion. “One possible benefit of resecularization,” he writes, “is that it may 
reduce dogmatism about one’s own values, if we do not believe in a God-given law in our 
                                                          
155 For example: whether Theism is true, or whether materialism is false, or whether abstract objects exist, 
etc. 
156 For example: whether we can know that Jesus is the Son of God, whether we are one of God’s elect, etc.   
157 Richard Sorabji (2014), 201. Sorabji adds: “But equally freedom of religion needs independent recognition. 
For as Andrew Koppelman has pointed out, claims for exemptions based on religion do not always involve 
conscience.  His examples include those who wished to take up the smoking of a dangerous drug, peyote, as a 
religious sacrament of their ethnic group. People might legitimately want a religious exemption for an 
outward practice that made them feel closer to God. Other religious people again had appealed to enlarge a 
religious building into a restricted area, or to avoid a logging road obliterating their only available place of 
worship. Religion could not easily be protected in these cases by an appeal to freedom of conscience.” (201) 
158 Christopher Lund (2017): “Religion and moral conscience are not nested categories. Instead, they are 
overlapping but distinct, like circles in a Venn diagram.” (506) 
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hearts, and it may encourage us to revise mistaken values.”159 Sorabji thinks that any sort 
of legal regime that aims to protect conscience – especially one that might be operating 
within a climate of religious pluralism – would need a conception of conscience that is 
“itself secular enough to be open between different religious beliefs” such that the concept 
can be used “in considering claims for protection independently of any particular religious 
views.”160 This, of course, would not imply that such a regime would commit itself to 
protecting every sincere belief, however disruptive.”161 
V. Competing Conceptions of Conscience 
In what follows, I will contrast the above view of conscience against some 
competing notions of conscience present in the contemporary discussion of the concept. 
A. Quasi-Religion and Quasi-Conscience 
The first competing notion that I will focus on is the tendency to define conscience 
so broadly such that what is described as ‘conscience’ ends up being more appropriately 
labeled as quasi-conscience. That is, the tendency is to define ‘conscience’ too broadly and 
to assign it features that have not been historically attributed to the concept. Interestingly, 
this trend of broadly defining conscience mimics a tendency to broadly define religion in 
the same sort of way such that what is described as ‘religion’ ends up being something 
more akin to quasi-religion.  
                                                          
159 Richard Sorabji (2014), 219 
160 Richard Sorabji (2014), 219. To illustrate what can go wrong when one fails to have a secular concept of 
conscience, Sorabji points to Origen: “The concept of conviction or faith (pistis) in Origen was so unsecularized 
that heretical belief was called credulity rather than conviction.” (219) 
161 Richard Sorabji (2014), 219 
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 Remember that in the Seeger and Welsh cases, for example, the Court ended up 
treating nonreligious conscience beliefs as quasi-religious conscience beliefs so that they 
might qualify for the statutory exemption whose scope was narrowly written. What was 
evidently not a religious belief ended up being classified as such because it occupied “a 
place parallel to” traditional religious beliefs in the life of their possessor.162 As such, these 
Court decisions overturned the view that the only sorts of beliefs that are eligible for legal 
exemptions are those that are religious in content and instead supported the view that 
beliefs that function like traditional religious beliefs in the life of their possessor are eligible 
for legal exemptions as well. In so-doing, these decisions effectively expanded concepts like 
‘religion’ or ‘religious beliefs’ into something like quasi-religion or quasi-religious beliefs.   
 Oddly enough, this trend of defining religion so broadly such that it ends up being 
understood as something more like quasi-religion continues on into the contemporary 
literature as well. Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis, for example, argue that ‘religion’ 
consists of “efforts to align your life with the truth about whatever transcendent source (or 
sources) of being, meaning, and value there might be” and “efforts to honor or find 
harmony with that source – call it the ‘divine.’”163 As one can imagine, overly broad 
definitions of religion like this are problematic for at least a few reasons – some of which 
are more or less mirrored in overly broad definitions of conscience too. First, Anderson and 
                                                          
162 Incidentally, Richard Sorabji (2014) notes that “the difficulty of stretching the meaning of religious belief 
until it becomes quasi-religious has certainly supplied one good reason for [redressing the omission of 
freedom of conscience in the First Amendment].” (205, fn. 7) Perhaps this offers some explanation for why 
the conceptual move from religion to quasi-religion preceded the move from conscience to quasi-conscience. 
163 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2107), 131 
60 
 
 
Girgis’ definition seems underinclusive in important ways. In defining religion as the effort 
to align our lives with some transcendent source (or sources), they are being needlessly 
narrow. Most likely, such a definition of religion would counterintuitively exclude some of 
the most prominent Eastern religions like Buddhism and Confucianism due to their 
naturalistic leanings.  
 Second, their definition seems overinclusive in important ways. Girgis and Anderson 
argue that people are engaged in religious activities when they make efforts to align, honor, 
or find harmony with the transcendent source of being, meaning, and value that there 
might be – thus explaining why agnostics, atheists, and anti-theists are considered religious 
under their definition.164 But this criterion of religion seems problematic insofar as these 
last three groups would likely understand themselves as nonreligious or even anti-religious. 
So, if Girgis and Anderson’s definition of religion concludes that self-identified nonreligious 
and antireligious individuals are religious, then it seems problematic. Moreover, atheists, 
agnostics, and anti-theists might just simply deny any sort of transcendent source of 
ultimate value and meaning – and Anderson and Girgis even say as much. But we should 
note that with these sorts of individuals, there would therefore be no source(s) of being, 
meaning, and value – nothing “divine” – with which to align their life, honor, or find 
harmony with. Thus, it seems like their definition must include doing more than just 
aligning, honoring, or finding harmony with some transcendent source and would have to 
include something like aligning, honoring, or finding harmony with the truth about the 
                                                          
164 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 131. Anderson and Girgis write: “Even those 
who end up atheist or agnostic are compelled to search by a sense of the value of achieving harmony with 
whatever ultimate source of meaning there might be.” (131) 
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absence of anything divine. In such cases, we’re back again to counterintuitively defining an 
individual who denies the existence of anything divine as ‘religious.’ 
Lastly, Girgis and Anderson seem to believe that these investigative efforts into this 
possible transcendent source(s) must result in something like alignment, honor, or 
harmony. This criterion also seems problematic insofar as it seems like the religious 
individual need not arrive at a position of alignment, honor, or harmony in order to be 
considered religious. For example, some individual might zealously look for the 
transcendent source of being, meaning, and value that there might be, conclude that 
atheism is true, and experience disharmony as a result of this realization – and even 
dishonor this conclusion with contempt and resist aligning with it. Additionally, it would 
seem odd to categorize an individual that is consistently on a sort of investigative 
theological quest, working through comparative theological questions, and wrestling 
through theological conundrums – without ever coming to a final harmony or alignment 
about any of them – a nonreligious person. 
 As noted above, this trend of broadly defining religion mirrors a similar tendency to 
broadly define conscience in the same sort of way such that what is described as 
‘conscience’ ends up being something more akin to quasi-conscience. Martha Nussbaum, 
for example, claims that ‘conscience’ is “the faculty in human beings with which they search 
for life’s ultimate meaning.”165 Moreover, she notes that this faculty “is identified in part by 
                                                          
165 Martha Nussbaum (2008), 19-20. Nussbaum notes: “This faculty was held to be present in all human 
beings in such a way as to make human beings equal: anyone who has it (and all humans do) is worthy of 
boundless respect, and that respect should be equally given to high and low, male and female, to members of 
the religions one likes and also to members of religions one hates. Conscience is precious, worthy of respect, 
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what it does – it reasons, searches, and experiences emotions of longing connected to that 
search – and in part by its subject matter – it deals with ultimate questions, questions of 
ultimate meaning.”166 The first and primary objection against Nussbaum’s view is that it is 
overinclusive. Historically speaking, we’ve seen that conscience has been understood most 
fundamentally as a person’s capacity to form beliefs about what actions or attitudes had 
been in the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not 
adopt in a particular situation. Nussbaum, however, believes that conscience is instead a 
person’s capacity to form value beliefs about what is ultimately meaningful in life. Whereas 
traditional conscience beliefs have been limited to beliefs about what actions or attitudes 
might be wrong for us to adopt or not adopt, the beliefs of conscience according to 
Nussbaum are something much more than these beliefs – but it may include them. 
Nussbaum’s conscience beliefs would include any beliefs about what is or is not meaningful 
to an individual independent of what actions or attitudes they might take to be wrong or 
not wrong for them to adopt or not adopt. Beliefs about what an individual takes to be 
meaningful would likely imply or else contain conscience beliefs in the historical sense, but 
they should not be understood as the same. 
 Additionally, Nussbaum’s conscience will likely have a hard time squaring away 
with several of the historical features typically attributed to conscience. First, conscience in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but it is also vulnerable, capable of being wounded and imprisoned. The tradition [of “liberty of conscience” 
or “equal liberty of conscience”] argues that conscience, on that account, needs a protected space around it 
within which people can pursue their search for life’s meaning (or not pursue it, if they choose). Government 
should guarantee that protected space.” (19) 
166 Martha Nussbaum (2008), 168-69 
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the historical sense is understood to be the applier and not the supplier of our values. 
Nussbaum’s conscience seems to reverse this role: conscience now seems to be the 
capacity that primarily supplies our values – or something like our answers to these 
questions of ultimate meaning. Second, whereas conscience in the historical sense creates 
obligations for its possessor, Nussbaum’s conscience fails to do as much. Perhaps we could 
understand Nussbaum’s conscience as derivatively producing hypothetical imperatives 
given whatever answers to these questions of ultimate meaning that it produces. But even 
if we stretch this far, it seems like Nussbaum’s conscience falls short of producing the 
strong, overriding obligations that we see in the historical description.  
 Third, conscience in the historical sense actively judges your actions or attitudes, 
confirms whether our actions or attitudes measure up to our values, and delivers acquittals 
or accusations as a result.  As the capacity to just generally “search for life’s ultimate 
meaning,” Nussbaum’s conscience falls comparably short of conscience’s historical 
description here as well. Nussbaum doesn’t seem to ascribe to conscience the same, 
traditional cognitive roles of measurer, judger, accuser, acquitter, etc. Lastly, conscience in 
the historical sense – in addition to possessing a multi-faceted cognitive role – also 
possesses a multi-faceted affective role. Specifically, the conscience in the historical sense 
can share knowledge with oneself of a moral defect and produce guilt or remorse, share 
knowledge with oneself of a moral merit and produce something like pride or joy, or fail to 
share knowledge with oneself of a moral defect or merit and produce something like a 
sense of relief. In short, the historical notion of conscience produces more than just 
“emotions of longing” connected to a search for ultimate meaning or value. In this way, 
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perhaps Nussbaum’s conscience is, generally speaking, affectively much nicer and kinder to 
its possessor than its historical depiction. 
B. Conscience as Volitional Necessity 
Lastly, we should note a further definitional trend in the literature on conscience – 
namely, the tendency to define conscience as “volitional necessity.” Andrew Koppelman, for 
example, argues that “conscience” is “an imprecise word for [the] internal compulsion to 
act that is specified only by the possessor’s internal psychology.”167 He thinks a better term 
for conscience is what Harry Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity.”168 Frankfurt defines 
someone who is bound by volitional necessity as someone who is “unable to form a 
determined and effective intention – regardless of what motives or reasons he may have 
for doing so – to perform (or to refrain from performing) the action that is at issue.”169 
Accordingly, Koppelman thinks that an individual in the grip of a volitional necessity – and 
so in the grip of conscience by his definition – “cares about something so wholeheartedly 
that he cannot form an intention to act in a way that is inconsistent with that care.”170 This 
suggests that volitional necessities are demands that someone feels like they must do 
because they “care about something so wholeheartedly.” 
The conception of conscience sketched above differs from Koppelman and 
Frankfurt’s account of volitional necessity in at least two important ways. First, since 
conscience beliefs are perceived obligations, we can understand them as demands that 
                                                          
167 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 234 
168 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 234 
169 Harry Frankfurt (2006), 46 
170 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 216; emphasis added 
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someone believes they must perform. However, conscience beliefs differ from volitional 
necessities in that the demands of the former must be satisfied even if the individual does 
not desire or “care” about performing the demand at all. Overall, this means that desire and 
duty are largely separable within the demands of conscience but not so separable within 
volitional necessities. Put another way, volitional necessities are demarcated by second-
order desires – or “desires about desires”171 – such that we not only desire to do X, but we 
also desire to desire to do X. Demands of conscience, on the contrary, just tell us that we 
ought to do X – regardless of whether we actually desire to do X or not. Whereas the 
conscience places requirements on individuals independent of their desires, volitional 
necessities are just desires all the way down. Unfortunately, when we define conscience as 
volitional necessity, we risk reducing conscience to what John Henry Newman has referred 
to as mere “self-will.”172 
 Moreover, because volitional necessities “can arise from anything at all that a 
person cares about,” it is possible for the object of the volitional necessity to be amoral or 
value-neutral.173 Another difference thus arises: whereas the demands of conscience 
cannot be value neutral, the demands of volitional necessities “need not have any 
connection to…value.”174 Thus, the value-neutral nature of volitional necessities stands in 
contrast with the value-dependent nature of demands of conscience beliefs. Whereas 
volitional necessities are value-neutral desires to act in a way that is consistent with that 
                                                          
171 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 234 
172 John Henry Newman (1897), 250 
173 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 216 
174 Andrew Koppelman (2009), 216 
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care, the beliefs of conscience are value-dependent requiring us to act in a way that is 
consistent with them. Moreover, this second difference between the demands of conscience 
and the volitional necessities is important when discussing the value of moral integrity 
before the law: if a volitional necessity is thwarted by law, it may not necessarily involve an 
imperilment to moral integrity because it is possible that no moral values were involved. 
But when a demand of conscience is thwarted by law, it necessarily involves an 
imperilment to moral integrity because moral values must always be involved. Insofar as 
the demands of conscience require that individuals do things that they otherwise might not 
want to do and necessarily involve imperilments to moral integrity, they should be 
understood as different from volitional necessities. 
C. The Christian Conscience 
The idea that the conscience is a value-neutral capacity that is also neutral toward 
religious values may be challenged by religious believers. Not only so, but it is also true that 
majority of religious believers engaged in discussions about the freedoms of religion and 
conscience in the United States are explicitly Christian. Accordingly, it thus seems 
appropriate to engage with the concept of conscience as understood by Christians in order 
to see if there is a fundamental disagreement with the account sketched above, and if so, 
where the disagreement may lie. In what follows, I will show that even the most 
conservative Christian accounts of conscience fail to sufficiently deviate from the account of 
conscience sketched above. As such, I will conclude that even the most conservative 
Christians have no reason to object to the account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity 
that is neutral toward religious values or object to the legal implications of adopting such 
an account.  
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 I will take as the most representative account of the conscience from a conservative 
Christian perspective the account advanced by Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley.175 Their 
definition of the conscience – which is fundamentally constituted by verses from the New 
Testament176 – is “your consciousness of what you believe is right and wrong.”177 When we 
compare this to the first feature of Sorabji’s definition of conscience – namely, that it is a 
person’s belief or else capacity to form beliefs about what actions or attitudes had been in 
the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt in a 
particular situation – we see that they are very similar. Worth noting, however, is the fact 
that Naselli and Crowley simply emphasize the conscience beliefs that the capacity of 
conscience produces in their definition of conscience. Of course, their definition is not 
incompatible with, but perhaps only reflects one aspect of Sorabji’s definition of conscience 
– which remains agnostic about whether conscience refers specifically to “the things 
believed or the believing of them.” A simple synthesis of their views, which is my 
considered view, is as follows: conscience refers to the capacity to form beliefs about what 
actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the future, wrong or not wrong for 
                                                          
175 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016) 
176 Specifically, Naselli and Crowley (2016) note – as Sorabji did – that in the New Testament, conscience 
translates as syneidēsis, “a word that occurs thirty times in the Greek New Testament…twice in Acts, twenty 
times in Paul’s letters, five times in Hebrews, and three times in 1 Peter.” (32-33) Their views also align with 
Sorabji’s concerning the Old Testament usage of conscience as well: “Conscience is also one of the few 
theologically significant New Testament words that lacks a parallel word or group of words in the Hebrew 
Old Testament. But the concept of conscience is certainly in the Old Testament even if no word itself is 
present.” (32-33) 
177 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016), 42 
68 
 
 
him to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation and conscience beliefs or the beliefs of 
conscience just refer to these beliefs. The case for the overall similarity of both accounts is 
all the more justified when we emphasize the second feature of Sorabji’s conscience in 
conjunction with the first: that these beliefs require personal self-awareness and are in the 
first instance beliefs about what would be wrong for oneself. Both definitions overall 
emphasize that conscience involves beliefs that we are aware of concerning what actions or 
attitudes are right or wrong for us to adopt – either in the past, present or future – in a 
given situation. 
 Naselli and Crowley also claim that their account of conscience implies that 
conscience can – and oftentimes does – produce “different results for people based on 
different moral standards.”178 They claim that “what you believe is right and wrong is not 
necessarily the same as what actually is right and wrong…So someone’s ‘clear’ conscience 
may actually be evil because it is based on immoral standards.”179 In essence, what they are 
highlighting here is something that Sorabji has also noted: that we can hold different beliefs 
about what is right or wrong for us because we hold to different “moral standards” – or to 
use Sorabji’s language, different moral values. Where Naselli and Crowley seem to differ 
from Sorabji is in their belief that there is, in fact, some correct moral standard or set of 
values – and in particular, they believe that the correct moral standard or set of values are 
uniquely Christian values and the moral standards depicted in the Bible.180 Sorabji might 
                                                          
178 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016), 42 
179 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016), 42 
180 Naselli and Crowley (2016) adopt the Pauline position depicted in Romans 2:15: “Gentiles show, by 
obeying many of God’s moral demands even though they have no access to God’s revealed law (Romans 2:14), 
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also believe that there is some correct set or standard of values, but he stops short of 
claiming as much in his account of conscience. Relatedly, both accounts emphasize that the 
values that conscience applies – and thus the beliefs that it produces – can, do, and should 
change over time.181 Nevertheless, it’s clear that both accounts of conscience emphasize the 
value-neutrality of conscience in that conscience can produce different beliefs about what’s 
right or wrong for us depending on what moral values or standards we adopt – Christian or 
otherwise.  
 Naselli and Crowley might disagree with Sorabji on a different point related to 
conscience, but it seems like even this disagreement should not lead a conservative 
Christian to reject Sorabji’s basic account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity that is 
also neutral toward religious values. In particular, Naselli and Crowley argue that the 
origins of the conscience stem from God insofar as God created us in his image with this 
moral capacity.182 They write:  
You’re made in the image of God, and God is a moral God, so you must be a 
moral  creature who makes moral judgments. And what is conscience if not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that they have a certain consciousness of those moral standards – a consciousness that is clear enough to 
allow their own mind to either accuse or excuse their actions. It’s even clear enough for God to use as 
evidence of judgment day (Romans 2:16).” (34) 
181 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016): “Your conscience is your consciousness of what you believe is 
right and wrong at any given point in time, and it can change for a complex of reasons, good and bad.” (43) 
182 For a contemporary defense of this claim, see Tapio Puolimatka (2017). 
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shining the spotlight of your moral judgment back on yourself, your thoughts, 
and your actions.183 
In arguing that our conscience is a God-given capacity, Naselli and Crowley might claim that 
conscience is therefore not secular. But this shouldn’t matter much when looking at the 
particular nature and value of conscience – especially when considering the legal 
implications of its nature and value. God-given or otherwise, the nature of conscience as a 
value-neutral capacity that is also neutral between religious values remains consistent 
between the above accounts regardless of its origin story. And as noted above, the legal 
value of conscience seems to depend more on possessing and exercising this capacity, not 
on whether this capacity produces true beliefs. So, it seems that even the most conservative 
Christians have no reason to resist the account of conscience as a value-neutral capacity 
that is neutral toward religious values – or reason to object to the legal implications of 
adopting this account. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed and defended an account of conscience against 
competing notions in order to better navigate the narrow version of the specialness 
question in subsequent chapters. My account of ‘conscience’ is historically informed, 
predicated upon the work of Richard Sorabji. The account is not an attempt to define a neat 
and tidy set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘conscience,’ but is instead an 
attempt to capture the more historically central or core aspects of the concept. Once I 
formulated an account of ‘conscience,’ I first compared, contrasted, and defended this 
                                                          
183 Andrew Naselli and J. D. Crowley (2016), 23 
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account of conscience against common, competing notions of conscience present in the 
contemporary discussion of the concept. I ended the chapter by comparing and contrasting 
this historically grounded account of conscience with a more conservative Christian 
account of conscience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CATEGORICITY AND INSULATION FROM EVIDENCE 
The Puritan mistake is sometimes still with us – religious liberty for my religion, and for 
sufficiently similar religions, but not for religions or religious views that are too different or 
too unacceptable.  
– Douglas Laycock, “The Religious Exemption Debate,” p. 174 
I. Introduction 
In the next two chapters, I provide support for my central claim by analyzing several 
possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be legally relevant by 
theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held by either kind of 
conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response to the original 
specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between the two kinds of 
conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response to the 
specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature. 
In this chapter in particular, I narrow in on two of Brian Leiter’s main features of the 
religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from evidence respectively. After initially 
interacting with Leiter’s categoricity feature, I turn my attention to Leiter’s arguments that 
religious beliefs are insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not worthy of special legal 
treatment. I argue that he fails to show that religious conscience beliefs are both in 
principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from 
this evidence than secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then Leiter fails to 
sufficiently distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience and fails to 
answer the “central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? Second, I look at whether or 
not it is plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from other forms of 
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evidence. Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I argue that, 
typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a relevant kind of 
evidence – namely, moral argumentation. I also show that, while it seems as though the 
religious conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when compared to the 
secular conscience, this should make no legal difference overall.184 Lastly, I consider 
whether religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly to private 
evidence. In response, I conclude the chapter by offering a few cursory arguments why we 
might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully 
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence. 
II. Categoricity 
The first feature that is supposed to “single out ‘religious’ states of mind from 
others”185 is what Brian Leiter calls the categoricity feature. By this, Leiter thinks that 
religious claims of conscience place heavy demands on action that “must be satisfied no 
matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or 
disincentives the world offers up.”186 Additionally, Leiter contends that “those who 
genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they 
recognize are overwhelmingly religious.”187 While this feature is commonplace in most 
major religions, it is plausibly not unique to religious states of mind. In fact, perhaps the 
most salient feature of nonreligious moral systems is that the demands of morality are 
                                                          
184 See Joseph Dunne (2018) for the previously published portions of this chapter. 
185 Brian Leiter (2013), 33  
186 Brian Leiter (2013), 34 
187 Brian Leiter (2013), 38 
74 
 
 
categorical insofar as our prior interests and desires must be overridden by some 
superseding principle, duty, rule, etc.188 As Kenneth Himma remarks:  
On any ordinary pretheoretical understanding of morality, the demands of 
morality are categorical. Morality is the kind of thing that characteristically 
requires sacrifice of prudential interests. This is most obviously seen in 
negative moral norms, which prohibit the commission of certain acts. The 
norm “Do not kill innocent persons” requires a prudential sacrifice of at least 
this much: I must give up an option to kill innocent persons no matter what I 
might gain from it.189 
 Incidentally, Leiter contends that categoricity is a necessary feature “of all claims of 
conscience, not only religious claims”190 and that “an experience of categoricity is central to 
anything that would count as a claim of conscience.”191 His mature position, then, is that all 
conscience beliefs are, in principle, categorical, but in practice “those who genuinely 
conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they recognize are 
                                                          
188 Kenneth Himma (2014), 4 
189 Kenneth Himma (2014), 4 
190 Brian Leiter (2013), 34 
191 Brian Leiter (2013), 148, fn. 17. Interestingly, squaring these claims away with Leiter’s earlier claim that 
“those who genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they recognize 
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overwhelmingly religious.” Michael McConnell – a critic of Leiter – likewise argues that “the 
demands of right and wrong may arise from nonreligious as well as religious systems of 
belief.”192 If this is correct, then categoricity should be understood as a necessary condition 
for all claims of conscience, not just the religious conscience. Furthermore, it would be a 
mistake to understand categoricity as a sufficient condition for the religious conscience, for 
possessing this feature would not be enough to make some claim of conscience uniquely 
religious. Since this feature is shared by both kinds of conscience, something further is 
needed to differentiate them – e.g., Leiter’s insulation from evidence feature. 
 Additionally, the view that categoricity is a necessary feature of both forms of 
conscience is supported by the account of conscience developed in the previous chapter as 
well. Remember that one of the core features of conscience is that it creates a strong 
obligation for its possessor to follow. Oddly, Sorbaji also categorizes this obligation as one 
that is “not always an overriding obligation, since there can be counter-obligations, so that 
one is in a double bind, wrong if one does follow conscience and wrong if one does not.” 
Orestes of ancient Greek tragedy helps to illustrate the sort of morally binding situation 
that Sorabji has in mind where Orestes believed himself to be in the wrong if he did not 
avenge his father’s death, but also in the wrong if he killed his mother – the murderer of his 
father. So how does Sorabji’s description square with the categoricity of conscience, 
especially when the obligation that conscience produces is not always an “overriding 
obligation?”  
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 Sorabji contends that in these sorts of situations, it is “not that one duty is merely 
prima facie, and that it is cancelled out by the other.”193 To the contrary, it seems like he 
thinks it is possible to possess competing conscience beliefs concerning what is wrong or 
not wrong for us to do or not do such that we are “damned if we do or damned if we don’t” 
so to speak. This would not necessarily imply that either conscience belief fails to be 
categorical, however. In fact, the reason these moral double binds seem to be so sticky and 
troubling is precisely because the possessor feels as though both beliefs “must be satisfied 
no matter what,” regardless of their “antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or 
disincentives the world offers up” – which would include satisfying a competing belief of a 
similar nature. So, while we can still claim that conscience produces categorical obligations, 
we just might not consider them totally “overriding” only because our conscience can 
produce competing categorical obligations that might sometimes interfere with each other. 
III. Insulation from Evidence 
By “insulation from evidence,” Leiter thinks that religious beliefs “do not answer 
ultimately to evidence and reasons” – and he takes this feature as the primary delineator of 
religious conscience beliefs from other conscience beliefs.194 Exactly how might religious 
states of mind fail to answer to evidence and reasons? There seem to be two ways. On the 
one hand, insulation from evidence could be understood as “a property of beliefs which, by 
virtue of their content, cannot be validated or invalidated by empirical evidence.”195 
Understood in this way, the objects of insulation are the religious conscience beliefs 
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themselves, not necessarily the religious believer. On the other hand, “insulation from 
evidence” could be understood as an individual epistemic attitude or state of mind that 
believes despite the existence of discrediting evidence. Understood in this way, the object 
of insulation is the religious believer, not the religious conscience beliefs.  
Unfortunately, Leiter is not initially clear about which view he holds. At one point, 
he claims that “insulation from evidence…will be understood as a claim about the religious 
doctrine rather than about the typical epistemic attitudes of believers.”196 At first, it seems 
as though Leiter thinks religious conscience beliefs are in principle insulated from evidence. 
But at another point, he claims that “the distinctively religious state of mind is that of faith 
– that is, believing something notwithstanding the evidence and reasons that fail to support 
it or even contradict it.”197 Here, he seems to adopt the other view: religious conscience 
beliefs are just in practice more insulated from evidence when compared to their 
nonreligious counterparts. Thankfully, Leiter clarifies his position in a later piece: “My 
considered view, in fact, is that it is Believer Insulation that is crucial to the second of the 
three characteristics of religion, though, of course, in some cases Believer Insulation will 
not be a problem if the beliefs in question are marked by Belief Insulation.”198 Given his 
clarifications, we can conclude that Leiter, in fact, holds the “Believer Insulation” position 
(i.e., in practice insulation) – not the “Belief Insulation” position (i.e., in principle 
insulation). 
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François Boucher and Cécile Laborde argue that Leiter faces a dilemma about this 
allegedly demarcating feature no matter which view he holds. They contend that if Leiter 
accepts Believer Insulation, then “he cannot distinguish religion from fanatical adherence 
to any set of beliefs.”199 The same seems true when we narrow our range from ‘religion’ to 
‘religious conscience:’ under the first horn, the religious believer refuses to let available 
evidence stand against their religious conscience beliefs, and as such, it would be difficult to 
differentiate them from any other sort of fanatical adherence to some set of value beliefs. If 
Leiter accepts Belief Insulation – and believes that “religious beliefs…neither claim support 
from empirical evidence of the sciences nor purports to be constrained by empirical 
evidence”200 – Boucher and Laborde contend that then “he cannot distinguish secular from 
religious conscientious commitments.”201 If the dilemma holds, then it doesn’t matter 
which view Leiter holds: his “insulation from evidence” feature fails to demarcate the 
religious conscience from its secular counterpart in either case. 
The second horn of the dilemma exists insofar as Boucher and Laborde take both 
kinds of conscience to be, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence. To see why they 
think this, they have us consider two different moral imperatives adopted by a religious 
group and by a secular group – arguing that both are categorical and “arguably insulated 
from empirical evidence and standards of justification found in natural science.”202 They 
initially consider examples of religious conscience beliefs, e.g., the Buddhist who doesn’t 
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eat meat because it “spreads fear among living creatures and goes against the virtue of 
compassion” and the Quaker whose pacifism is grounded in the claim that “all wars and 
outward fighting proceed from men’s lust.”203 Then, they explain that the secular analogs to 
these religious conscience beliefs – namely, that “violence and the use of weapons to kill 
other human beings is always wrong” and “that life has intrinsic value” – also “ground an 
ethical commitment…while being just as impossible to prove with empirical evidence and 
the tools of modern science.”204 Can we justifiably believe that both forms of conscience 
are, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence? 
A. Empirical Evidence 
To answer this “in principle” question, we should return to the nature of conscience 
itself. Remember that Sorabji claimed that the conscience produces value beliefs about 
which past, present, or future actions or attitudes would be wrong or not wrong for us to 
adopt or not adopt by applying certain values to our particular context.205 This means that 
the evidential or justificatory basis on which conscience beliefs stand are our moral values. 
We adopt values, and those values – at least in some way – explain why we hold the 
conscience beliefs we do, serve to justify the conscience beliefs that we hold, and act as the 
evidence that our conscience beliefs appeal to. Of course, these values can – and often do – 
                                                          
203 François Boucher and Cécile Laborde (2016), 502 
204 François Boucher and Cécile Laborde (2016), 502 
205 Richard Sorabji (2014), 215-16 
80 
 
 
run the risk of reflecting merely local conventions, customs, or superstitions, and therefore 
require constant reflection and awareness of other values as Sorabji notes.206 
If this is true, then why does Leiter think that a greater, in practice insulation from 
empirical evidence is the distinguishing feature of the religious conscience? I suspect that a 
methodological mistake by Leiter is partly to blame here. In his analysis, Leiter broadly 
compares religious beliefs to conscience beliefs instead of comparing religious and 
nonreligious conscience beliefs in particular. More specifically, though it seems clear from 
his hypothetical scenario involving the Sikh and rural boy that Leiter had the narrow 
version of the specialness question in mind – comparing secular and religious conscience – 
his method for answering this question nevertheless operated as though he was trying to 
answer the broad version of the question – comparing religion and conscience more 
broadly. This insight is supported by the fact that Leiter’s method was to uncover the 
general “features of religious belief that…distinguish religious beliefs from other kinds of 
belief” in order to see whether those features warrant toleration.207 So, when Leiter argues 
that ‘religious beliefs’ are insulated from empirical evidence, he seems to have a wider 
range of religious beliefs in mind, which include ontological and epistemological beliefs as 
well as conscience beliefs. In fact, when addressing this feature, Leiter relies exclusively on 
examples highlighting the insulation from empirical evidence that uniquely ontological or 
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epistemological religious beliefs seem to enjoy – e.g., arguments for the existence of God, 
testimonial evidence supporting the belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, etc. Not once 
does he cite an example of a uniquely religious conscience belief that might be insulated 
from empirical evidence. Thus, it seems as though at least part of the reason that Leiter 
included this feature was in response to thinking about ontological and epistemological 
religious beliefs as opposed to religious conscience beliefs specifically. 
B. Religious Ontological and Epistemological Beliefs 
We should pause for a moment in order to highlight the fact that the view that 
religious ontological and epistemological beliefs are insulated, in practice, from empirical 
evidence is highly contentious.208 Unfortunately, Leiter just assumes this view and fails to 
offer any substantive arguments in favor of his particular claim – even in spite of known 
counterexamples to his position. Leiter writes: 
There are, for example, “intellectualist” traditions in religious thought – 
William Paley’s “natural theology” or neo-Thomist arguments come to mind – 
according to which religious beliefs (for example, belief in a creator, or as in 
American recently, belief in “an intelligent designer”) are, in fact, supported 
by the kinds of evidence adduced in the sciences, once that evidence is rightly 
interpreted.209 
First, we should note that when Leiter talks about “religious beliefs” here, he cites as 
an example the belief that God exists and the belief in an intelligent designer – both of 
which are examples of explicitly ontological claims. Second, we should also note that Leiter 
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tries to be charitable here, noting that “[i]t is doubtful, though, whether these intellectualist 
traditions capture the character of popular religious belief, the typical epistemic attitudes 
of religious believers.”210 
But even if we table the comparison to popular religious beliefs, Leiter argues that 
these “intellectualist traditions in religious thought might still be thought of as insulated 
from evidence.”211 First, he notes that “it is dubious (to put the matter gently) that these 
positions are really serious about following the evidence where it leads, as opposed to 
manipulating it to fit preordained ends.”212 As noted above, Leiter just seems to assume 
that this is the case without citing any evidence or advancing a substantive argument – 
even though there are counterexamples to this claim. As Michael McConnell highlights: 
But religious belief has been attested to by millions of seemingly intelligent 
and rational people over long periods of time, who report that they have 
experienced, in some way, transcendent reality. There is even, as Leiter 
admits, a “large literature in Anglophone philosophy devoted to defending 
the rationality of religious belief.” Leiter chooses to disregard this testimonial 
evidence, along with its philosophical defense, without so much as 
“address[ing] . . . in any detail”—really, at all—the arguments that are 
offered. Why? The only reason he supplies is that the “dominant sentiment 
among other philosophers” is that belief in God is “unsupported by reasons 
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and evidence.” With all respect, there is no reason to think that members of 
modern philosophy faculties have any special insights about God. 213 
The irony here should not be lightly noted: Leiter’s claim that intellectualist traditions of 
religious thought are insulated from evidence is advanced without sufficient evidence and 
without regard for relevant evidence to the contrary.  
Second, Leiter notes that “in the case of the sciences, beliefs based on evidence are 
also revisable in light of the evidence; but in the intellectualist traditions in religious 
thought just noted, it never turns out that the fundamental beliefs are revised in light of 
new evidence.”214 Again, Leiter just seems to assume that this is the case without citing any 
evidence or advancing any substantive argument – even though there are counterexamples 
here as well. As Michael McConnell notes: 
Developments in biology, physics, linguistics, archeology, and other 
disciplines have had profound impact on Biblical hermeneutics and theology 
in mainstream Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, and ‘practical reason’ 
has played a major role in natural law thinking since at least Thomas 
Aquinas. To be sure, some religious traditions are more insulated from 
scientific developments than others. The Navajo creation story, for example, 
is impervious to archeological and linguistic evidence that the tribe migrated 
to the Southwest from Canada only a few centuries before the arrival of 
Europeans, and fundamentalist Christian belief in the historicity of Noah’s 
flood and the literal six-day creation, depending on how these ideas are 
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understood, is much the same. But to say that ‘insulation from evidence’ is a 
defining characteristic of ‘all’ (or even most) religions is simply false. Religion 
is constantly changing, and constantly interacting with the culture and other 
ways of understanding the world.215 
Concerning these “intellectualist” religious traditions, Leiter simply concludes: “The whole 
exercise is one of post-hoc rationalization, as is no doubt obvious to those outside the 
sectarian tradition.”216 
As I see it, the sword cuts both ways: what seems obvious to those inside the 
sectarian tradition is not obvious to those outside the sectarian tradition either. As 
McConnell notes, “no religious believer would recognize [Leiter’s] description.”217 
McConnell writes:  
Religious believers do not think they are “insulating” themselves from all the 
relevant “evidence.” They think they are considering evidence of a different, 
nonmaterial sort, in addition to the evidence of science, history, and the 
senses. It would be more accurate, and less loaded, to amend this second part 
of Leiter’s definition to say that religion is a system of belief in which 
significant aspects are not based on science or common sense observations 
about the material world.218 
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If religious believers are insulated from the “only epistemically relevant considerations,”219 
then it’s no surprise that Leiter reaches the conclusion that he does. McConnell continues:  
In a footnote, Leiter acknowledges that “of course” there may be matters 
such as the “meaning of life” that “are insulated from evidence only in the 
sense that no scientific evidence would seem to bear on them.” But he 
immediately dismisses the importance of this observation on the ground that 
“[s]uch beliefs are not my concern here, mainly because they are not 
distinctive to religion.” What could he be thinking? His entire argument is 
built around the idea that religion is “a culpable form of unwarranted belief” 
precisely because of its “insulation from evidence.” If it turns out that 
religion’s “insulation from evidence” is attributable to the fact that “no 
scientific evidence bears” on many questions of a religious nature, then 
religious belief cannot be criticized on these grounds. There is no reason to 
apply the “ordinary epistemic standards” of science and material observation 
to questions on which they do not bear. If Leiter is confining his “concern” to 
beliefs on which “scientific evidence would seem to bear,” he is leaving out 
most of what is central to religion, including beliefs underlying almost all 
claims of religious conscience, which are the subject of his book. 220 
Overall, then, Leiter’s view just seems to be “a sectarian premise, predicated on a 
questionable view about evidence”221 – but admittedly, so is the view that there are other 
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viable forms of evidence in addition to common sense and the sciences. Of course, Leiter is 
free to “confine himself to whatever categories of evidence may strike him as persuasive, 
but he cannot reasonably label as ‘culpable’ or ‘unwarranted’ the sincere conclusion of 
many persons, including thinkers of the first rank, that there are nonmaterial aspects of 
reality supporting religious belief.”222 
So, the otherwise obvious, additional evidence to those inside the sectarian tradition 
might not be so obvious to those outside the sectarian tradition such that those on the 
outside might be the ones lacking – not those on the inside. But even if Leiter is right that 
religious ontological and epistemological beliefs are, in practice, more insulated from 
empirical evidence – and those on the inside of sectarian traditions are wrong – it might 
not matter much to the original specialness question. McConnell argues that, “even for 
those who agree with Leiter as a matter of personal conviction that there is no persuasive 
evidence supporting the truth of religious belief, but agree with Madison and Washington 
that the truth of religion is not a subject on which the government should take a stand, 
Leiter’s conclusions do not follow, because they rest on the view that the state should treat 
religious beliefs and arguments as lacking evidentiary warrant.”223 In short, McConnell 
argues that the truthfulness of religious beliefs – here, specifically ontological or 
epistemological religious beliefs – is just not an issue that the government should take a 
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stand on. Instead, it is “better to proceed on the premise that people may reasonably 
disagree about the truth or falsehood of religious claims.”224 
C. Religious Conscience Beliefs 
Nevertheless, does Leiter think that religious conscience beliefs are, in practice, 
insulated from empirical evidence in the way that their ontological and epistemological 
counterparts are alleged to be? When broadly comparing ‘religion’ and ‘morality,’ we get 
close to Leiter’s answer to this question: 
Is moral belief necessarily insulated from reasons and evidence? [F]or 
cognitivist realists like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton…moral judgments are 
not insulated from reasons and evidence as they are understood in the 
sciences; indeed, just the opposite. So on this view, morality is not at all like 
religion; it answers to reasons and evidence – and answers successfully! 
Noncognitivist antirealists, by contrast, conceive of moral judgments not as 
expressing beliefs…but as expressing mental states that are not truth-apt, 
such as feelings. On this picture, then, moral judgments are by their nature 
insulated from reasons and evidence; just as feeling cheerful or sad is not 
answerable to reasons or evidence, so too with moral judgment. Religious 
judgments are still different, on this account, since some religious judgments 
do express beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons and 
evidence, but are nonetheless taken to be insulated from them. So on either 
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of the two main contenders for a credible metaphysics and semantics of 
morality, morality is still different from religion.225 
A few points about this paragraph are in order. First, Leiter actually presents a false-
dichotomy here since it is possible – indeed, some say plausible – to hold non-naturalist 
versions of metaethical cognitivism.226 This point is important when you consider that non-
naturalist forms of cognitivism involve some degree of insulation from empirical evidences. 
Second, since Leiter’s discussion about moral or religious beliefs focuses on their insulation 
from empirical evidence, his views on their insulation from other forms of evidence – e.g., 
conceptual evidence – remain an open question. Third, this paragraph nicely illustrates 
Leiter’s initial ambiguity about whether he holds Believer or Belief insulation. When 
discussing metaethical cognitivism, Leiter seems to hold Belief Insulation: “So on this view, 
morality is not at all like religion [because] it answers to reasons and evidence.” Yet, when 
discussing metaethical noncognitivism, Leiter seems to hold Believer Insulation: “Religious 
judgments are still different, on this account, since some religious judgments do express 
beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to reasons and evidence, but are 
nonetheless taken to be insulated from them.” Lastly, this paragraph also illustrates the 
confusion that results from Leiter’s methodological mistake. Leiter understands the 
“central puzzle” of Why Tolerate Religion? to be “why the state should have to tolerate 
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exemptions from generally applicable laws when they conflict with religious obligations 
but not with any other equally serious obligations of conscience.”227 But as we noted above, 
his method for answering this puzzle oddly focuses on ‘religion’ more broadly – not 
religious conscience specifically. In other words, Leiter mistakenly answers the narrow 
version of the specialness question through broad version methodology – thus disallowing 
him from straightforwardly addressing the narrow question. 
Given Leiter’s claims up to this point, it doesn’t seem like he takes much of a stand 
on whether or not religious conscience beliefs are, in practice, insulated from empirical 
evidence even though he repeatedly claims that religious beliefs, in general, are. Again, it 
seems like his methodological mistake prevents making this distinction. Leiter must believe 
that religious conscience beliefs respond to the same kinds of evidences – and in roughly 
the same way – as other kinds of religious beliefs if he believes that religious conscience 
beliefs are, in practice, largely insulated from empirical evidence. Unfortunately, Leiter 
gives us no reason to believe that religious conscience beliefs respond to the same kind of 
evidence as their ontological or epistemological counterparts allegedly do. He only thinks 
that religious beliefs are, in general, insulated from empirical evidence in practice – which 
may or may not include religious conscience beliefs. 
In fact, when contrasting ‘morality’ and ‘religion,’ Leiter actually seems to give us 
reasons to believe that the opposite is true: namely, that religious beliefs – understood as 
ontological or epistemological religious beliefs – and moral beliefs – which would include 
religious conscience beliefs – may differ with respect to evidence. 
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Consider this: if one is a metaethical cognitivist as Leiter describes it above – and 
believes that moral judgments are, in principle, truth-apt and responsive to empirical 
evidence as he assumes – then moral beliefs (which include conscience beliefs) would be 
distinct from religious ontological and epistemological beliefs when those religious beliefs 
are, in principle, insulated from empirical evidence. Interestingly, a straightforward 
reading of Leiter in the above paragraph seems to suggest that he holds this kind of Belief 
Insulation position: after all, moral beliefs are “not at all like religion” insofar as moral 
belief “answers to reasons and evidence as they are understood in the sciences” and 
religion does not.228 Under this sort of scenario, the conscience part of the religious 
conscience would be in principle open to empirical evidence, but the religious part of the 
religious conscience would not. While we know that Leiter actually holds the Believer 
Insulation position,229 it is not similarly clear whether he is a metaethical cognitivist as 
described above.230 So, a straightforward reading indicates that Leiter takes moral and 
religious beliefs to differ with respect to evidence. But an adjusted reading makes it unclear 
whether or not Leiter thinks that religious conscience beliefs are insulated from empirical 
evidence the way that their ontological and epistemological counterparts are alleged to be. 
Leiter argues that if one is a metaethical noncognitivist – and believes that moral 
judgments are, in principle, not truth-apt and responsive to empirical evidence – then 
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moral beliefs (including conscience beliefs) are still distinct from religious beliefs. His 
defense here is to argue that, contrary to noncognitivist moral judgments, at least some 
religious beliefs are nevertheless, in principle, truth-apt and answerable to empirical 
reasons and evidence. Again, he seems to mean the ontological and epistemological kind, 
for these are the only kind of religious belief cited for example when discussing the 
insulation feature. Under his second scenario, the conscience part of the religious 
conscience would not be in principle open to empirical evidence, but the religious part of 
the religious conscience would. As was the case before, we know that Leiter holds the 
Believer Insulation position,231 but we don’t know whether he is a metaethical 
noncognitivist. So, under this scenario, it remains unclear whether Leiter thinks that 
religious conscience beliefs are insulated from empirical evidence in the way that their 
ontological and epistemological counterparts are alleged to be as well. 
Even though Leiter repeatedly claims that religious beliefs are, in general, insulated 
from empirical evidence, he nevertheless fails to clearly show that religious conscience 
beliefs are, in practice similarly insulated from empirical evidence. It seems like we can 
only assume that they are if we also assume that Leiter is a metaethical cognitivist of some 
kind and that religious conscience beliefs are, in principle, truth-apt and answerable to 
empirical evidence. If Leiter were to adopt a form of metaethical cognitivism, then the 
specific moral judgments produced by either kind of conscience would amount to moral 
beliefs that are, in principle if not always in practice, truth-apt and responsive to such 
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evidence.232 In such a case, Leiter would still need to show that religious conscience beliefs 
are somehow more insulated from empirical evidence than their nonreligious counterparts 
– and more insulated such that differential legal treatment would be justified. In the 
absence of an argument from Leiter showing that religious conscience beliefs are both in 
principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from 
this evidence in a legally differentiating way when compared to their nonreligious 
counterparts, we should suspend judgment on any conclusion he draws about their 
respective legal treatment. 
Perhaps the greatest implication of my critique is that, by failing to show that the 
religious conscience is both in principle responsive to empirical evidence and in practice 
typically more insulated from this evidence than secular conscience in a way that justifies 
differential legal treatment, Leiter has failed to answer the “central puzzle” of Why Tolerate 
Religion? His conclusion that the state has no principled reason to grant exemptions from 
generally applicable laws to “religious obligations but not [to] any other equally serious 
obligations of conscience” rests on the assumption that religious conscience beliefs are 
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differentiated by their insulation from empirical evidence.233 As Michael McConnell notes, 
“it is the ‘insulation from evidence’ that most clearly distinguishes religion in Leiter’s 
definition, and does almost all the work in his analysis”234 – and if I’m right that Leiter has 
failed to distinguish the religious conscience through this feature, then his analysis is 
largely undermined and never gets off the ground. 
IV. Other Forms of Evidence 
To be sure, Boucher and Laborde similarly fail to offer an argument for their 
metaethical assumptions – namely, that both forms of conscience are, in principle, 
insulated from empirical evidence. Additionally, it’s not clear whether they think that the 
religious conscience is somehow differently insulated from nonreligious conscience with 
respect to other evidences. Independent of these scholars, however, can we justifiably 
believe that the religious conscience is somehow differently insulated with respect to other 
forms of evidence – and ultimately in a way that justifies special legal treatment? In what 
follows, I’ll argue that: (a) typically, both forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated 
from a relevant kind of evidence – namely, moral argumentation; and (b) the secular 
conscience typically seems to be, at least in some sense, comparably more insulated from 
moral values. I think a reasonable case can be made for (a) and (b) via Jonathan Haidt’s 
work in moral psychology and that, even when (a) and (b) are plausible, treating religious 
conscience with special legal solicitude is not. 
A. Moral Argumentation 
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In The Righteous Mind, Haidt’s first principle of moral psychology states that 
“[moral] intuitions come first [and] strategic reasoning second.”235 Haidt writes: 
Moral intuitions arise automatically and almost instantaneously, long before 
moral reasoning has a chance to get started, and those first intuitions tend to 
drive our later reasoning. If you think that moral reasoning is something we 
do to figure out the truth, you’ll be constantly frustrated by how foolish, 
biased, and illogical people become when they disagree with you. But if you 
think about moral reasoning as a skill we humans evolved to further our 
social agendas – to justify our own actions and to defend the teams we 
belong to – then things will make a lot more sense. Keep your eye on the 
intuitions, and don’t take people’s moral arguments at face value. They’re 
mostly post hoc constructions made up on the fly, crafted to advance one or 
more strategic objectives.236 
By intuitions, Haidt means the “dozens or hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments 
and decisions that we all make every day.”237 And by moral judgments, Haidt is referring to 
a rapid cognitive process distinguished from reasoning238 that is “akin to the judgments 
animals make as they move through the world, feeling themselves drawn toward or away 
from various things.”239 While Haidt seems to initially indicate that our moral judgments 
                                                          
235 Jonathan Haidt (2013), XX 
236 Jonathan Haidt (2013), XX – XXI 
237 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 53 
238 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 53 
239 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 72 
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are, in principle, insulated from moral argumentation, he does concede that it’s still 
“possible for people simply to reason their way to a moral conclusion that contradicts their 
initial intuitive judgment, although [he] believe this process is rare.”240 He thinks that 
friends can challenge us, giving us reasons and arguments that sometimes “trigger new 
intuitions, thereby making it possible for us to change our minds.”241 Thus, Haidt maintains 
that while our moral judgments seem to be, at least in principle, open to this sort of 
evidence, in practice he thinks they are largely insulated.242 
This first principle of moral psychology is important for establishing (a) in that 
Haidt is presumably talking about all moral judgments – religious or otherwise. If (a) is 
true, then we may actually have good reason to treat religious and secular conscience 
beliefs equally before the law since they would be practically indistinguishable concerning 
their insulation from this sort of evidence. Both kinds of conscience beliefs are intuitive 
moral judgments produced by applying values to our actions or attitudes that are not 
themselves initially justified by some moral argument or line of reasoning. Both kinds of 
conscience adopt some moral values, apply these values to our particular actions or 
attitudes, and produce an intuitive moral judgment. And the intuitive moral judgments 
produced by both kinds of conscience are described as being in principle open to moral 
                                                          
240 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 80 
241 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 55. “It’s not every day”, Haidt says “that we change our mind about a moral issue 
without any prompting from anyone else.” (56) We should note, however, that even though others may give 
us moral arguments that we might find persuasive, we ultimately seem to answer to the intuition that their 
moral arguments create in us. 
242 To better understand how this influence from others and our own reasoning might work in changing our 
minds about moral conclusions, see figure 2.4 depicting Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model. (55) 
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arguments even though, in practice, they are typically insulated from this evidence.243 At 
this point, then, there are no grounds for affording religious conscience special legal 
solicitude if it nearly indistinguishable from secular conscience with regard to its insulation 
from moral argumentation. 
B. Moral Values 
Concerning (b), does Haidt’s research help us develop a plausible case that the 
secular conscience is typically more insulated from moral values – and perhaps in a way 
that justifies special legal solicitude for religious conscience? Here, we can turn to Haidt’s 
second principle of moral psychology, which states that “there’s more to morality than 
harm and fairness.”244 By this principle, Haidt only means to make a descriptive claim 
about what sorts of “moral foundations”245 and related values246 that people from across 
different cultures draw from as an anthropological fact. He writes: 
                                                          
243 Haidt notes that one of the most common criticisms of his social intuitions model from philosophers is that 
conceptual evidence actually seems to change or at least influence our moral beliefs more frequently in 
practice than he seems to grant. Haidt (2013) writes: “These critics present no evidence, but, in fairness, I 
have no evidence either as to the actual frequency in daily life with which people reason their way to 
counterintuitive conclusions (link 5) or change their minds during private reflection about moral matters 
(link 6). Of course people change their minds on moral issues, but I suspect that in most cases the cause of 
change was a new intuitively compelling experience (link 1), such as seeing a sonogram of a fetus, or an 
intuitively compelling argument made by another person (link 3). I also suspect that philosophers are able to 
override their initial intuitions more easily than can ordinary folk, based on findings by Kuhn (1991).” (385) 
244 Jonathan Haidt (2013), XXI 
245 Haidt (2013) describes these moral foundations as “sets of modules that work together” to meet adaptive 
challenges. (147) He describes modules as “little switches in the brains of all animals” that are “switched on 
by patters that were important for survival in a particular ecological niche and when they detect that pattern, 
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The moral domain is unusually narrow in WEIRD [i.e. – western, educated, 
industrial, rich, and democratic] cultures, where it is largely limited to the 
ethic of autonomy (i.e., moral concerns about individuals harming, 
oppressing, or cheating other individuals). It is broader – including the ethics 
of community and divinity – in most other societies, and within religious and 
conservative moral matrices within WEIRD societies.247 
So, Hadit’s research indicates the following: that nonreligious and non-conservative 
individuals within a WEIRD culture typically draw from comparatively fewer moral 
foundations and related values than their religious and conservative WEIRD counterparts 
when explaining or justifying moral judgments. The more nonreligious and liberal WEIRD 
individuals, according to Haidt, typically draw from just three moral foundations and their 
related values – what he calls the Care/Harm foundation,248 the Fairness/Cheating 
foundation,249 and the Liberty/Oppression foundation.250 Conversely, more religious and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they send out a signal that (eventually) changes the animal’s behavior in a way that is (usually) adaptive.” 
(144) 
246 Haidt (2013) explains that each moral foundation has characteristic emotions – e.g., compassion is a 
characteristic emotion of the Care/Harm foundation – and relevant virtues and values – e.g., obedience and 
deference are the virtues and values of the Authority/Subversion foundation. (146) 
247 Jonathan Haidt (2013), 129; emphasis added 
248 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to signs of suffering and need; it makes us 
despise cruelty and want to care for those who are suffering.” (178) 
249 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to indications that another person is likely to 
be a good (or bad) partner for collaboration and reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish 
cheaters.” (178) 
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conservative WEIRD individuals tend to draw from three additional moral foundations – 
the Loyalty/Betrayal foundation251, the Authority/Subversion foundation252, and the 
Sanctity/Degradation foundation.253 Hence, this is why Haidt suggests that there is, at least 
descriptively, “more to morality than harm and fairness:” after all, liberals typically appeal 
to only three moral foundations whereas conservatives tend to appeal to all six.254 
For our present purposes, what’s important to highlight is that nonreligious WEIRD 
individuals seem to typically draw on three moral foundations and their related values 
whereas religious WEIRD individuals typically draw on all six moral foundations and their 
related values. Haidt’s second principle implies that there is a descriptive difference with 
our moral beliefs that trends along secular and religious lines: religious moral beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
250 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes people notice and resent any sign of attempted domination. 
It triggers an urge to band together and resist or overthrow bullies and tyrants.” (215) 
251 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to signs that another person is (or is not) a 
team player. It makes us trust and reward such people, and it makes us want to hurt, ostracize, or even kill 
those who betray us or our group.” (178-79) 
252 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes us sensitive to signs of rank or status, and to signs that 
other people are (or are not) behaving properly, given their position.” (179) 
253 Jonathan Haidt (2013): this foundation “makes it possible for people to invest objects with irrational and 
extreme values – both positive and negative – which are important for binding groups together.” (179) 
254 Jonathan Haidt (2013): “Liberals have a three-foundation morality, whereas conservatives use all six. 
Liberal moral matrices rest on the Care/harm, Liberty/oppression, and Fairness/cheating foundations 
although liberals are often willing to trade away fairness (as proportionality) when it conflicts with 
compassion or with their desire to fight oppression. Conservative morality rests on all six foundations, 
although conservatives are more willing than liberals to sacrifice Care and let some people get hurt in order 
to achieve their many other moral objectives.” (214) 
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typically draw from a larger evidential base (i.e., a larger set of moral values) when 
compared to their secular counterparts (i.e., a smaller set of moral values). If this is true, 
then (b) seems plausible: the religious conscience would typically apply a broader range of 
values and must therefore work with a greater range of evidence in order to produce 
beliefs about what would be wrong or not wrong for one to do or not do. Using Haidt’s 
language, the religious and secular individual would obviously both possess moral beliefs 
(including conscience beliefs), but their intuitive moral judgments would be produced by a 
different set of moral foundations and related values getting “triggered” by and applied to 
particular events. Thus, the more religious person must typically process the intuitive 
moral judgments produced by six moral foundations and related values, while the more 
secular person must typically process the intuitive moral judgments produced by only 
three moral foundations and related values.255 
If (b) is plausible, then there seem to be only two reasons why we might grant 
special legal treatment to the religious conscience: either because there is something 
special about the different moral value(s) that the religious conscience applies or else 
because there is something special about the religious conscience having to apply a greater 
number of values. Under the first scenario, there would have to be something special about 
the value(s) uniquely applied by the religious conscience – something that the value(s) 
applied by the secular conscience lack(s) – that would warrant preferential legal treatment. 
                                                          
255 This helps us, for example, understand why we see such a vast difference between the political left and 
right over the use of concepts such as ‘sanctity’ and ‘purity’. Those on the right are driven by intuitions 
triggered by the sanctity foundation and those on the left lack these intuitions. For more on this, see Jonathan 
Haidt (2013), Chapter 8 “The Conservative Advantage,” 180-216. 
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Under the second scenario, there would have to be something special about having to 
navigate and apply a greater number of values – something the secular conscience does not 
have to do – that would warrant preferential legal treatment.  
We can plausibly dismiss the second reason as drawing a distinction without a 
moral difference. After all, navigating a greater number of moral values en route to 
formulating one’s conscience belief just doesn’t seem to amount to a principled reason for 
granting totally different legal protections to the religious conscience objector. Regarding 
the first reason, however, we can make a few points. First, we should note that Haidt’s 
research concerns trends with respect to these moral foundations and values: the religious 
conscience seems to typically draw from a larger set of moral values or foundations, while 
the secular conscience seems to typically draw from a smaller set of moral values or 
foundations. This means that it is possible for both forms of conscience to not only 
sometimes draw from an atypical moral foundation and related value, but to sometimes 
draw from an atypical moral foundation and related value with an atypical weightiness as 
well.256 So, it seems then, that granting special protections to religious conscience on the 
grounds that it typically draws from a certain set of arbitrarily designated, special values 
would inevitably lead to unwarranted exclusivity and underinclusivity. While it is true that 
laws draw somewhat arbitrary lines all the time that are over and underinclusive, drawing 
                                                          
256 For example, Haidt (2013) notes that Unitarian (religious, liberal) preachers made greater use of Care and 
Fairness words in their sermons, while Baptist (religious, conservative) preachers made greater use of 
Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity words in their sermons. (188) This indicates that there are outlier religious 
consciences – e.g., Unitarian consciences – that typically and weightily draw on the first three moral 
foundations and related values. 
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a line between moral values in this way might be especially arbitrary – which leads to the 
next point. 
Second, qualitatively comparing some moral values to other moral values – when 
possible – seems difficult to do. You might think that moral values are incommensurable, 
and so any sort of comparative question would be, in principle, impossible to navigate. You 
might also think that it is in principle possible to show that some moral values are better to 
adopt than others – and that some value beliefs are more justified than others. But, as 
noted, when this is possible, it is oftentimes difficult to do – especially when comparatively 
evaluating the values that underlie conscientious objections. This would amount to, for 
example, exempting a religious conscientious objector to conscription but not a similarly 
situated secular objector solely on the basis that the value underlying the religious 
conscience belief is somehow better or more worthy of entirely different legal 
protections.257 Lastly, you might also worry whether courts are the appropriate arbiters of 
these comparative questions between underlying moral values. Not only are these 
questions difficult to navigate, but answering them might effectively cause the state to take 
a definitive stance on some conception(s) of the good life or to endorse some sectarian 
value(s) over some nonsectarian value(s). Disallowing courts to be the arbiters of 
questions comparing moral values may actually protect against the “totalization of 
                                                          
257 To use Boucher and Laborde’s (2016) example, this would amount to granting an exemption to the Quaker 
whose pacifism is grounded in one kind of value and claim - i.e., that “all wars and outward fighting proceed 
from men’s lust” – but not the secularist whose conscientious objection is grounded in a different sort of value 
and claim – i.e., that “violence and the use of weapons to kill other human beings is always wrong.” (502) 
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morality” on the part of the government258 as well as encourage the sort of “skepticism and 
humility that we owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic society.”259 
V. Private Evidence 
Of course, there may still be other kinds of evidence not discussed above that are 
relevant to conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise. For example, John Corvino contends 
that McConnell overlooks the more pertinent private evidence that religious beliefs appeal 
to when responding to Leiter’s insulation from empirical evidence feature. Corvino notes 
that even if one grants McConnell’s “evidence of a different, nonmaterial sort,”260 this sort 
of evidence is “often private in a way that renders it effectively useless for the purpose of 
resolving interpersonal disputes.”261 In virtue of their evidence being private, the “law 
                                                          
258 Nathan Chapman (2013), 1494 
259 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1929. I’m also sympathetic to the views of Nadia Sawicki (2012) on this point. 
Sawicki argues that true respect for any claims of conscience demands a consistent, coherent, and repeatable 
mechanism for legal accommodation, even if that test is open-ended and results in uncertainty at the margins. 
(1395) She thinks that the most promising legal mechanism for determining the permissibility of 
conscientious exemptions may be the kind of content-neutral balancing test often used in constitutional law – 
indeed, the kind that we see with RFRA. (1396) While she grants that a balancing approach may be subject to 
criticism (e.g., that it risks being used as a proxy for judgments based on majoritarian values), she thinks that 
the alternative to establishing a content-neutral guiding principle is to “abandon the promise of freedom of 
conscience and concede that American society considers exercises of personal conscience to be valuable only 
to the extent that they align with widely accepted moral principles.” (1396) This alternative, Sawicki argues 
“would undermine the foundational purpose of legal accommodation of conscientious belief, which is to 
protect individuals from oppressive majoritarian understanding of morality.” (1396) 
260 Michael McConnell (2013), 786-87 
261 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 49 
103 
 
 
avoids inquiring into the plausibility of religious claims” and governments remain 
powerless to persuade religious believers otherwise – acknowledging that religious claims 
“are generally accepted ‘on faith.’”262 Corvino concludes: 
It is precisely by being ‘beyond human understanding’ that religious beliefs 
are ‘insulated from evidence’ in Leiter’s sense,263 and precisely for that 
reason that Justice Scalia opined that, in a religiously diverse nation, any 
system requiring strict scrutiny for laws burdening religious beliefs is 
‘courting anarchy.’”264 
A. Content Neutrality 
In response to Corvino, we should note a few things. First, Corvino’s private 
evidence feature may be understood as a friendly amendment to Leiter’s admittedly 
obscure insulation feature: perhaps a better way to understand Leiter’s insulation feature 
is not that religious beliefs are narrowly insulated from empirical evidence but that 
religious beliefs appeal to uniquely private evidence for justification instead. Though this 
may be closer to what we commonly mean when we suggest that religious beliefs are 
insulated from evidence, even Corvino’s updated feature – like Leiter’s – needs further 
clarification about the specific role and place that private evidence occupies in both 
religious and conscience beliefs in order to be helpful. At the very least, it seems clear that 
                                                          
262 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 49 
263 I should note here that Corvino’s understanding of Leiter’s insulation feature is mistaken here. As 
discussed in this chapter, being insulated from evidence in Leiter’s sense means being insulated in practice 
from empirical evidence, not being insulated “beyond human understanding” – which is too sweeping.  
264 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 50 
104 
 
 
religious ontological beliefs can often appeal to private evidence for justification instead of 
empirical evidence. But what’s not entirely clear is whether religious conscience beliefs can 
similarly appeal to private evidence for justification instead of moral values. Regardless, 
even if religious conscience beliefs do not directly appeal to private evidence, they may 
nevertheless indirectly appeal to private evidence insofar as religious conscience beliefs – 
at least to some degree – are influenced by religious ontological beliefs that directly appeal 
to private evidence.265 
Second, even when we grant that religious conscience beliefs uniquely rely on 
private evidence either directly or indirectly, should this make a legal difference overall? 
Though there may be evidential differences between religious and nonreligious conscience 
beliefs, perhaps there is no reason to think that their evidential position is ultimately a 
relevant consideration when determining the permissibility of granting legal exemptions. 
In other words, perhaps the whole discussion surrounding the respective insulation of 
                                                          
265 It’s worth highlighting here that the opposite seems possible too: religious ontological beliefs can be 
indirectly influenced by – at least to some degree – moral values insofar as they are influenced by religious 
conscience beliefs that directly appeal to moral values. On the one hand, religious ontological beliefs (which 
appeal to empirical evidence and/or private evidence) can affect our religious conscience beliefs – e.g., 
believing that God exists can affect what actions I take to be right or wrong. But the opposite also seems true: 
religious conscience beliefs (which appeal to moral values) can affect our religious ontological beliefs – e.g., 
believing that certain actions are right or wrong can affect whether I believe that God exists. Thus, it is not 
only possible for ontological beliefs to affect our conscience beliefs, but it is also possible for conscience 
beliefs to affect our ontological beliefs – that is, to sort of “suppress the truth in unrighteousness.” (Romans 
1:18 NASB) The main point here is simple: because the evidentiary or justificatory relationship between 
religious ontological beliefs and religious conscience beliefs is not straightforward, we cannot simply assume 
that religious conscience beliefs are always asymmetrically influenced by religious ontological beliefs. 
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religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs from evidence is a red herring because, when 
determining the permissibility of granting legal exemptions, the legal mechanism should be 
content-neutral.266 
By adopting an approach that deemphasizes the particular content of a 
conscientious objection, courts may be able to set aside questions about evidence 
altogether and instead emphasize extrinsic features (e.g., the infringement of rights or 
harm caused to third-parties) over intrinsic features (e.g., whether the content is justified 
by private evidence) as relevant to determining whether granting a legal exemption is 
justified. Of course, other approaches consider the particular content of a conscientious 
objection as significant and, in some way, determinative of whether or not a legal 
exemption is justified. Approaches in this vein may consider the bad evidential basis of a 
conscience belief as a good reason to withhold accommodations and a good evidential basis 
as a good reason to grant accommodations. The larger question at hand in response to 
Corvino, then, is whether we ought to adopt a content-neutral or a content non-neutral 
approach to granting legal exemptions. In what follows, I offer a few cursory reasons why 
we might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully 
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence. 
                                                          
266 Separate from the central question in this paragraph is the following: even when we grant the content non-
neutralist that a religious conscience’s direct or indirect appeal to private evidence constitutes a weighty and 
relevant factor in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption, just how weighty and relevant that reason 
is or should be remains unhelpfully unclear – especially when considered amongst competing reasons for 
granting or not granting an exemption. This related though different question will be covered at length at the 
end of the next chapter. 
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Nadia Sawicki is an example of a contemporary theorist who defends a content-
neutral view. Broadly, she argues that true respect for any claim of conscience demands a 
consistent, coherent, and repeatable mechanism for legal accommodation, even if that test 
is open-ended and results in uncertainty at the margins.267 More specifically, she thinks 
that the most promising legal mechanism for determining the permissibility of 
conscientious exemptions may be the kind of content-neutral balancing test often used in 
constitutional law – indeed, the kind that we see with RFRA.268 While she grants that a 
balancing approach may be subject to criticism (e.g., that it risks being used as a proxy for 
judgments based on majoritarian values), she thinks that the alternative to establishing a 
content-neutral guiding principle is to “abandon the promise of freedom of conscience and 
concede that American society considers exercises of personal conscience to be valuable 
only to the extent that they align with widely accepted moral principles.”269 This 
alternative, Sawicki argues “would undermine the foundational purpose of legal 
accommodation of conscientious belief, which is to protect individuals from oppressive 
majoritarian understanding of morality.”270 
 Amy Sepinwall reaches a similar conclusion about content-neutrality when 
addressing a separate though related question: when is a claim of moral complicity 
compelling enough to warrant an accommodation – especially when that accommodation 
would impose costs on third parties? Her answer is that conscientious objections should 
                                                          
267 Nadia Sawicki (2012), 1395 
268 Nadia Sawicki (2012), 1396 
269 Nadia Sawicki (2012), 1396 
270 Nadia Sawicki (2012), 1396 
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likewise be evaluated under a sort of content-neutral RFRA regime but that “a separate, 
additional set of considerations must be brought to bear – namely, considerations tracking 
the interests of third parties.”271 Thus, she suggests adding to the content-neutral RFRA test 
an additional feature: roughly, third-party costs “exceeding some threshold amount should 
be found untenable – and exemptions should be denied when these excessive costs would 
otherwise result.272 Specifying exactly where this threshold might be on a cost spectrum is, 
Sepinwall thinks, “a matter for democratic deliberation.”273  
Sepinwall adds this extrinsic feature to her test of exemption demarcation because 
of the reasons she sees for refraining from evaluating the intrinsic content of any given 
conscience belief. Because courts are limited when evaluating the more intrinsic features of 
a conscience belief, Sepinwall believes that courts should instead focus on more extrinsic 
features when determining whether a legal exemption is warranted.  
In fact, Sepinwall argues that moral beliefs in general – which include conscience 
beliefs – should enjoy total deference by courts. A position of total deference to objectors’ 
moral beliefs appropriately maintains the “skepticism and humility that we owe one 
another as compatriots in a pluralistic society.”274 And given the reality of moral and 
religious pluralism, “we are often without a capacity for certitude … in moral and religious 
                                                          
271 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1974  
272 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1974 
273 Sepinwall (2015) writes: “There is no a priori, context-independent answer to the question of how much of 
a burden it is fair to impose on third parties for the sake of respecting religious observance.” (1975) 
274 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1927 
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matters … that would allow us to discern truth and falsity” – it seems like an attitude of 
“moral deference on the part of the state” is appropriate.275 
But what about particular moral beliefs that are highly objectionable like racism or – 
to cite Sepinwall’s example – homophobia?276 Should certain limits on moral deference and 
content-neutrality be appropriated so as to ensure that courts, as State actors, are not 
compelled to treat highly objectionable moral beliefs like racism as on par with other moral 
beliefs? To this question, Sepinwall offers three responses. First, she argues that “according 
deference to a claim that denigrates another group is not the same as endorsing that 
claim.”277 Though a court should treat the moral belief with deference and neutrality, 
Sepinwall thinks that courts have a responsibility to clearly articulate that such a moral 
view “flies in the face of our most fundamental constitutional values…[thereby serving] 
                                                          
275 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1927 
276 Interestingly, though Sepinwall (2015) grants much deferential latitude for religious claims of complicity, 
she nevertheless thinks that “we should expect that claims seeking religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws would typically fail” because the third parties whose interests are relevant in these 
cases are those who are “immediately denied service or employment by the religious objector.” (1978) 
Moreover, she thinks that “all members of the group facing discrimination can claim an expressive injury 
from the discrimination” and that “other historically oppressed groups can claim that an exemption threatens 
them with an injury, too.” (1978) A state that grants an exemption to the religious objector in this case runs 
the risk of failing to “take seriously the great evil of discrimination” and undermining “the sense of security 
and respect that a decent state should confer on all its citizens.” (1978) 
277 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1928 
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religious freedom but also [speaking] in favor of the notion of equal respect that underpins 
our constitutional regime.”278 
Second, deferring to and remaining neutral toward a moral claim doesn’t necessarily 
commit a court to issuing an exemption: the objector’s assertion must still be weighed 
against a governmental interest. Hence, the entitlements that citizens enjoy would be 
defeasible. It may turn out, for example, that in some instances, “the government will invoke 
its compelling interest in the eradication of, say, racism, and it will wield that interest to 
defeat the bid for an exemption.”279 We should note, too, that the moral belief must also be 
weighed by the court against the interests of third parties – at least according to 
Sepinwall’s revised test. She writes: 
Third parties will presumably be able to marshal arguments that acceding to 
the believer’s hateful claim inflicts a grave injury on them—one so grave that 
the court should find it dispositive. But even if third parties choose not to 
become too vexed about the believer’s claim, the state must, again in its 
capacity as a defender of our constitutional regime, add to its arguments 
about the compelling interests underpinning the challenged legal 
requirement a statement decrying the challenge because it deviates from our 
most cherished constitutional values.280 
In sum, Sepinwall argues that courts should afford a great deal of deference and 
neutrality when facing a conscientious objection. After all, “pluralism demands respect for 
                                                          
278 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1928 
279 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1928 
280 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1929 
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religious differences, but that respect goes both ways: it entails that we must be open to 
many claims of conscience, but we must also ensure that these claims do not unduly or 
disproportionately interfere with the interests of discrete third parties.”281 However, the 
deferential conclusion sketched here does not necessarily entail that an objector is always 
entitled to an exemption. Even though the courts “should in general treat as true the 
religious adherent’s claim…, they must still consider whether acceding to a request for an 
accommodation would impose undue burdens on third parties.”282 
Finally, Nathan Chapman offers several reasons why we ought to grant broad, 
content-neutral, defeasible entitlements for conscience beliefs. He argues that grating such 
entitlements for conscience may help to protect against tyranny insofar as “protecting 
conscience undermines the totalization of morality by the government.”283 By promoting a 
robust liberty of conscience, several anti-tyrannical consequences are encouraged – such as 
fueling advancements in otherwise stagnant democratic deliberation and aiding the 
elimination of at least some disputes over moral differences that “might otherwise 
monopolize the public sphere of a pluralistic society” – which may then leave “objectors 
and their opponents more resources … to debate (and to collaborate on) other important 
matters.”284 Such debate and collaboration may also generate social trust between groups 
that might otherwise be suspicious of each other.”285 Securing broad, content-neutral, 
                                                          
281 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1972 
282 Amy Sepinwall (2015), 1910 
283 Nathan Chapman (2013), 1494 
284 Nathan Chapman (2013), 1499 
285 Nathan Chapman (2013), 1499 
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defeasible protections for conscience also “limits the government’s pretensions to absolute 
moral authority,” permits “nonconformist moral thought that aims to undermine moral 
tyranny,” and allows the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has “an important place 
in political history and theory” – the kind that can be “particularly effective at jarring a 
morally apathetic society into taking notice and making important changes.”286 Lastly, such 
protections for conscience may also keep minority thoughts and practices alive against the 
conclusions promoted by the majority, allow for “majority decisions to be provisional,” 
allow the “persuasiveness of minority speech to be aided by the persuasiveness of minority 
action,” and allow for those who disagree with prevailing norms to prolong internal and 
national dialogues over contested moral issues.287 
VI. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided support for my central claim – namely, that because 
religious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar to other conscience beliefs, there is no 
good reason to treat them differently before the law. In particular, I narrowed in on two of 
Brian Leiter’s main features of the religious conscience: categoricity and insulation from 
evidence respectively. After showing that Leiter’s categoricity feature is shared by both 
kinds of conscience, I turned my attention to Leiter’s arguments that religious beliefs are 
insulated from evidence, and as a result, are not worthy of special legal treatment. I argued 
that Leiter failed to show that religious conscience beliefs are both in principle responsive 
to empirical evidence and in practice typically more insulated from this evidence than 
secular conscience beliefs. If I am right about this, then Leiter failed to sufficiently 
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distinguish the religious conscience from the secular conscience and failed to answer the 
“central puzzle” of his book Why Tolerate Religion? I then looked at whether or not it is 
plausible to understand the religious conscience as insulated from other forms of evidence. 
Following the research of social-psychologist Jonathan Haidt, I argued that, typically, both 
forms of conscience seem to be similarly insulated from a relevant kind of evidence – 
namely, moral argumentation. I also showed that, while it seems as though the religious 
conscience usually draws from a larger set of moral values when compared to the secular 
conscience, this should make no legal difference overall. Lastly, I considered whether 
religious conscience beliefs uniquely appeal either directly or indirectly to private 
evidence. In response, I concluded the chapter by offering a few cursory arguments why we 
might prefer content-neutral approaches without making a complete case – hopefully 
curtailing any lingering questions about comparative evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: FURTHER FEATURES 
Religion is a special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a wide variety of roles in 
human life: it is an institution, but it is more than that; it is an ideology or worldview, but it is 
more than that; it is a set of personal loyalties and locus of community, akin to family ties, but 
it is more than that; it is an aspect of identity, but it is more than that; it provides answers to 
questions of ultimate reality, and offers a connection to the transcendent; but it is more than 
that. Religion cannot be reduced to a subset of any larger category. In any particular context, 
religion may appear to be analogous to some other aspect of human activity - to another 
institution, worldview, personal loyalty, basis of personal identity, or answer to ultimate and 
transcendent questions. However, there is no other human phenomenon that combines all of 
these aspects; if there were such a concept, it would probably be viewed as a religion. 
  – Michael McConnell, “The Problem of Singling out Religion,” p. 42 
I. Introduction 
As in the last chapter, I continue to provide support for my central claim by 
analyzing several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs taken to be 
legally relevant by theorists in the field. Overall, I contend that there are no features held 
by either kind of conscience that give us good grounds to adopt an Inegalitarian Response 
to the original specialness question. Instead, I argue that a comparative analysis between 
the two kinds of conscience actually gives us good reason to adopt an Egalitarian Response 
to the specialness question since they are sufficiently similar in nature. 
In this chapter in particular, I narrow in on three further, possibly delineating 
features of the religious conscience that theorists take to be legally relevant. First, I 
investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are more central to our identity – and 
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relatedly, whether they are more central to our moral integrity. Ultimately, I argue that 
both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are sufficiently central to our identity 
and moral integrity such that there is no obvious reason to grant preferential legal 
treatment to one over the other. Second, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs 
are more primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I contend that granting legal exemptions 
on the grounds that the belief or practice in question is primordial or non-voluntary is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argue that non-voluntariness should not be 
classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal exemption. Second, I argue that 
non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption either. And third, I argue that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient 
condition, it should not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption. 
As I end chapter four, I investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are uniquely 
linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice so that differential treatment before the law 
is warranted. I argue that, because both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs have 
similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance, their differential treatment 
before the law is plausibly unwarranted. First, I argue that unjustified prejudice and 
intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar 
as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by 
both kinds of conscience. Second, I argue that we should be skeptical that religious 
conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and 
intolerance. If these claims are right, then it seems like we should accept an anti-
intolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach. And if the anti-
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intolerance approach is adopted, then we have no reason to treat religious conscientious 
objectors with special, negative treatment. Nevertheless, I conclude by highlighting a 
further problem for both the anti-religious approach and the anti-intolerance approach: 
just how relevant or how weighty should content-based reasons be in the exemption 
calculus if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief, 
practice, or ideology? 
II. Central to Identity 
 The first feature we will investigate as possibly demarcating religious conscience is 
the central to identity feature. That is, perhaps the religious conscience is 
disproportionately central to the identity of its possessor when compared to the centrality 
of the secular conscience to its possessor – and as such, the former is thought to be more 
deserving of legal protections. As Alberto Giubilini notes, the conscience in general 
“delimits a sphere of personal morality that is an essential part of our sense of personal 
identity, understood as our sense of who we are and of what characterizes qualitatively our 
individuality (for instance, our character, our psychological traits, our past experience, 
etc.).”288 Perhaps the religious conscience is more central to our identity such that it is more 
constitutive of, more important to, or plays a greater role in shaping the identity of its 
possessor. Do we have reason to believe that this is the case? And if it is the case, should 
this count as a good reason to legally privilege the religious conscience?  
 One reason that people might initially think that religious conscience beliefs are 
more central to our identity is that religious beliefs in general seem to be more central to 
our identity than other kinds of beliefs. As such, it seems plausible to legally single out 
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religious beliefs: after all, they seem to serve as a proxy for, or else provide “evidence for 
deep and important commitments” – roughly, the sorts of things that are central to our 
identity.289 This way of thinking is flawed for at least two reasons. First, even if we take the 
above claim at face value, religious beliefs are nevertheless “both over and underinclusive 
as a proxy for deep and important commitments” anyway.290 As John Corvino notes, “not 
every religious claim is deep and important, and not every deep and important claim is 
religious.”291 In other words, not every belief central to one’s identity is religious and not 
every religious belief is central one’s identity. Second, and more importantly, reasoning in 
this way commits the same sort of methodological error that Leiter committed; things get 
conceptually muddy and complicated when we try to compare and contrast religious 
beliefs in general – which include conscience beliefs – with conscience beliefs in general – of 
which some are religious – for legal privileging purposes. The objects of comparison central 
to the narrow version of the specialness question are religious and secular conscience 
beliefs – not religious and conscience beliefs more generally.  
                                                          
289 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 56 
290 John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis (2017), 57. Corvino adds: “One might object here that 
the law is a rough instrument, and that any proxy is going to be either over- or underinsclusive to some 
extent. After all, the whole point of considering proxies is that direct evidence is either impossible or ufeasible. 
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 To work through this feature in a clearer way that avoids Leiter’s methodological 
mistake, we should again look back at the nature of conscience – i.e., the faculty that applies 
our values in order to produce beliefs about what actions or attitudes are wrong or not 
wrong for us to adopt or not adopt in our past, present, or future situations. Interestingly, 
Richard Sorabji thinks that the conscience in general, religious or otherwise, is not 
necessarily central to our identity – and that being central to one’s identity is just a 
contingent and correlated feature of conscience, not constitutive of it. According to Sorabji, 
then, being central to one’s identity is neither a necessary or sufficient condition of 
conscience: conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, need not be central to one’s identity, 
and those beliefs that happen to be central to one’s identity need not be conscience beliefs.  
 To illustrate his position that conscience beliefs in general are not necessarily 
central to one’s identity, Sorabji has us consider the example of the Money Lover:  
His success in making money made him feel not merely good at money-
making, but also like a good person (a “jolly good fellow”). Moneymaking 
allowed him to structure his identity, and if “good person” is a moral 
category, his moral identity. His belief in the need to make money might be 
intensely felt, and it would facilitate his rational capacity for directing his life. 
What is needed to make his belief and practice one of conscience is some 
reference to what it would be morally wrong for him to do or not to do. In the 
example imagined, the belief and practice of moneymaking would not need 
protection as a matter of conscience, since it is an agreed form of life in no 
danger from opposing viewpoints. But if for any reason it needed to be 
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presented as a matter of conscience, that could easily be achieved by citing 
duties to family and shareholder, or, more admirably, by deliberately taking 
on duties to society.292 
In this example, it’s clear that beliefs that are central to one’s identity are not necessarily 
conscience beliefs – e.g., they could be beliefs that you’re good at money-making, and that 
money-making makes you feel good. So, beliefs that are central to one’s identity are not 
sufficient for being conscience beliefs – much less religious conscience beliefs. But is Sorabji 
right that conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, are not necessarily central to one’s 
identity? Is it possible that our conscience beliefs are not central to our identity? 
A. Moral Identity 
I don’t think Sorabji effectively makes the case that conscience beliefs are not 
central to our identity. In the above paragraph, Sorabji uses the Money Lover to seemingly 
illustrate that someone can have a moral identity without reference to conscience beliefs 
about what “would be morally wrong for him to do or not to do.” Contrary to Sorabji, 
however, it seems as though conscience beliefs at least partly constitute our moral identity 
– for it seems difficult to articulate one’s complete moral identity without ever referencing 
what they believe to be morally wrong to do or not do. While it is possible to highlight at 
least some aspects of our moral identity that are not necessarily conscience beliefs, it just 
seems impossible to discuss the totality of our moral identity without any reference to our 
conscience beliefs. If conscience beliefs are necessarily central to our moral identity, then it 
seems as though conscience beliefs might be necessarily central to our overall identity as 
well. After all, it seems plausible to think that our overall identity is at least partly 
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constituted by our moral identity. Even Sorabji seems to indicate as much: moneymaking 
allowed the Money Lover “to structure his identity” – which included “his moral identity.”  
 If I am right about this – namely, that conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise, are 
necessarily central to our overall identity insofar as conscience beliefs are a necessary 
aspect of our moral identity, and that our moral identity a necessary aspect of our overall 
identity – then is there reason to legally privilege the religious conscience over the 
nonreligious conscience? The answer seems to be “no” at first glance if both forms of 
conscience are similarly central to our moral identity if not our overall identity. It seems as 
if we should just treat both forms of conscience similarly before the law if they are at least 
similarly central to our moral or overall identity. As Gemma Cornelissen notes, “the identity 
approach locates a plausible basis for the concern behind religious exemptions, but it fails 
on its own to explain why religious beliefs should be considered more central to 
individuals’ identities than other personal attributes, including non-religious beliefs.”293 
But, importantly, what if these forms of conscience are dissimilarly central to our identity 
such that the religious conscience is somehow more central to our moral or overall 
identity? 
 Even if religious conscience beliefs are somehow more central to an individual’s 
moral or overall identity, I still don’t think that it is a sufficient reason for preferential 
treatment before the law. While it’s true that “the identity approach seems, at least at first 
glance, to come close to what people are concerned with when they claim a religious 
exemption,”294 it doesn’t seem as though identity concerns are the only relevant grounds 
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for an exemption worth considering. As such, it seems possible that the nonreligious 
conscience – as well as the religious conscience, really – could be justifiably granted the 
same legal exemption, but on non-identity grounds. In fact, Sorabji accepts this conclusion, 
believing that conscience’s “connection with being in the wrong accounts for the force of, 
and respect for, conscience of others, for no one wants to be in the wrong.”295 As such, he 
doesn’t think that we would need to look for something additional in order to ground 
protections for conscience – such as its “being central to people’s identity.”296 In this sort of 
scenario, religious conscience might be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise 
– but it might not matter much with respect to comparative treatment before the law: there 
might be adequate, non-identity grounds for legal exemptions that are similarly shared by 
either form of conscience. As noted by Sorabji, the relevant feature for grounding an 
exemption might just be that the belief in question is conscientious in nature, not 
necessarily that it is central – or more central – to one’s identity.  
 While that may be true, it’s also worth noting here that even if the religious 
conscience were understood to be more central to one’s identity – moral or otherwise – 
there might be simpler reasons to treat both forms of conscience equally. If we suppose 
that being central to one’s identity is a relevant consideration for determining the 
permissibility of an exemption and that secular conscience is nevertheless central to one’s 
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identity even though it’s not as central as the religious conscience, then it seems plausible 
to think that the secular conscience would remain sufficiently central to one’s identity so as 
to warrant the exemption. We can see this point illustrated in the Seeger and Welsh cases, 
for example. We can, for the sake of argument, just suppose religious conscience beliefs 
against conscription were more central to the identity of the objectors than the secular 
conscience beliefs against conscription in these cases. But even if they were more central, it 
still seems as though the secular conscience beliefs against conscription were sufficiently 
central to their identity so as to warrant the same exemption. After all, the secular 
conscience beliefs in these cases qualified for the exemption because they seemed to 
sufficiently occupy “in the life of [their] possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of 
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”297 As Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure 
argue, “it is not religious convictions in themselves that must enjoy a special status but, 
rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to structure their moral identity.”298 
B. Moral Integrity 
Just as some have inquired about the centrality of religious conscience beliefs to the 
moral identity of their possessor, others have relatedly inquired about the centrality of 
religious conscience beliefs to the moral integrity of their possessor. This might sound like 
doubletalk, but it’s important to point out that moral identity, conscience, and moral 
integrity are different but related concepts. Alberto Giubilini writes: 
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The concept of personal identity in the sense in which the notion is used here 
– i.e., what defines me as this particular person in a qualitative sense – is 
intimately related to the notions of conscience and of moral integrity, and 
more specifically to  the “identity view of integrity.” According to this view, 
for people to have integrity means to remain faithful to “identity-conferring 
commitments,” i.e., “commitments that people identify with most deeply, as 
constituting what they consider their life is fundamentally about.”299 
So, on the one hand, one’s moral identity can be constituted by something like Taylor and 
Maclure’s “core beliefs,” or what Giubilini refers to as “identity-conferring commitments” – 
and which, I should add, plausibly include our conscience beliefs, religious or otherwise. On 
the other hand, one’s moral integrity is constituted by the degree to which we “remain 
faithful” to these “core beliefs” or “identity-conferring commitments” – which, again, 
plausibly include our conscience beliefs. When someone fails to “remain faithful” to their 
“core beliefs” or “identity-conferring commitments,” they are, to some degree, lacking 
moral integrity. When we fail to integrate our moral values and beliefs with our actions or 
attitudes – and when we possess knowledge of this defect – we are said to have a guilty 
conscience. We might say that it is hard to “live with myself”300  insofar as part of us “knows 
of the defect but is keeping it a secret” and “the other shares the secret.”301 As Sorabji notes, 
                                                          
299 Alberto Giubilini (2016) 
300 James F. Childress (1979), 315-35 
301 Richard Sorabji (2014), 12 
123 
 
 
“for those who feel the force of conscience strongly, the expression ‘I could not live with 
myself’ displays the connection of a clear conscience with integrity.”302 
 The relevant question at hand concerns what sort of relationship religious and 
nonreligious conscience beliefs have to our moral integrity respectively. After all, requests 
for exemptions are commonly made on the grounds of respecting moral integrity – 
especially in healthcare contexts.303 When we suppose that both kinds of conscience belief 
are similarly central to our moral integrity, there remains no obvious reason to legally 
privilege religious conscience beliefs over secular conscience beliefs. And even when we 
suppose that the religious conscience is – if possible – somehow more central to our moral 
integrity, there nevertheless seems to be no obvious reason to legally privilege the religious 
conscience over the secular. Even in this latter scenario, it is plausible to think that, when 
the religious conscience is – if possible – somehow more central to one’s moral integrity, 
the secular conscience may be nonetheless sufficiently central to one’s moral integrity so as 
to warrant similar accommodations. Perhaps Seeger and Welsh are good examples of cases 
where nonreligious conscience beliefs were understood to be sufficiently central to one’s 
moral integrity so as to warrant granting them the same legal accommodations enjoyed by 
religious conscience beliefs that were admittedly central to one’s moral integrity. Overall 
then, the same sort of argument made when discussing the relationship between religious 
conscience and moral identity can be plausibly made when discussing the relationship 
between religious conscience and moral integrity as well.  
III. Primordialism and Non-Voluntariness  
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The next feature under investigation concerns primordialism and non-
voluntariness. More specifically, I will investigate whether religious conscience beliefs are 
somehow less freely chosen or constructed such that they deserve special legal treatment 
over and above their more freely chosen, secular counterparts. Sonu Bedi, for example, 
contends that the primordial and non-voluntary nature of a given belief should be a 
relevant consideration when determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption. 
He argues that “granting religious groups exemptions from facially neutral laws stands on 
the horns of an often neglected but core dilemma” involving the role of choice:304 
On the one hand, contemporary theory has come to see religious affiliations 
and practices as contingent, open-ended and freely constructed. On the other 
hand, in order to justify different or special treatment for such groups we 
must view these affiliations as unchosen, static and not freely constructed. I 
argue that we cannot have it both ways…We must be able to identify the 
difference between religion and mere preference, and this difference must be 
enough to justify the religious exemption. I argue that doing so requires 
viewing the religious practice as anything but voluntary. That is, in 
establishing the all-important exemption, we must see the religious practice 
as effectively unchosen, rigid and inhospitable to contestation. Consequently, 
securing an exemption entails rejecting the open-ended, freely constructed 
and contingent characterization of religious affiliations. Put simply, the more 
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the religious group is seen as just like any other voluntary association or 
preference, the more difficult it becomes to justify an exemption.305 
So, Bedi argues that religious beliefs in general – and by association, religious 
conscience beliefs in particular – can only enjoy special treatment in the form of legal 
exemptions if they are understood to be “effectively unchosen, rigid and inhospitable to 
contestation.” Conversely, any sort of “voluntary association or preference” would stand 
comparatively less justified for special treatment in the form of legal exemptions. Thus, the 
justification for special legal treatment and the lack of free-choice are, according to Bedi, 
inversely proportional: as our role in choosing beliefs decreases, our justification for 
deserving special treatment in the form of a legal exemption increases – and vice versa. 
A. The (Religious) Belief Continuum  
Bedi’s above argument rests on a few, key claims worth highlighting and analyzing. 
The first is that religious beliefs “can be characterized along a continuum.”306 On one end, 
the religious belief “is entirely unchosen” – “something one cannot help but do.”307 Here, 
religion is understood to be “a priori and given: there is no choice in being Sikh or 
Christian” because religious beliefs “are rigid, static and compelled.”308 Religion more 
generally is “primordial.”309 Bedi continues: 
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It is primordial because unlike a simple preference or membership in the 
voluntary association—the Rotary Club or the local charity group, religious 
affiliations are importantly prior and essential. We are born into them. They 
shape and inform our identity rather than vice versa…On the primordial end 
of the continuum, religious practices are rigid and unchangeable instead of 
mutable and fluid. After all, if we cannot choose such practices—that is, they 
are simply given—we as individuals cannot alter, change or even revise 
them.310 
On this far end of the spectrum, our religious beliefs – which would include religious 
conscience beliefs – are entirely unchosen.  
On the other far end of the spectrum, religious belief “is characterized as entirely 
voluntary.”311 Here, religious beliefs are entirely chosen: 
The other end contends that all religious affiliations and practices are chosen 
making the very notion of a coherent community a fiction. After all, as an 
empirical matter individuals do convert, leave particular faiths, and even pick 
and choose which religious tenets to follow. Here we are seen as choosing 
everything, leaving nothing up to mere circumstance. Religious practices are 
mere preferences alterable as we see fit. Far from being constrained by such 
affiliations, we create, change, affirm, fix and amend them. They do not 
determine our behavior, rather we determine them.312 
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Bedi “highly doubt[s] that religion occupies one extreme or the other” and, instead, 
occupies a position somewhere in the middle – which seems plausible enough. In the 
middle, religious beliefs – which, again, would include religious conscience beliefs – would 
include elements that are both chosen and unchosen.  
Gemma Cornelissen similarly investigates the “nature of believing” when evaluating 
the original specialness question, concluding alongside Bedi that religious beliefs likely lie 
somewhere in the middle.313 Cornelissen agrees with the “standard picture” in philosophy 
that belief acquisition broadly speaking is roughly analogous to catching a cold.314 In some 
sense, she agrees that “one cannot decide what one believes” since “beliefs aim at truth” – 
but that this should be taken with two large caveats.315 First, it’s clear that “we can control 
many aspects of our surrounding circumstances which tend to give rise to and sustain 
certain beliefs and not others.”316 “We can,” Cornelissen writes, “choose to attend church 
services in attempt to promote in ourselves a belief in that church’s teaching” for 
example.317 Similarly, we can choose to place ourselves in a particular context that tends to 
give rise to and sustain a cold as well. While we don’t choose to have a cold in a strong 
sense, we do choose to set ourselves up in a particular way in order to catch that cold. 
Second, it seems like we can also “control the extent to which we exercise or apply our 
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beliefs in reasoning and behavior.”318 Cornelissen illustrates this point with an interesting 
Seeger and Welsh-like example: “An individual might have little control over believing that 
war is wrong but, in theory, she could very well choose not to apply her belief if 
conscripted.” Accordingly, Cornelissen argues that beliefs seem to “require endorsement: 
they become relevant only when the believer not only ‘holds’ them to be true, but actively 
chooses to ‘take’ them as true in her reasoning.”319 So, like Bedi, Cornelissen also takes 
religious beliefs – which include religious conscience beliefs – to lie somewhere in the 
middle of the belief continuum described above. 
We should also notice that Bedi and Cornelissen’s position is compatible with 
Haidt’s views – namely, that conscience beliefs in general seem to be typically insulated 
from moral argumentation in similar ways. For Haidt, the process of forming moral beliefs 
begins by non-volitionally and primordially adopting moral values (which run the risk of 
reflecting merely local conventions, customs, or superstitions), then non-volitionally 
applying these values to our particular actions or attitudes, and then non-volitionally 
producing an intuitive moral judgment. The only seemingly chosen or non-primordial 
aspect of this process is a “post-hoc rationalization” step involving appeals to moral 
arguments in order to justify our beliefs.320 Interestingly, Haidt believes that the non-
volitional and primordial intuitive moral judgments of conscience are still, at least in 
principle, open to change and amendment (e.g., through moral argumentation or intuitive 
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moral judgments produced in us) even though, in practice, they are typically unchanging 
and insulated from relevant evidence. 
The process Haidt describes seems to fit well with Cornelissen’s “standard picture” 
of belief acquisition: there are non-volitional and primordial aspects to our beliefs that are, 
in principle, open to change – but this change typically happens in an indirect sort of way, 
e.g., by controlling our belief-forming influences and controlling the extent to which we 
exercise or apply our beliefs in reasoning and behavior. Cornelissen’s second caveat – that 
we can control the extent to which we exercise or apply our beliefs in reasoning and 
behavior – might help to explain Haidt’s finding that our moral beliefs are, in practice, 
typically insulated from relevant and contrary evidence. Though friends might challenge us 
and give us reasons and arguments that sometimes “trigger new intuitions, thereby making 
it possible for us to change our minds,” we could nevertheless fail to endorse the intuition 
or belief, failing to actively choose to “take” them as true in our reasoning even when we 
might non-volitionally “hold” them to be true. 
B. Non-Voluntariness and Legal Exemptions 
Bedi continues that “much contemporary theory rejects the primordial view and 
explicitly moves towards the paradigm of choice and contestability.”321 As noted above, he 
thinks that by moving “in the direction of anti-primordialism…we undercut the ability to 
grant an exemption, to treat religion as special or different from a mere preference or 
voluntary association.”322 Justifiably granting an exemption gets so undermined because – 
according to Bedi’s second, key claim – “the only way to effectively justify [an] exemption is 
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to treat the affiliation or practice as non-voluntary, as anything but contestable or fluid.”323 
Is it true that the only justifiable grounds for granting a legal exemption that the belief in 
question be non-voluntary? Why think that non-voluntary, primordial beliefs are the only 
sorts of beliefs worthy of legal exemptions? 
I find Bedi’s second, key claim to be problematic for at least three reasons. First, it 
seems as though non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary condition for 
obtaining a legal exemption – a view that Bedi clearly posits insofar as he thinks that 
justifying a religious exemption requires that the religious belief be non-voluntary. To see 
why I think non-voluntariness fails as a necessary condition, let’s look again at the Seeger 
case. The reason that a legal accommodation was afforded to the conscientious objector 
had nothing to do with whether or not his belief was freely chosen. What was centrally in 
question was whether the objector’s belief, freely chosen or not, occupied “in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption comes within the statutory definition.” So, the pacifist who freely chooses not to 
serve in the war after carefully considering the nonreligious arguments for pacifism would 
still qualify for a legal exemption in Seeger because of their belief’s functional equivalence 
to traditional religious beliefs – not because of its non-voluntariness. The legal conclusion 
in Seeger seems like the acceptable moral conclusion as well, for we seem morally justified 
in granting a legal exemption to the pacifist who voluntarily acquired their beliefs, thus 
demonstrating the non-necessity of non-voluntariness. 
Second, it seems that non-voluntariness should not be understood as a sufficient 
condition for obtaining a legal exemption either. Remember that Bedi claims that the only 
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way to justify an exemption is that the belief in question be non-voluntary. This implies 
that Bedi understands non-voluntariness as, at the very least, sufficient for warranting a 
legal exemption. To see why non-voluntariness remains insufficient for warranting a legal 
exemption, however, just consider the real or imagined unjust discriminator whose beliefs 
are unchosen and primordial and who requests a legal exemption from some law in order 
to unjustly discriminate to an unacceptable level. The unjust discriminator would satisfy 
Bedi’s necessary and sufficient condition of possessing a non-voluntary belief – yet, 
intuitively, it seems like we are not morally justified in granting the unjust discriminator a 
legal exemption. Other interests (e.g., third-party harms) may be sufficient for blocking a 
legal exemption in such a case. Thus, this counterexample shows that non-voluntariness is 
insufficient to justify granting the requested legal exemption. 
Third, it seems that, even if we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient condition, it 
should nevertheless not be understood as the only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption. Interestingly, Bedi not only takes non-voluntariness as merely sufficient for 
warranting a legal exemption; he actually takes non-voluntariness as the only sufficient 
ground for warranting a legal exemption. Contrary to Bedi’s position, there seem to be 
other sufficient grounds for justifying legal exemptions – grounds that are likely more 
important and overriding, in fact. Again, we can look to Seeger to illustrate this point. What 
really seems to be doing the justificatory work in cases like Seeger is that the belief is 
perceived to be an obligation to its possessor – voluntarily chosen or not. That is, what 
seems central in these cases is that the belief in question places heavy demands on an 
individual’s action that “must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent 
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desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.”324 Accordingly, 
it seems as though what more centrally and sufficiently justifies granting legal exemptions 
are considerations related to obligation such as one’s moral identity, moral integrity, and 
the like – or some combination of these and related features. After all, requiring someone to 
act against their perceived obligations, freely chosen or not, would in some sense cause 
them to undermine their moral identity or moral integrity such that may not be able to “live 
with themselves.”325 Bedi rhetorically asks if something “is a choice that some have decided 
to take, why should it receive an exemption?”326 We can respond: for a multitude of other 
sufficient and possibly more important non-volitional reasons including protecting one’s 
moral identity, moral integrity, and the like. 
IV. Unjustified Intolerance and Prejudice 
The last feature that I will look at in this chapter is whether or not religious 
conscience beliefs enjoy a unique link to unjustified intolerance and prejudice such that 
negative differential treatment before the law is justified. To illustrate what I have in mind 
with this feature, consider John Corvino’s discussion about the intrinsic value of religion. 
He notes “that religion – like health, education, family, and so on – is a fundamental good 
worth promoting” insofar as it “engages the distinctively human capacity for grappling with 
basic questions about meaning and existence,” “binds people together, often for charitable 
purposes that promote the general welfare,” “provides a way to mark major life events, and 
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it offers solace in times of grief and despair.”327 Though he agrees that religion doubtlessly 
“does all of these things, and does them well,” Corvino also thinks that religion doubtlessly 
“does great evil” as well.328  
If that’s true, then perhaps we’ve identified a reason to treat religious conscience 
unequally before the law: religious conscience beliefs might have a comparatively greater 
propensity for conflict insofar as they enjoy a unique link to unjustified intolerance and 
prejudice. In response to this idea, I will argue that religious and nonreligious claims of 
conscience arguably have similar propensities for conflict such that unequal treatment 
before the law would be unjustified.  
A. Nehushtan’s Anti-Religious Approach 
As noted, some writers have worried that we may have the legal picture backwards: 
given the features of religious belief, we may actually have good reasons to afford special, 
negative legal treatment toward religious beliefs. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends 
that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs are undeserving of a 
special legal status because they possess a strong tie to unjustified intolerance. This means 
that Nehushtan defends the view that we should accept an anti-religious approach to 
granting conscientious exemptions.329 His argument for this conclusion is as follows: 
(1) Unjustified intolerance should not be tolerated; 
(2) Empirical evidence links religion and intolerance, that is, people’s 
responses to measures of religion and intolerance are closely related; 
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(3) Theoretical evidence links (some) religions and intolerance; 
(4) The religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to grant 
conscientious exemptions.330 
Overall, Nehushtan and Leiter seem to agree, then, that religious beliefs “are far more likely 
to cause harms and infringe on liberty” and, as such, believe that there might be “special 
reasons not to tolerate religion.”331 
Should we accept Nehushtan’s argument and adopt an anti-religious approach? For 
now, I will assume his first premise (since he defends it at length elsewhere332) and instead 
focus on the remaining premises. I should note, however, that nothing about Nehushtan’s 
first premise gives us any reason to treat religious conscience differently than its 
nonreligious counterpart – that is, with either special positive or special negative 
solicitude. Upon accepting (1), Nehushtan’s conclusion is just that “conscientious objections 
that rely on intolerant values should not be tolerated, including, when necessary, a refusal 
to grant conscientious exemptions.”333 What he fails to highlight is the fact that either kind 
of conscience, religious or otherwise, can rely on unjustifiably intolerant values. Given the 
nature of conscience, we know that conscience, religious or otherwise, is the applier of our 
values – values that commonly risk being intolerant because of their tendency to be derived 
from local custom or superstition. As far as the argument is concerned at this point, it 
doesn’t seem as though Nehusthan necessarily holds an anti-religious position per se. 
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Instead, it seems as though he’s arguing for an anti-intolerance position where any 
conscientious objection that might “rely on [unjustifiably] intolerant values,” religious or 
otherwise, should not be tolerated – up to the point of withholding the legal exemption. 
Furthermore, we should note that Nehushtan’s argument, at least as written, is 
formally invalid. More specifically, Nehushtan qualifies the kind of intolerance he has in 
mind with premise (1) – namely, unjustified intolerance. But in premises (2) and (3), 
Nehushtan drops the qualifier and merely describes the empirical and theoretical links that 
religion has to mere intolerance. So, in order for his argument to be valid – and for 
Nehushtan to conclude that the religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to 
grant conscientious exemptions – Nehushtan must add the unjustified qualifier to premises 
(2) and (3). In what follows, I will simply assume this friendly amendment to Nehushtan 
and interact with the valid version of his argument. 
Yet, even after we offer a friendly amendment to Nehushtan’s argument in order to 
make it valid, is it nevertheless sound? That is, are premises (2) and (3) true? Nehushtan 
claims that both empirical and theoretical evidence links some religions – specifically 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – and intolerance. Concerning (2), Nehushtan explains that 
“scholars do not dispute the strong and unique empirical links between religious 
orientation and prejudice or intolerance.”334 Two conclusions about this empirical link are 
highlighted. First, “religion and intolerance are indeed closely related” in that, “as a broad 
generalization, the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced that person is.”335 
Second, “the first conclusion should be qualified and treated with caution” – the most 
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important such qualification being “the need to differentiate between various types of 
religious orientation.”336 The importance of differentiating between various types is 
understood when we consider that “different religious orientations can entail various 
degree of intolerance towards different target-groups.”337 
To illustrate the different prejudices and intolerances displayed among particular 
religious orientations, consider the results of the following study: 
The target of prejudice is important when considering prejudice-religious 
orientations relationships. The intrinsic [religious orientation, where religion 
is an end in itself, was] consistently negatively related to the self-reported 
racial/ethnic intolerance, but it was positively related to intolerance of gay 
men and lesbians and possibly to authoritarianism and intolerance of 
communists and religious outgroups though there are few relevant studies. 
The extrinsic [religious orientation, where religion is merely a means to self-
serving ends,] was sometimes positively related to racial/ethnic and 
gay/lesbians intolerance. [The quest religious orientation, where religion is 
perceived as a quest or a way of finding the truth rather than as the truth 
itself,] showed a weak tendency to be associated with tolerance for racial 
groups; a much stronger effect appeared for gay/lesbian as targets. Finally, 
[religious fundamentalism] was consistently related to increased prejudice 
against gay/lesbian persons, women, Communists and religious outgroups, 
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as well as authoritarianism, but its relationship with racial/ethnic 
intolerance is less clear cut.338 
So, it seems as though the main takeaway from this research is that different 
religious orientations not only differ with regard to the kind of prejudice and intolerance 
(i.e., negatively or positively related), but also with regard to the object of prejudice and 
intolerance as well (e.g., races/ethnicities, gays/lesbians, women, authoritarians, 
communists, religious outgroups, etc.). Even though different religious orientations are 
differently prejudiced against and intolerant of different people groups, Nehushtan 
concludes (2): there is a strong and unique empirical link between religious orientation in 
general and prejudice or intolerance. 
Though these studies are admittedly vulnerable to criticism339 and fail to give us a 
full picture of things,340 Nehushtan nevertheless contends that “the results in these studies 
                                                          
338 Bruce Hunsberger and Lynne Jackson (2005), 812. This study is also cited in Nehushtan (2011a), 160. 
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Canada), mainly amongst Christians. This fact is unfortunate, as we might expect that the kinds and degree of 
intolerant tendencies among religious people would be culturally and geographically specific. The studies 
outside of North America that examined religious prejudice and intolerance among non-Christians are too 
few and often suffer from methodological flaws. This regrettable fact may raise doubts about whether North 
American studies should be used to draw conclusions about religion as such.” (160) 
340 Yossi Nehushtan (2011a): “…there is also good reason to believe that a considerable proportion of the 
studies conducted to date actually fail to describe how intolerant and prejudiced religious people really are. It 
is very likely that religious people are even more intolerant and prejudiced than many studies describe. Most 
of the studies have used ‘pencil and paper’ instruments that examine self-reported prejudice rather than 
using behavioral instruments to measure prejudice. In other words, most studies examined the relationship 
between religious orientation and overt forms of prejudice.” (161) 
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over time” provide us cursory reasons for accepting (3): “the relevant resemblance 
between Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and the fact that the description of religious 
fundamentalism is potentially applicable to at least these three religions, all provide 
[theoretical] grounds to believe in the applicability of the above findings to Judaism…Islam, 
[Christianity] and perhaps to other similar religions as well.”341 
B. The Anti-Intolerance Approach 
Now that we’ve seen Nehushtan’s argument laid out, we can return to the original 
question of this section: should we adopt an anti-religious approach? At the very least, I 
don’t think that Nehushtan has offered a complete argument for accepting an anti-religious 
approach. But more strongly, I think there are better reasons to accept an anti-intolerance 
approach instead when we accept Nehushtan’s first premise. To see why, first consider 
that, in order to justify adopting the anti-religious approach over the anti-intolerance 
approach, Nehushtan would need to show that religious beliefs have a uniquely strong tie to 
unjustified prejudice and intolerance that other beliefs fail to possess. More specifically, 
Nehushtan would need to show that religious conscience beliefs have a uniquely strong tie 
to unjustified prejudice and intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs fail to possess 
– and that this tie is sufficiently unique such that differential legal treatment is warranted. 
Unfortunately, Nehushtan only shows that religious beliefs are, in general, strongly tied to 
prejudice and intolerance – not that they have a uniquely strong tie to unjustified prejudice 
and intolerance in a way that justifies their special, negative treatment before the law. To 
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fully make this case, Nehushtan would need to consider the tie to unjustified prejudice and 
intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs have also. 
Additionally, this central claim that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely 
strong tie to unjustified prejudice and intolerance just seems false. At the outset, it seems 
like we can safely claim that various conscience beliefs in general possess at least some 
kind of prejudice or intolerance – regardless of the strength. Any sort of value belief with a 
particular content has the potential to be prejudiced against something or intolerant of 
something. This claim seems especially plausible when we grant, alongside Nehushtan, that 
both the kind and objects of prejudice and intolerance can vary. More crucially, however, 
the justification of the prejudice and intolerance is what seems to be important here: 
religious conscience beliefs allegedly have a uniquely strong tie to unjustified prejudice and 
intolerance that nonreligious conscience beliefs lack. Contrary to Nehusthan, I will now 
argue that religious conscience beliefs fail to possess a uniquely strong in principle or in 
practice tie to unjustified prejudice and intolerance. 
First, it seems as though unjustified prejudice and intolerance are similarly 
correlated to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs insofar as the driving force 
behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at least in principle, shared by both kinds of 
conscience. To see why this is the case, consider the example of suicide bombers offered by 
Jonathan Haidt:  
To take one example, religion does not seem to be the cause of suicide 
bombing. According to Robert Pape, who has created a database of every 
suicide terrorist attack in the last hundred years, suicide bombing is a 
nationalist response to military occupation by a culturally alien democratic 
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power. It’s a response to boots and tanks on the ground – never to bombs 
dropped from the air. It’s a response to contamination of the sacred 
homeland. (Imagine a fist punched into a beehive, and left in for a long time.) 
Most military occupations don’t lead to suicide bombings. There has to be an 
ideology in place that can rally young men to martyr themselves for a greater 
cause. The ideology can be secular (as was the case with the Marxist-Leninist 
Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka) or it can be religious (as was the case with the 
Shiite Muslims who first demonstrated that suicide bombing works, driving 
the United States out of Lebanon in 1983). Anything that binds people 
together into a moral matrix that glorifies the in-group while at the same time 
demonizing another group can lead to moralistic killing, and many religions 
are well suited for that task. Religion is therefore often an accessory to 
atrocity, rather than the driving force of the atrocity.342 
According to Haidt, unjustified prejudices and intolerances – like those manifested 
in suicide bombings – are not the unique products of religion per se, but instead seem to be 
the products of ideologies that “bind people together into a moral matrix that glorifies the 
in-group while at the same time demonizing another group.” While these ideologies can be 
either secular or religious, what serves as the primary “driving force of the atrocity” is 
being deeply embedded within the above sort of moral matrix that glorifies the in-group 
and demonizes the out-group. Thus, the underlying feature that seems to drive unjustified 
prejudice and intolerance is not, at least in principle, unique to religious conscience beliefs. 
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Second, it seems like we should doubt that unjustifiably prejudiced and intolerant 
ideologies are, in practice, uniquely religious – which seems to be the idea that really does 
the distinguishing work for Nehushtan. To see why we should doubt religion’s unique in-
practice-link to unjustified prejudice and intolerance, just consider some of the following 
claims made by the BBC’s war audit in 2004.343 For example, one of the main findings of the 
study was: 
...that the overwhelming majority of wars and the overwhelming majority of 
the victims of such wars cannot be classified primarily according to religious 
causes or religious beliefs. There have been horrific examples though where 
particular communities have been targeted because of their religious faith, 
and these atrocities have been perpetrated by the three most vicious and 
blood-thirsty regimes ever to hold power: Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China and 
Hitler’s Germany.344 
Moreover: 
The discussion of god-invoking, militantly religious states in connection with 
a propensity for war raises the question of whether atheistic or secular 
states, such as China, are less prone to war or large scale violence. The 
information…on death tolls from major wars is a fairly strong indication that 
atheism is not by itself any indicator in this direction. Atheist governments in 
the USSR, China and Russia were in fact the biggest perpetrators of mass 
violence that the world has ever seen, with both governments individually 
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responsible for many more deaths than the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler. The 
presence of the millenarian ideology of Communism (like Nazism) gave the 
rulers the justification for mass murder, in much the same way that religion 
had been used by other rulers before them the world over to justify war. The 
common thread here linking the disposition to war of religious and atheistic 
states is absolutism: the more absolutist the state, the more likely it is to go 
to war. Thus we can conclude that a genuinely secular (atheistic) state may 
be less inclined to go to war than a state in which religion is very prominent, 
only as long as the secular state is one which is not pursuing a millenarian or 
totalitarian ideology (such as Communism or Nazism) and as long as the 
state is one in which pluralism and tolerance of diversity are the norm.345 
The main point here is simple: it seems like we can be reasonably skeptical that religion 
boasts of a unique in-practice-link to unjustified prejudice and intolerance. Given the above 
claims, perhaps a good case can be made that nonreligious ideologies and beliefs – which 
include nonreligious conscience beliefs – are, in practice, similarly unjustifiably prejudiced 
and intolerant. At the very least, the modest claim is sufficient: we should doubt that 
religious ideologies and beliefs possess a uniquely strong in practice tie to unjustified 
prejudice and intolerance – especially in a way that warrants altogether different treatment 
before the law. 
If these claims are right, then we have good reason to instead accept an anti-
intolerance approach over Nehushtan’s exclusively anti-religious approach when we are 
under the assumption of his first premise. If the anti-intolerance approach is adopted, then 
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we have no reason to treat religious conscientious objectors with special, negative 
treatment. The only kind of conscience belief that might receive special, negative treatment 
before the law would be conscience beliefs based on unjustifiably intolerant values – 
regardless of their religiosity. 
C. A Remaining Problem for Content Non-Neutral Approaches 
In this last section, I raise a lingering concern that applies to all content non-neutral 
approaches. The concern is that, even when we grant the content non-neutralist that the 
unjustifiably intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant 
factor in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption, just how weighty and relevant that 
reason is or should be remains unhelpfully unclear – especially when considered amongst 
competing reasons for granting or not granting an exemption. 
For example, Nehushtan admits that the unjustifiably prejudiced and intolerant 
content of a conscience as a reason “is not necessarily compelling,” yet ought to be 
understood as a “relevant, presumably weighty justification that should be included within 
the balance of reasons.”346 If this is true, then how strong – or for that matter, how helpful – 
is the content non-neutral conclusion of either approach described above? The content-
based reason for withholding an exemption may be relevant and weighty, but how relevant 
and how weighty? Other reasons included within the balance of reasons could very well be 
like legitimate governmental interests in a liberal society: not necessarily equally weighty 
or equally important.347 So, if the reason isn’t necessarily compelling and is categorized as 
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just one reason among many within the balance of reasons, then it can end up being 
marginally relevant and weighty. In the end, then, how helpful and how much does the anti-
religious or anti-intolerance approach really accomplish if content-based reasons are 
marginally relevant and weighty within the balance of reasons? 
Nehushtan’s reply to the concern about the weight of the content-based reason will 
vary according to whether one adopts what he calls “the narrow thesis” or “the broad 
thesis.” Concerning the narrow thesis, he writes: 
According to what I shall call ‘the narrow thesis’, if claims for religious-
conscientious exemptions are based directly on intolerant values, beliefs and 
conscience, or on values that utterly undermine the rationales for tolerance, 
the state has a strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant the exemption. 
This view does not accord any weight to the fact that the conscientious 
objection is based on religious beliefs. It also does not take a stand against 
religion as such. Nevertheless, even within the narrow thesis, it is important 
to acknowledge the existence of the links between certain religions and 
intolerance. These links should lead authorities to apply a cautious, perhaps 
suspicious attitude towards religious requests for conscientious exemptions, 
even though the decision would have to be made mainly on a case-by-case 
basis, that is, according to the content of the values that ground each and 
every conscientious objection, be it religious or not.348 
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from setting a hierarchy of values or rights or giving a priori priority to certain rights over others.” (148-49) 
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From this paragraph, we can note a few things. First, the content-based reason is 
considered “normally prevailing” when the conscience belief in question is “based directly 
on intolerant values” – or based directly “on values that utterly undermine the rationales 
for tolerance.” Unfortunately, there is no further discussion about the kinds of reasons that 
might count against this otherwise “normally prevailing,” content-based reason. Given the 
above description, it seems clear that adopting “the narrow thesis” implies the anti-
intolerance approach over the anti-religious approach. Under the narrow thesis, what 
matters is whether the conscience belief in question is based on unjustified intolerant 
values – regardless of its religiosity – such that each request for an exemption must be 
made “on a case-by-case basis.” Moreover, Nehushtan thinks that, given the strong link 
between religious beliefs, prejudice, and intolerance, authorities should “apply a cautious, 
perhaps suspicious attitude towards religious requests for conscientious exemptions.” That 
is, he argues that, under the narrow thesis, we should treat all conscientious objectors the 
same before the law in the sense that they must all be ran through the same legal 
mechanism to determine the permissibility of granting an exemption. But when a religious 
objector comes along, authorities should be comparatively more suspicious. If I am right 
that we should be skeptical that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely strong tie to 
unjustified prejudice and intolerance, then his conclusion here would be unreasonably 
discriminatory against religious believers. 
The second part of Nehushtan’s answer to the question about the weight of the 
content-based reason concerns what he calls “the broad thesis.” Though Nehushtan does 
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not “argue which of these two theses is preferable,” he admittedly tends “to favor the broad 
rather than the narrow thesis.”349 Concerning to the broad thesis, Nehustan writes: 
According to what I shall call ‘the broad thesis’, the state has a good reason, 
although not necessarily a prevailing one, not to grant religious conscientious 
exemptions, even in cases where the claims to be granted exemptions are not 
based directly on intolerant values, beliefs or conscience. The state may have 
such a reason because of the special links between certain religions and 
intolerance. The stronger the link regarding a certain religion, the stronger is 
the reason not to grant religious conscientious exemptions to its adherents. 
The broad thesis assumes that the tolerant-liberal state has a right both to 
strengthen its liberal, secular nature and to discourage its citizens from 
choosing a religious way of life. The broad thesis suggests that granting 
conscientious exemptions to religious objectors who act upon a conscience 
that is not intolerant may still support, even if indirectly institutions or 
practices of that religion that are intolerant.350 
We should note a few things about adopting the broad thesis as well. First, the old 
problem about how relevant and weighty the content-based reason is within the balance of 
reasons returns – showing again that Nehusthan’s claims about this content-based reason 
aren’t that helpful. In fact, this particular problem may be worse under the broad thesis 
insofar as the reason can be considered relevant “even in cases where the claims to be 
granted exemptions are not based directly on intolerant values.” Unfortunately, the 
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relevance and weight of the content-based reason is already ambiguous. But under the 
broad thesis, whether or not the particular conscience belief actually violates content-
based concerns would be uniquely and additionally ambiguous. After all, the content-based 
reason would now be considered relevant even in cases where the claim in question is 
based even indirectly on intolerant values – whatever that might look like. Lastly, if I am 
right that we should doubt that religious conscience beliefs possess a uniquely strong tie to 
prejudice and intolerance, then the state would seemingly have reason not to grant any sort 
of conscientious exemption in cases where the claims in question are based even indirectly 
on intolerant values. Such a conclusion, taken at face value, seems overreaching.  
Sadly, Nehushtan never quite answers whether the content-based reason “should be 
a uniquely strong reason” and even admits that this “is a question yet to be resolved.”351 
While he thinks that there is nevertheless “a strong case” for regarding the content-based 
reason as “a relevant reason,” the “question yet to be answered” remains: should the 
content-based reason merely be “a relevant factor to be considered” or should it be “a 
relatively weighty reason?”352 This is a problem for both anti-religious and anti-intolerance 
approaches. Nehushtan notes that both the narrow and broad theses “entail an evaluative, 
normative judgment which identifies either the intolerant content of a person’s religious 
conscience, the intolerant nature of a certain religion, or the intolerant practice of that 
religion.”353 And if I am right that we ought to adopt an anti-intolerance approach over an 
anti-religious approach under the assumption of Nehushtan’s first premise, then either 
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thesis would instead entail an evaluative, normative judgment which identifies either the 
intolerant content of a person’s conscience, the intolerant nature of a certain ideology, or 
the intolerant practice of that ideology. Yet, the problem about the relevance and 
weightiness of content-based reasons would show up here too: just how relevant or how 
weighty should content-based reasons be if we discover unjustifiably intolerant content in 
a person’s conscience belief, practice, or ideology? 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided further support for my central claim – namely, that 
because religious conscience beliefs are sufficiently similar to other conscience beliefs, 
there is no good reason to treat them differently before the law. In particular, I narrowed in 
on three further, possibly delineating features of the religious conscience that theorists 
take to be legally relevant. First, I investigated whether religious conscience beliefs are 
more central to our identity – and relatedly, whether they are more central to our moral 
integrity. Ultimately, I argued that both religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are 
sufficiently central to our identity and moral integrity such that there is no obvious reason 
to grant preferential legal treatment to one over the other. Second, I investigated whether 
religious conscience beliefs are more primordial, unchosen, or non-voluntary. I claimed 
that granting legal exemptions on the grounds that the belief or practice in question is 
primordial or non-voluntary is problematic for at least three reasons. First, I argued that 
non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary condition for obtaining a legal 
exemption. Second, I argued that non-voluntariness should not be understood as a 
sufficient condition for obtaining a legal exemption either. And third, I argued that, even if 
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we grant non-voluntariness as a sufficient condition, it should not be understood as the 
only sufficient condition for obtaining a legal exemption.  
As I ended the chapter, I investigated whether religious conscience beliefs are 
uniquely linked to unjustified intolerance and prejudice such that differential treatment 
before the law is warranted. I argued that both religious and nonreligious conscience 
beliefs plausibly have similar propensities for unjustified prejudice and intolerance such 
that unequal treatment before the law is, in fact, unwarranted. First, I argued that 
unjustified prejudice and intolerance are similarly correlated to religious and nonreligious 
conscience beliefs insofar as the driving force behind the prejudice and intolerance is, at 
least in principle, shared by both kinds of conscience. Second, I argued that we should 
doubt that religious conscience beliefs enjoy a uniquely strong in-practice-link to 
unjustified prejudice and intolerance. If these claims are right, then I argued that we should 
accept the anti-intolerance approach over an exclusively anti-religious approach under the 
assumption of Nehushtan’s first premise. And when the anti-intolerance approach is 
adopted, we have no reason to treat religious conscientious objectors with special, negative 
treatment. Nevertheless, I concluded by highlighting a further problem for both the anti-
religious approach and the anti-intolerance approach: just how relevant or how weighty 
should content-based reasons be in the exemption calculus if we discover unjustifiably 
intolerant content in a person’s conscience belief, practice, or ideology? 
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CHAPTER 5: OBJECTIONS TO THE EGALITARIAN RESPONSE 
 A strategy of mandatory religious exemptions…puts religionists and secularists at war with 
one another, with the former claiming a right to be free from laws that the latter must obey. 
By contrast, a strategy for protecting religion under broader umbrellas of rights and 
immunities makes religionists and secularists into partners in developing a workable theory 
of the limited state.  
– Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People, p. 180 
I. Introduction  
Having argued for the Egalitarian Response, in the last chapter I address several 
lurking objections to this position. In the first section, I address the multifaceted critique of 
the Egalitarian Response advanced by Kathleen Brady. In particular, I address her claims 
that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special legal treatment because they enjoy a 
distinct relationship with the divine; that accepting the Egalitarian Response results in 
weaker protections for both religious and secular conscience beliefs; and that accepting the 
Egalitarian Response limits liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. In the 
second section, I address the Feasibility Objection which worries that the implications of 
accepting this response may be pragmatically or legally unworkable – possibly leading to 
something like legal anarchy. There, I discuss responses to this objection raised by Douglas 
Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offer two responses to the 
Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May – which just claims that there is no 
principled moral reason to grant legal accommodations to conscience beliefs that are not 
equally good reason to grant legal accommodations to non-moral projects. 
II. Kathleen Brady’s Objections 
151 
 
 
In her book The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law, Kathleen Brady 
advances a multifaceted critique of the Egalitarian Response to the original specialness 
question. In this section, I will detail her most salient objections and respond to them in 
turn. 
A. Religion’s Distinctive Relationship with the Divine 
Contrary to the Egalitarian Response, Brady contends that “religious beliefs and 
practices are distinctive” and that “the distinctive character of religious belief and practice 
has implications for the relationship between religion and government.”354 Concerning the 
basis of their distinctiveness, she writes: 
Unlike secular commitments, [religious beliefs and practices] involve the 
relationship of persons with the divine. Humans have the ability to reflect on 
their existence and the larger world of which they are a part, and as they do 
so, they confront the ground or source of all that is as a question and concern. 
We are all oriented to the divine. For the religious person, however, this 
orientation has become a relationship. The divine is not just a question or 
concern. The divine is present to them as something good and trustworthy, 
and the religious person seeks union or communion with the divine as 
humanity’s highest end. Salvation or liberation or fulfillment inheres in this 
connection, and through union or communion with the divine, humanity’s 
deepest existential threats are overcome. Death is overcome as human 
finitude is taken up into the infinite. So are the threats of meaninglessness 
and guilt. In the divine, the religious believer understands himself and the 
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world as they really are and should be. Life takes on meaning and is given 
purpose. The believer shares in what is eternal, absolute, and perfect. For the 
believer, all of life is lived in light of this relationship, and it reaches deep into 
the many facets of human thought and experience.355 
According to Brady, what distinguishes religious beliefs and practices from their 
secular counterparts is roughly the following: religious beliefs and practices involve 
seeking union or communion with the divine – which is humanity’s highest end and the 
ground or source of all that is. Beyond this, the divine is also described as being good, 
trustworthy, eternal, absolute, perfect, able to bring salvation, liberation, or fulfilment 
when united with, and able to overcome humanity’s deepest existential threats like 
meaninglessness, purposelessness, and guilt. Moreover, when united with the divine, the 
religious believer “understands himself and the world as they really are and should be” and 
their whole life is “lived in light of this relationship.”  
Moreover, Brady argues that religious and secular convictions are further 
differentiated insofar as they could never be “functional equivalents or fully analogous 
even when the latter take the form of moral commitments that are deeply held, central to 
personal identity, or meaning-giving.”356 In other words, Brady would not agree that 
religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be functional equivalents in the way that 
they were in Seeger and Welsh for example. We should note, however, that being functional 
equivalents and being fully analogous are different. As was decided in Seeger and Welsh, it 
seems like religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be functional equivalents while 
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only being sufficiently analogous to one another. The different modes of conscience could, 
for example, be differently insulated from certain kinds of evidence – rendering them not 
fully analogous – yet sufficiently similar such that they would qualify as functional 
equivalents before the law. What’s important for our present purposes is not necessarily 
whether or not religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs can be equally analogous but 
whether they are sufficiently functionally equivalent for purposes of determining their 
comparative legal treatment. As emphasized above, Brady’s central reason for believing in 
their functional inequality is that “religious beliefs and practices, unlike secular ones, are 
always inseparable from the believer’s encounter with the divine.”357 
So, the connectedness – the union or communion – that religious beliefs have with 
the divine seems to be the central feature that Brady takes as distinguishing religious 
conscience from secular conscience before the law. After all, religion in general is 
“different” insofar as the object of religious belief is, in some sense, the divine – “the source 
and ground of all that is.”358 While it’s true that “religious belief involves moral conviction 
and commitment” in the same way that secular belief does, Brady thinks that religious 
belief involves “more than that” – indeed, it involves the very “source of obligation.”359 So, 
Brady’s first reason for not adopting the Egalitarian Response is that religious conscience 
beliefs uniquely possess the distinctive feature of union with the divine that justifies 
affording them special legal treatment.  
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In response to Brady’s first objection, we can ask a few questions. First, while it 
seems plausible to understand union with the divine as a sufficient condition for ‘religion,’ 
is it necessary? Second, if it is necessary for a belief system to invoke some concept of the 
‘divine’ in order to be counted as a ‘religion,’ is Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ adequate for 
legal purposes? We’ll consider each of these questions in turn. 
First, while Brady’s “union with the divine” may be a sufficient condition for 
‘religion,’ is it necessary? To answer, let’s consider Confucianism – an Eastern system of 
belief that many intuitively count as a ‘religion.’ If it is a religion, and if Brady is right that 
religions distinctively seek union or communion with the divine, then we should expect 
Confucianism to distinctively seek union or communion with the divine. Interestingly, 
religion scholar Stephen Prothero argues that Confucianism actually distinguishes itself 
from other world religions by its explicit “lack of interest in the divine.”360 He writes: 
[Confucianism’s] adherents speak of an impersonal force called Heaven that 
watches over human life and legitimates the authority of rulers, and they 
have been known to revere the quasi-divine sage emperors of golden ages 
past. But they pay about as much attention to the creator God as your 
average atheist, and even less to formal theology. The Analects, which refer 
no fewer than eighteen times to an impersonal Heaven, do not once use 
personal terms for God popular in pre-Confucian China. Before Confucius, 
Chinese thinkers were more likely to speak of Heaven than Earth. After 
Confucius it was the other way around. To this day, Confucians are 
preoccupied with humans rather than gods, and with life before death rather 
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than life after it. Their concerns are ethical rather than eschatological, 
practical rather than metaphysical.361 
Given the explicit lack of interest in a personal creator God, formal theology,362 life 
after death, eschatology, and metaphysics, it’s easy to see why, at least at face value, 
Confucianism is described as “lacking interest in the divine.” If it’s true that Confucianism 
lacks a strong relationship or union with the divine as understood by Brady, then we either 
have a counterexample to Brady’s distinguishing feature of religion or else Confucianism 
isn’t really a religion after all. 
Prothero tries to answer this dilemma by giving us reason to believe that a 
necessary feature of all religions is the application of some concept of the ‘divine’ within its 
broader system and, subsequently, that Confucianism might be a religion after all: 
This [lack of interest in the ‘divine’] might make the Confucian project sound 
secular, but it makes more sense to see it as a thisworldly religion – an 
attempt to find the sacred hidden in plain sight in the profane or, as the 
contemporary Confucian thinker Tu Weiming puts it, “to regard the everyday 
human world as profoundly spiritual.” If religion is about the sacred as 
opposed to the profane, the spirit as opposed to matter, the Creator as 
opposed to the created, Confucianism plainly does not qualify. But perhaps 
                                                          
361 Stephen Prothero (2011), 105-106 
362 Prothero (2011): “Of all the religious dimensions, Confucians care the least about theology. Confucians 
traditionally speak of God about as comfortably as do French politicians, and the notion of a transcendent 
Creator calling the shots from on high is as foreign to Confucianism as Confucianism is to most Western 
readers. Confucians do affirm, however, that our human nature comes from Heaven, that the good life is a life 
lived in accordance with this nature, and that a good state carries out the Mandate of Heaven.” (108) 
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what we are to learn from this tradition is not that Confucianism is not a 
religion but that not all religious people parse the sacred and the secular the 
way Christians do.363 
Thus, Prothero seems to think that Confucianism just rejects an “otherworldly” 
interpretation of the ‘divine’ and embraces a “thisworldly” interpretation of the ‘divine’ 
instead. What this tells us is that Confucianism still embraces some concept of the ‘divine’ – 
just not a particularly theistic or otherworldly version of it “the way Christians do.”364 
Perhaps the example of Confucianism can serve as good evidence that implementing some 
notion of the ‘divine’ is necessary for all religions even though they may differ on what the 
‘divine’ really amounts to. Put another way, perhaps a necessary condition for all religions 
is that they contain this basic sacred-secular divide where what is sacred is understood as 
‘divine’ even though where the sacred-secular dividing line falls may differ from religion to 
religion. In Christianity for example, the sacred-secular divide seems to fall between the 
Augustinian eternal “City of God” and the temporal “City of Man,” but from the Confucian 
perspective, the sacred and secular are “forever trespassing upon and interpenetrating 
                                                          
363 Stephen Prothero (2011), 107 
364 Prothero (2011): “Unlike Christianity, which drives a wedge between the sacred and the secular – the 
eternal ‘City of God’ and the temporal ‘City of Man’ – Confucianism glories in creatively confusing the two. 
There is a transcendent dimension in Confucianism. Confucians just locate it in the world rather than above or 
beyond it. The closest Confucians get to Western notions of a transcendent and ‘wholly other’ God is the 
notion of Heaven (tian), which, while impersonal, nonetheless seems to have a will. But transcendence is 
always to be found here and now in human history and in human bodies themselves. What we refer to as the 
sacred and the secular are from the Confucian perspective forever trespassing upon and interpenetrating 
each other – ‘immanent transcendence.’” (108) 
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each other.”365 Both systems of belief can therefore be plausibly understood as ‘religions’ 
since they similarly rely upon a sacred-secular divide even though they differ on where the 
‘divine’ line is drawn.  
Up to this point, we have noted that it is plausible to think that when a belief system 
posits the existence of the ‘divine’ – i.e., some sacred-secular divide – it can be counted as a 
‘religion.’ But this divinity feature also seems necessary for demarcating a religion: after all, 
it is difficult to conceive of a religion that fails to posit anything as divine and fails to draw 
any sort of sacred-secular divide. Even Confucianism – a belief system that some take to be 
just “a philosophy, ethic, or way or life” and not “a religion at all”366 – may posit some basic 
concept of the ‘divine’ and sacred-secular divide. So it seems that Brady was right to think 
that one of the demarcating features of religion, at least in some sense, involved reference 
to the divine or sacred-secular divide. However, even when we think that it is necessary for 
a belief system to posit some concept of the ‘divine’ in order to be counted as a ‘religion,’ 
we must ask the further question: is Brady’s particular concept of the ‘divine’ adequate for 
legal purposes? 
                                                          
365 Stephen Prothero (2011), 108. “For all these reasons, Confucianism can be regarded as religious 
humanism. Confucians share with secular humanists a single-minded focus on this world of rag and bone. 
They, too, are far more interested in how to live than in plumbing the depths of Ultimate Reality. But whereas 
secular humanists insist on emptying the world of the sacred, Confucians insist on infusing the world with 
sacred import – on seeing Heaven in humanity, on investing human beings with incalculable value, on 
hallowing the everyday. In Confucianism, the secular is sacred. Or, as Tu Weiming puts it, ‘The Way of Heaven 
is immanent in human affairs.’” (108) 
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To best answer this, we must remember that Brady takes the demarcating of 
religious beliefs to be that they involve a “relationship of persons with the divine.” And 
again, that the ‘divine’ according to Brady involves the following sorts of features: 
– It is the ground or source of all that is as a question and concern and is 
eternal, absolute, and perfect. 
– All humans are oriented to the divine, but persons who have a 
“relationship” with it – i.e., “union or communion with it” – are considered 
‘religious.’ For the believer, all of life is lived in light of this relationship to the 
divine, and it reaches deep into the many facets of human thought and 
experience. 
– For those with a relationship with the divine, it is not just a question or 
concern, but present to them as something good and trustworthy.  
– Union or communion with the divine is humanity’s highest end, and 
salvation and liberation inheres this union. 
– Additionally, humanity’s deepest existential threats of meaninglessness and 
guilt are overcome with meaning and purpose through union or communion 
with the divine. 
– Through union or communion with the divine, the religious believer 
understands himself and the world as they really are and should be. 
Given the above, I doubt that Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ is adequate for legal 
purposes because Brady seemingly understands the ‘divine’ as narrowly theistic – and even 
vaguely Christian. Perhaps most importantly, not every religion takes the divine to be as 
personal, relatable, or communal as Brady does. Additionally, Brady’s account of the divine 
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sounds overly theistic in that it seemingly relies on the “notion of a transcendent Creator 
calling the shots from on high” insofar as the divine is described as eternal, absolute, 
perfect, and the source and ground of all that is. Unfortunately, this notion of a 
transcendent Creator is something that is as foreign to the Eastern religion of Confucianism 
“as Confucianism is to most Western readers.”367 Interestingly, Prothero notes that “the 
closest Confucians get to Western notions of a transcendent and ‘wholly other’ God is the 
notion of Heaven (tian), which, while impersonal, nonetheless seems to have a will.”368 
If it’s true that Brady takes ‘divine’ to roughly mean theistic God, then her concept of 
‘divine’ will be clearly underinclusive for purposes of the law. This underinclusive notion of 
‘divine’ would, for example, likely not recognize Confucianism as a religion since its concept 
of the ‘divine’ is non-theistic. If Brady understood ‘divine’ to mean something that included 
theism as well as other ways of parsing out the sacred-secular divide (e.g., pantheism), then 
her subsequent definition of ‘religion’ would likely better represent what religion actually 
is and would be more appropriate for legal purposes. While Brady is probably right that 
‘religion’ necessarily invokes some notion of the ‘divine,’ she is nevertheless wrong if she 
understands the ‘divine’ as basically theistic – or even vaguely Christian. 
Furthermore, if Brady’s concept of the ‘divine’ is, in fact, narrowly theistic, then 
Brady’s argument for the distinctiveness of the religious conscience would be predicated 
upon a metaethical assumption that, if false, would largely undermine her position. In other 
words, if Brady’s moral ontology is predicated upon the truthfulness of theism insofar as 
she understands the divine to be the “source of obligation” – indeed, the very “ground or 
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source of all that is as a question and concern” – then her argument for the distinctiveness 
of religious conscience will fall apart is these assumptions turn out to be wrong. If it turns 
out that theism is false – or that her particular metaethical assumption about the divine’s 
relationship to moral ontology is false – then her whole account would be largely, if not 
entirely, undermined. 
Moreover, even if we suppose that her metaethical assumptions are true, then it’s 
still not clear that nonreligious conscientious objectors should be treated differently before 
the law. Even if we grant that a nonreligious conscientious objection is predicated on a 
faulty metaethical view, specifically a faulty moral ontology, this does not seem to imply 
that we should treat their conscientious objection altogether differently before the law. The 
nonreligious conscientious objection would, if Brady’s assumptions are granted, still be 
drawing on the divine in at least some, indirect way because they are citing a moral 
obligation as the grounds for their requested exemption. The only difference between the 
nonreligious conscientious objector and the religious conscientious objector would be that 
the latter knows and acknowledges the true source of obligation whereas the former would 
fail to know and acknowledge the true source of obligation.  
At best, withholding legal privileges in the form of exemptions from conscientious 
objectors drawing from the incorrect metaethics would be intolerant, failing to uphold the 
“skepticism and humility that we owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic 
society.”369 After all, tolerance requires, as Brian Leiter argues, not merely being indifferent 
toward some group, but actively putting up with the perceivably wrong, mistaken, or 
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undesirable beliefs and actions of that group.370 Thus, a tolerant attitude toward 
conscientious objectors would seemingly allow them the opportunity to be wrong by 
permitting a legal exemption in some cases. Otherwise, we may run the risk of a kind of 
“totalization of morality” on the part of the government.371 Not only so, but we should also 
remember that every conscientious objection – drawing from the true metaethics or not – 
requires a degree of tolerance insofar as every conscientious objection is requesting an 
exemption from a law that is otherwise taken to be correct or justified. As Yossi Nehustan 
notes, the “very fact that a conscientious exemption is granted from a legal rule 
presupposes that the state does not share the conscientious objector’s values or his way of 
balancing them.”372 In fact, the state “thinks that it would be unbearable and indeed 
intolerable if everyone shared the objector’s kind of conscience and reasoning; otherwise, 
the exemption would be the general rule rather than an exemption from it.”373 So, tolerance 
is required to grant any legal exemption to any kind of conscientious objector – even in 
cases when the law is wrong and the conscientious objector is right.  
B. Weaker Protections for Religious Belief 
Brady also contends that perhaps the “biggest danger with equalizing the treatment 
of religious and nonreligious conscience” involves collapsing the distinction between 
religious and nonreligious belief.374 She argues that by undermining the distinctiveness of 
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religious beliefs and collapsing their distinction from nonreligious beliefs, we end up 
forfeiting “the most compelling reasons for protecting both religious and secular 
convictions.”375 To see why she thinks that adopting the Egalitarian Response will lead to 
weaker protections for religious beliefs in particular, consider the following:  
…as we collapse the distinction between religious and nonreligious belief, 
religion begins to disappear. We no longer see it for what it is, and it is 
replaced by the analogous category, whether it is deep-seated convictions 
about right and wrong, fundamental choices about the meaning and direction 
of one’s life, central components of personal identity, or something else. For 
some, religion collapses even further and becomes, just like secular 
commitments seem, merely an interest, an exercise in autonomy, a 
preference, or a feeling. When religious conviction becomes just an interest, a 
preference, or a choice, it often receives very little protection beyond 
protection against discrimination based on the content of the choice. As 
Brian Leiter concludes, no claims of conscience should receive exemptions 
from burdens on others. Even when religion is somewhat more than that, it is 
not what it really is. It is not about a relationship with the divine. It is not 
about the effort of persons to connect with the ground and source of all that 
is and, indeed, to share in the eternal. Religion becomes morality, but religion 
is more than that. It is about the source of morality and everything else. It is 
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not just about right and wrong, meaning and identity. It is about what 
grounds and informs all of these. 376 
So, Brady’s second reason for not adopting the Egalitarian Response seems to be the 
following: accepting the Egalitarian Response would inevitably lead to weaker protections 
for religious beliefs – including religious conscience beliefs. How does she reach this 
conclusion? She begins by arguing that, by accepting the Egalitarian Response, we end up 
collapsing the distinction between religious and nonreligious belief. And when we collapse 
the distinction between them, ‘religion’ so understood will disappear and be replaced by an 
analogous category. And when ‘religion’ so understood begins to disappear and be replaced 
by an analogous category, the legal protections for religious beliefs are undermined 
because the analogous category, it is argued, would fail to possess features sufficient for the 
strong sort of legal protections once enjoyed by religion. 
In response to Brady here, we can say a few things. First, I think Brady is right to 
think that religious beliefs are not simply deep-seated convictions about right and wrong, 
fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, of the central 
components of personal identity. Of course, religious beliefs involve ontological and 
epistemological beliefs about what’s real and knowable as well, and so involve further 
dimensions than those listed above. Second, we should not think that secular moral beliefs 
and commitments, which include secular conscience beliefs, are simply exercises in 
autonomy, preferences, or mere choices. Both religious and secular conscience beliefs can, 
in principle, be non-voluntarily formed and upheld as well as voluntarily formed and 
upheld. Not only so, but both religious and secular conscience beliefs are, in practice, 
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similarly formed and upheld as well – involving mixed elements of voluntariness and non-
voluntariness. We should, therefore, be careful not to see one kind of conscience belief as 
largely different in nature from the other. 
Third, Brady worries that, if religious convictions were to become just an interest, a 
preference, or a choice, it may often receive “very little protection beyond protection 
against discrimination based on the content of the choice.” Elsewhere, I have argued that 
the role that choices plays in conscience beliefs – i.e., whether they were voluntarily formed 
and upheld or not – should not affect the permissibility of granting a legal exemption. More 
specifically, I argued that non-voluntariness should not be classified as a necessary or 
sufficient condition for granting a legal exemption. So, not only do I doubt that secular 
convictions are more of a mere interest, preference, or choice when compared to religious 
convictions, I also doubt that they should be treated with very little legal protection for 
being voluntarily formed and upheld.  
Fourth, it seems like we can similarly afford special legal treatment to secular 
conscience beliefs in a way that would not involve replacing the category of ‘religion’ with 
another category. We could, for example, jointly afford strong legal protections for the 
Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Conscience. As Kevin Vallier states, we could 
“upgrade respect for nonreligious comprehensive and moral belief to the level presently 
extended to religious belief” in order to grant freedom of conscience the same legal status 
now enjoyed by religious freedom.377 Though these two freedoms overlap conceptually, 
they are not the same and do not pick out the same concept overall – so one, conjoining 
legal category would likely be underinclusive. Disentangling the Freedom of Religion and 
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the Freedom of Conscience actually helps us to see that we can have good reasons to afford 
special legal treatment to both religious and conscience beliefs and that we can have good 
reasons to adopt the Egalitarian Response at the same time. While the Egalitarian Response 
tells us that religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs should be treated equally before 
the law, this is separate from how it is that we think religious and conscience beliefs should 
both be treated more generally. Determining how they both ought to be treated is a 
separate question from determining whether we think they should be treated equally. So, 
contrary to Brady, I think it is possible to believe that religious conscience beliefs in 
particular should not receive comparatively special legal treatment over and above their 
nonreligious counterparts while at the same time believe that religious beliefs more 
broadly, like conscience beliefs, should be granted a basically special legal status. 
Lastly, I want to point out that, even if some analogous category did replace religion 
in the way that Brady fears, the features of that analogous category would likely be 
sufficient to warrant a basically legal status for that category anyway. Following Brady, this 
new, analogous legal category would probably contain deep-seated convictions about right 
and wrong, fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, and the 
central components of personal identity. Or, to put it differently, this category would 
probably include basic “core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments.”378 But consider 
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this: if a legal category constituted by deep-seated convictions about right and wrong, 
fundamental choices about the meaning and direction of one’s life, and the central 
components of personal identity – i.e., core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments – 
isn’t worthy of a basically special legal status, then what sort of category is? As such, I think 
that if some analogous category did replace religion in the way that Brady fears – though I 
don’t think that it should for conceptual reasons – the features of that analogous category 
would likely be sufficient to warrant a basically legal status for that category anyway. 
C. Weaker Protections for Secular Conscience 
While it is clear that Brady affirms the distinctiveness of religious conscience beliefs, 
she nevertheless thinks that this position does not necessarily imply “that we should not 
care about secular convictions.”379 Interestingly, she argues that “the more we appreciate 
the distinctiveness of religion, the more we will appreciate the worth of secular 
conscience.”380 Relatedly, she argues that “the stronger foundation for protecting secular 
convictions is not equity norms, but rather the unique attributes of religion.”381 She writes: 
…understanding religion’s uniqueness allows us to see strong reasons for 
protecting secular conscience that are not available to those who view 
religious and secular conscience as functional equivalents. Contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
judgment, and to conduct their life – in short, to constitute a moral identity for themselves. Core beliefs and 
commitments, which we will also call ‘convictions of conscience’, include both deeply held religious and 
secular beliefs and are distinguished from the legitimate but less fundamental ‘preferences’ we display as 
individuals.” (13) 
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demands for equal treatment reflect a failure to understand the differences 
between religious and nonreligious convictions, but they also reflect the 
intuition that secular moral commitments are also worthy of respect and 
protection. This intuition is correct, but we can see this most clearly when we 
retain an appreciation for the uniqueness of religious claims. Collapsing the 
distinction between religious and secular conscience obscures the full worth 
of secular commitments and with it some of our most compelling reasons for 
protecting them.382 
Brady’s idea here seems to be as follows: as appreciation for the distinctiveness of 
religion increases, appreciation for the worth of secular conscience also increases. That is, 
Brady argues that the distinctiveness of religion and the worth of secular conscience are 
directly proportional. Not only so, but she thinks that we possess “strong reasons” – indeed 
what she labels as the “most compelling reasons” – for protecting secular conscience that 
are unavailable to us unless we affirm the distinctiveness of religious conscience. She 
worries that, if we end up collapsing the strong distinction between religious and secular 
conscience, then we’ll end up obscuring the “full worth” of secular conscience beliefs and 
forfeiting the “most compelling reasons for protecting them.”  
So what exactly are these strong and most compelling reasons for protecting the full 
worth of secular conscience beliefs that we seem to lose when we deny the distinctiveness 
of religion? To understand Brady on this point, consider the following:  
Indeed, when religion disappears, the full worth of secular conscience does 
too, and secular commitments are no longer understood as what they can 
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also be. Secular moral commitments and religious convictions are not 
equivalents. They are not fully analogous. However, secular conscience and 
religious conscience are related. Religious conscience engages the divine 
directly. For the nonbeliever, the divine is rarely completely absent, but it is 
unseen and unacknowledged. It is presumed but not recognized. It is implied, 
but not knowingly. This divine referent gives secular moral commitment a 
special dignity as well. They are not mere interests or preferences or 
exercises of autonomy. They are judgments about right and wrong and 
human flourishing, and they are also more than that. In secular conscience, 
the divine is intimated, and what is sought by the believer is embraced 
indirectly.383 
And here: 
The relationship between religious and secular conscience can be seen most 
easily when secular commitments take the form of judgments about right 
and wrong, what is required or forbidden, that make demands on individuals 
that the individual experiences as transcending self-interest and personal 
preference…For the nonbeliever who experiences these demands, the 
judgment that a particular course of action is right or wrong, and right or 
wrong in such a way that they have no choice but to follow, implies some 
foundation for right and wrong. It implies that there is some order to the 
world and human relationship that we must respect and follow. It also 
presumes the fact that humans are moral agents who have been made with 
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the capacity to understand the concepts of right and wrong and to desire 
what is good, to seek it, and to embrace it when it is found. The exercise of 
human moral agency refers, if only implicitly, to the divine. It implies a moral 
order and a ground to this order, and it implies a ground that invites – indeed 
requires that we act not as automatons or by instinct, but as persons who are 
responsible for our actions. We must make moral choices, and when we do, 
we do not create right and wrong. We discern it, and what we discern we 
must follow. We have been created for moral freedom, but it is a freedom 
that discovers and responds rather than makes and creates.384 
In sum, Brady contends that the secular moral conscience, though not engaging the 
divine directly, possesses a special dignity – i.e., is afforded full worth and strong and 
compelling reasons for legal protection – insofar as its judgements about right and wrong 
and human flourishing unknowingly refer back to and intimate the divine.385 She is, at the 
very least, clear about holding this position: “the divine is implicit even in secular moral 
reasoning as the ground of this reasoning and of human freedom itself, and this implicit 
reference to the divine gives secular conscience a weight and significance that requires 
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385 Kathleen A. Brady (2015): “The equal treatment paradigm is so attractive in the exemptions context 
because of the intuition that secular moral convictions are also worthy of respect and protection, and this 
intuition is correct. Secular moral conscience participates in the ultimacy of religious conviction, but not in 
the same way and not directly. When we appreciate religion’s distinctiveness, we see this ultimacy more 
clearly. By contrast, when we collapse religious and secular convictions, this ultimately disappears, and when 
it does, both forms of conscience become more vulnerable to state incursion.” (315) 
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respect from the state.”386 This position seems misguided for a few reasons. First, as was 
noted above, Brady’s position makes strong metaethical assumptions involving theism that, 
if false, would largely if not totally undermine her position. We should note, too, that she 
seems to go even further with these assumptions insofar as she takes things like human 
moral agency and the broader moral order to refer, if only implicitly, to the divine as 
well.387 
Second, I think there are ways of affording a sufficient amount of worth or dignity to 
secular conscience beliefs other than having them unknowingly reference and intimate the 
divine. I actually think that Brady makes such an argument. For example, Brady seems to 
imply that the value of secular conscience beliefs is at least partly derived from their being 
obligatory in nature – i.e., not a mere interest or preference or exercise of autonomy. 
Secular conscience beliefs can likewise be beliefs about what is required or forbidden, and 
can make demands on individuals that they experiences as transcending self-interest and 
personal preference such that they are compelled to follow them. If this is true, then my 
contention is that these beliefs can derive a sufficient amount of worth or dignity from 
being obligatory in nature without unnecessarily or superfluously invoking a divine-
referring moral ontology. In fact, the obligatoriness feature may be accessible to conscience 
beliefs through some other, non-theistic moral ontology. If this is right, then Brady still 
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needs to explain: (a) why having a divine referent makes a conscience belief attain its full 
worth and dignity; (b) why the obligatoriness of a conscience belief fails to afford that 
belief with at least a sufficient amount of worth or dignity in the context of a legal 
exemption; and (c) why referencing the proper metaethics justifies affording special legal 
treatment to some conscience belief – and vice versa. 
D. The Objection from Religious Liberty 
The last objection from Brady contends that accepting the Egalitarian Response will 
limit liberty more broadly and religious liberty in particular. Brady contends that “equal 
treatment” of religious and secular conscience “has often meant” only modest protections 
for conscience overall, for many people who embrace the Egalitarian Response “have 
rejected a right to exemption altogether.”388 This is true of Brian Leiter, for example, who 
embraces both the Egalitarian Response and a version of the No Exemptions Approach.389 
In short, Brady’s argument is that, by accepting the Egalitarian Response and extending 
possible accommodations to secular conscience, liberty overall, and religious liberty by 
extension, will likely be thwarted in order to protect against the possible overuse and 
abuse of exemptions. The relationship between religious liberty and egalitarianism for 
conscience, then, is believed to be inversely proportional: as egalitarianism for conscience 
increases, religious liberty decreases. Brady writes: 
Indeed, as I have shown, when we collapse the distinction between religious 
and secular conscience, equality usually comes at the expense of liberty. It 
does so because a robust right of exemptions like the one I defend in this 
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book cannot feasibly be extended to all secular moral commitments or even 
just those that are strongly held or deeply important to individuals. Equality 
between religious and secular conscience would mean trading a strong right 
of religious exemption for weaker protection overall.390 
In response to Brady, we can simply argue that the inversely proportional 
relationship that she is worried about need not and might not exist even if we accept the 
Egalitarian Response. That is, it seems possible to accept the Egalitarian Response while at 
the same time accepting a robust right to legal exemptions for both kinds of conscience. An 
increase in equality need not imply a decrease in liberty. While the trend in the literature is 
to accept the Egalitarian Response in conjunction with the sort of Leiter No Exemptions 
Approach, we can nevertheless hold a logically possible, legally workable, and perhaps 
morally required alternate view: the Egalitarian Response in conjunction with a sort of 
Robust Exemptions Approach. This alternate view would simultaneously grant equality to 
nonreligious conscientious objectors while continuing to uphold and protect religious and 
conscience liberties through robust legal exemptions. It’s important to note, however, that 
we would still have to answer the more central worry underlying this objection: what we 
can call the worry about feasibility. The Feasibility Objection is what we will turn to next in 
order to explain how the views I have expressed above are legally workable if adopted. 
III. The Feasibility Objection 
Even if the Egalitarian Response is principally justified, a relevant question remains: 
are the implications of this paradigm pragmatically or legally unworkable? That is, would 
this paradigm lead to too many exemptions or worse – something like legal anarchy? As 
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Brady notes “already scholars worry about the chaotic potential of a right to exemption for 
religious conscience,” so she questions whether “expanding the right to cover nonreligious 
conscience would exacerbate this problem.”391 Similarly, Frederick Gedicks worries that 
“[s]uch an expansion of the reach of exemptions…threatens to make them unworkable by 
leaving too few people subject to the law.”392 Extending the reach of exemptions may 
“seriously undermine the observance, and thus the effectiveness, of law.”393 There may not 
be many accommodations for secular conscience now, but if equal protections are codified 
into law, we can probably expect use and abuse of exemptions to increase. And in order to 
protect against this, many have, as Brady notes, rejected a right to exemption altogether. 
A. Laycock’s Response  
Douglas Laycock holds a unique position within this debate insofar as he accepts the 
Egalitarian Response yet denies that there is a feasibility problem. On the one hand, 
Laycock straightforwardly claims that “[w]e should protect the moral commitments of 
religious believers, and we should also protect the moral commitments of nonbelievers 
when those commitments are held with religious intensity.”394 On the other hand, he seems 
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to think that, even when we afford robust and equal protections to religious and secular 
conscientious objectors alike, there simply “would not be many” conflicts involving viable 
claims of secular conscience – thus ameliorating the worry about feasibility.395 So, Laycock 
responds to the Feasibility Objection by rhetorically asking: what’s the problem? 
How could Laycock think that feasibility concerns are a non-problem? At base, 
Laycock argues that the Feasibility Objection falls flat because he thinks that nonbelievers 
typically don’t hold many intense moral commitments – that is, obligations delivered from 
conscience “that transcend his self-interest and his personal preferences and which he 
experiences as so strong that he has no choice but to comply”396 – that are actually at odds 
with the dominant morality reflected in governmental policy anyway. He elaborates: 
Nonbelievers have many moral commitments, and they hold some of those 
commitments with religious intensity. But they do not hold many intense 
moral commitments that are at odds with the dominant morality reflected in 
government policy. Nonbelievers tend to have a modern sensibility. They do 
not draw their morality from ancient books written in a radically different 
culture that lived with radically different technology and had a radically 
different understanding of the world; they do not obey an omnipotent, 
omniscient God whose commands may be beyond human understanding. On 
the whole, nonbelievers take their morality from the same modern milieu 
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obligations of theists.” (331) 
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that drives democratic decision making and government regulation. It is no 
accident that military service is the only prominent example where serious 
claims of nontheistic conscientious objection have been litigated.397 
Though nonbelievers hold many moral commitments, and some of which with 
religious intensity, Laycock claims that nonbelievers nonetheless fail to hold many moral 
commitments that are odds with the “dominant morality reflected in government policy.” 
This “modern sensibility” of nonbelievers is reflected in the fact that their morality is 
largely derived from the same backdrop of moral beliefs and values that drive democratic 
decision making and government regulation – not ancient books or an omnipotent, 
omniscient God. In other words, he thinks that the consciences of most nonbelievers 
seemingly draw upon and apply the values of the dominant morality more often and to a 
greater degree than religious consciences. Religious consciences, on the other hand, mostly 
draw upon and apply the values of the morality found in ancient, religious texts. Since the 
consciences of the nonreligious fail to deviate much from the dominant morality, Laycock 
remarks that it’s no surprise, then, that the “only prominent example where serious claims 
of nontheistic conscientious objection have been litigated” involve military conscription. 
“No doubt cases would arise that do not involve military service,” writes Laycock, “but 
there would not be many.”398 
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Laycock’s central claims here are, of course, empirical. Unfortunately, Laycock offers 
no evidence in support of these claims. Are we nevertheless justified in believing these 
claims? Not only so, but if Laycock’s empirical claims are warranted, then should this 
ameliorate the worries undergirding the Feasibility Objection overall? 
In support of Laycock’s empirical claims, we can somewhat surprisingly turn to 
Brian Leiter. Leiter similarly argues that requests for legal accommodations by 
nonbelievers are just simply uncommon, and that “litigated cases overwhelmingly involve 
claims of religious conscience.”399 In fact, Leiter goes as far as to say that, “while it is 
arguable in a few cases that atheists or agnostics brought challenges to neutral, generally 
applicable laws for burdening their ‘religious practice,’ it appears as if there is no clear 
instance of an atheist or agnostic challenging ‘valid and neutral laws of general 
applicability.’”400 In other words, Leiter claims that there are no clear cases in US 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in an animal research lab, he is unlikely to be asked to violate his conscience. And if he seeks conscientious 
objector protection for illegal acts of protest-- vandalism, destruction of labs, theft of lab animals, assaults on 
researchers-- he will lose on compelling interest grounds, just as a religious objector would. No conscientious 
objector, religious or secular, gets to impose his views on others or attack the persons or property of those 
who disagree with him.” (171-72) 
399 Brian Leiter (2013), 6 
400 Brian Leiter (2013), 140, fn. 6; emphasis added. Leiter adds: “Overwhelmingly, if not universally, 
Establishment or Free Exercise Clause challenges to statutes or government actions by atheists or agnostics 
involve claims of underlying religious motives rather than claims of general motives that nonetheless 
unconstitutionally burden atheism or agnosticism.” (140, fn. 6) 
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jurisprudence401 where an atheist or agnostic has challenged valid and neutral laws of 
general applicability. Such a conclusion should not be lightly noted. Perhaps Leiter’s finding 
is due to the fact that nonreligious claims of conscience have few, explicit legal protections, 
and so we should expect that this number is low. But this is a bad explanation, for the 
nonreligious need not have legal protections already in place in order to challenge valid 
and neutral laws of general applicability – e.g., Welsh and arguably Seeger. In fact, it seems 
as though the absence of explicit legal protections would motivate more challenges from 
atheists and agnostics.402 The worry undergirding the Feasibility Objection about an 
increased number of claimants seems similarly misguided: if the nonreligious are not 
challenging valid and neutral laws of general applicability now, why think that this number 
will increase to an unfeasible level once protections are codified? 
Nevertheless, justifying the counterfactual claim that the use and abuse of legal 
exemptions might increase to unfeasible levels if expanded to protect nonreligious 
conscientious objectors is really hard to do – and especially hard when the current litigated 
cases “overwhelmingly involve claims of religious conscience” and there is “no clear 
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instance of an atheist or agnostic challenging ‘valid and neutral laws of general 
applicability.’” Perhaps this will change if we adopt the Egalitarian Response, but perhaps 
not for the reasons that Laycock cites. After all, if nonreligious objections to valid and 
neutral laws of general applicability are overwhelmingly absent now, what makes us think 
they will increase to the point of unfeasibility in the future? Moreover, withholding equal 
liberty and legal protections to nonreligious conscientious objectors because of an 
unjustified counterfactual claim seems like bad policy in general. The existing positive 
reasons for extending equal liberty and legal protections to secular conscientious objectors 
simply seem stronger than the weaker, negative, counterfactual reasons we have for 
withholding equal liberty and legal protections.  
We started this section by highlighting the fact that scholars already “worry about 
the chaotic potential of a right to exemption for religious conscience” and wonder whether 
“expanding the right to cover nonreligious conscience would exacerbate this problem.”403 
As a result of these worries, many have rejected a right to exemption altogether. However, I 
agree with Laycock that this line of thinking “leads to the worst of all possible worlds – the 
equality of universal suppression.”404 Unfortunately, the trend in the scholarship is to see 
equality and liberty as inversely proportional: as equality increases, liberty decreases. This 
trend is exemplified in Leiter, for example, who simultaneously adopts the Egalitarian 
Response in addition to a No Exemptions Approach. I think we can – and should – do better 
than that and offer equality without drastic costs to liberty. We can, I think, offer equal legal 
protections for all forms of conscience without concerns of unworkability or legal anarchy. 
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B. Sawicki’s Response 
Nadia Sawicki offers an altogether different sort of response to concerns of 
feasibility, arguing that we may have strong pragmatic reasons not to withhold 
accommodations to religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs. More specifically, she 
worries that the pragmatic implications of failing to adopt the Egalitarian Response and 
adequately protect conscience beliefs may be unworkable. Sawicki notes that “we begin to 
understand the pragmatic argument for legal accommodation of conscience” when we 
“accept that an individual may be driven to act in accordance with her strong conscientious 
beliefs regardless of the consequences.”405 As such, the basis of her argument for 
accommodating conscience beliefs maintains “that a civil society is unlikely to function 
effectively if it chooses to punish conscientious objectors.” She writes: 
Punishment in a civil society can serve many purposes, among them 
retribution, deterrence, and reform. However, punishing a person for acting 
in accordance with her conscience rarely serves these purposes effectively. 
First, because it is impossible to coerce belief against someone's wishes, 
punishment of conduct motivated by conscientious belief is unlikely to result 
in reform or rehabilitation. On a similar note, the threat of punishment is 
unlikely to deter those acting on the basis of conscientious conviction. That 
being said, some conscientious objectors (those who are more are 
susceptible to the threat of punishment, perhaps because their moral 
commitments are not as firm) may be swayed by the threat of legal penalty, 
and may choose to comply with the law despite their conscience's voice to 
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the contrary. What is the likely result for these persons, we might ask? 
“Deterrence of those who lack the will to act on their convictions exacts a 
terrible price. Their feeling that they have yielded to compulsion and violated 
their most deeply held beliefs and principles may involve profound 
resentment and loss of self-respect.” Finally, when it comes to retribution, 
many believe that the retributive purposes of punishment are poorly served 
by punishing individuals who act on the basis of moral compulsion rather 
than self-interest or impulsiveness.406 
Overall, Sawicki’s pragmatic argument for accommodating conscience beliefs 
recognizes the punishment concerns raised above and responds accordingly. Of course, the 
original Feasibility Objection still lurks insofar as “granting conscience-based exemptions 
from legal obligations as a matter of course may wreak havoc on the state's ability to 
maintain order.”407 But her point is that “the same can be said of a state that rejects claims 
of conscience altogether.”408 Because a society cannot adopt laws that perfectly align with 
all of its citizens’ beliefs, Sawicki contends that a “society must order itself in such a way as 
to mediate between the interests of social order and the interests of citizens who might feel 
disenfranchised by laws that violate their conscientious beliefs.”409 And perhaps the only 
pragmatic and workable way to accomplish this, according to Sawicki, is to offer adequate 
legal accommodations for religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs. 
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IV. The Underinclusiveness Objection 
The third and last objection raised against the Egalitarian Response can be 
understood as the Problem of Underinclusivity. In short, this objection maintains that the 
Egalitarian Response may not be egalitarian enough: perhaps other sorts of beliefs, desires, 
motivations, concerns, projects, etc. should also enjoy an equal legal status with religious 
and nonreligious conscience beliefs. Perhaps the most salient proponent of this objection is 
Simon May. In his article “Exemptions for Conscience,” he argues that there “is nothing 
special about moral conscience that would justify granting an exemption…that is not 
shared by a variety of non-moral desires, motivations, concerns, or projects.”410 In other 
words, he believes there is “no principled moral reason for a defeasible entitlement to 
moral conscience-based exemptions that is not an equally good reason for a defeasible 
entitlement to non-moral project-based exemptions.”411 The heart of this objection is that 
the Egalitarian Response, in order to be truly egalitarian, must also extend legal 
exemptions to non-moral projects in addition to religious and secular conscientious 
objections. Hence, the Egalitarian Response may not be egalitarian enough. 
A. The Moral Conscience Principle and the Unfairness Objection 
As noted above, May is responding to the view that volitional conflicts involving 
conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise – warrant special legal accommodations because 
these individuals uniquely believe that “it would be wrong for her to do as the regulation 
requires and therefore wishes not to comply.”412 Thus, a conflict of conscience would 
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therefore be a subset of volitional conflicts more broadly insofar as the conscientious 
objector would not merely wish not to perform the required action; they also believe that it 
would be wrong to perform the required action. If we accept that the conflict between “the 
demands of a law and the demands of a person’s sincere moral conscience constitute a 
special type of volitional conflict” – indeed, one that’s importantly distinct from merely 
frustrating one’s will in other ways – then we would accept what May calls the “Moral 
Conscience principle.”413 This principle just claims that "a conflict between the demands of 
a law and the demands of an individual’s sincere moral conscience, whether religious or 
secular in content, provides [them] with a defeasible moral entitlement to an 
exemption.”414 
In response to the Moral Conscience principle, May levies the Unfairness Objection. 
To understand and illustrate the objection, he has us consider three hypothetical young 
friends who do not wish to serve in the military: 
Angelica believes that it would be morally wrong for her to enlist because 
that would be inconsistent with her religion’s strict pacifist views. She would 
prefer to spend the two years preparing for the missionary work that her 
community requires of its young adults. Unlike Angelica, Biko has no 
religious beliefs. His opposition to military service is based in his belief that 
the war is unjust. He sympathizes with the political ideals espoused by the 
rebels and strongly identifies with the now-defunct radical organization from 
which the separatist movement emerged and with which his family is closely 
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associated. He believes that it would be morally wrong for him to enlist as 
this would imply a lack of solidarity with the revolutionaries of the past and a 
craven betrayal of his family’s radical tradition. In contrast to his friends, 
Chester does not believe that it would be morally wrong to enlist. Instead, he 
wishes not to serve in the military because it would interfere with his 
development as a chess grandmaster. Already one of the best chess players in 
the country, Chester cannot afford to lose two years of play at his age if he is 
to stay competitive with other leading players around the world and have 
any chance of becoming world champion.415 
May adds that, since none of them fulfill the requirements for any category of non-
volitional exemption, “the law requires that they either enlist or face three years of 
confinement in a minimum-security detention camp.”416 As you might expect, all three 
“prefer to spend three years in detention to two years in the military, since they would then 
be able to dedicate themselves to their respective studies— Angelica and Chester would 
even be allowed out on furlough for important missionary activities and chess 
tournaments.”417 Desiring to remain free rather than be jailed, all three friends end up 
petitioning for exemptions.  
Overall, the Unfairness Objection raised against the Moral Conscience principle just 
argues that there is “no principled moral difference between the claims of Angelica and 
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Biko, on the one hand, and Chester on the other.”418 In order to maintain the Moral 
Conscience principle against the Unfairness Objection, May argues that we must “explain 
what it is that makes a person’s conscientious commitments different from her various 
non-moral projects”419 – and we should add: that differentiates conscientious commitments 
in way that warrants special legal treatment. 
Is there some other noteworthy feature that might differentiate a person’s 
conscientious commitments from their non-moral projects in a way that warrants special 
legal treatment? May has us consider four potentially distinguishing features. First, he 
considers that a person’s moral conscience may uniquely warrant accommodation in that 
“it imposes categorical demands.”420 In response, May argues that Chester’s ambition to 
become world champion also “imposes categorical demands on his life, demands that he 
experiences as volitional necessities on a par with his moral beliefs.”421 Second, May 
considers whether a person’s moral conscience uniquely warrants accommodations insofar 
as it “engages her capacity to reflect on the ultimate meaning of life.”422 May contends that 
Chester’s love for chess can similarly engage his capacity to reflect on the ultimate meaning 
of life. After all, “chess is not just a game for Chester,” for he understands it as a “most vivid 
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manifestation of the awesome beauty of the mathematical universe” and a “profound 
philosophical lesson in the significance of free will and the spark of genius.”423 
Third, May wonders whether one’s “intense desire to act morally” might 
differentiate the conscientious objector from the non-moral plan objector.424 May claims 
that Chester’s desire to play chess at the highest levels is arguably “as intensely felt as the 
desires of his friends – indeed, they are far more likely to waiver in their opposition to 
conscription than he is in his.”425 Lastly, May has us consider whether a person’s moral 
conscience warrants special legal accommodations insofar as “moral commitments are 
central to her identity.”426 He quickly disperses of this possibly distinguishing feature by 
pointing out that “Chester’s ambition to be world champion is no less central to his self-
conception” than his friend’s moral principles are to theirs.427 Thus, as May points out, 
“each of the four responses to the Unfairness Objection fails for the same reason: each 
identifies a feature of conscientious convictions that has some plausible moral significance 
but that is shared by some non-moral projects.”428 
If the Unfairness Objection holds, then why not just accept that Angelica, Biko, and 
Chester are all entitled to a defeasible legal exemption? May is leery about accepting this 
conclusion because he does not “believe the position is likely to prove tenable.”429 In other 
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words, May seems to be worried that accepting the Unfairness Objection – and 
consequently rejecting the Moral Conscience principle – may lead to greater feasibility 
concerns than what was faced when simply accepting the Egalitarian Response. After all, 
“no coherent defence of volitional exemptions can tolerate just any desire not to comply 
with a law.”430 
B. The Moral Integrity Response 
In trying to further stave off the Unfairness Objection, May considers a fifth and final 
response – what he calls the Moral Integrity Response: 
(1) An individual has a significant interest in preserving her moral 
integrity.431 Thus: 
(2) An individual has a defeasible entitlement that the state not require her 
to compromise her moral integrity. 
(3) An individual’s legal obligation to act contrary to her moral conscience 
requires her to compromise her moral integrity. Thus: 
(4) An individual has a defeasible entitlement that the state not legally 
obligate her to act contrary to her moral conscience.432 
In general, the Moral Integrity Response “promises to explain why conscientious 
objection is special by identifying a distinctively moral interest of individuals” – namely, 
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protecting their moral integrity.433 Unfortunately, May contends that this last line of 
defense also fails. First, he argues that “the threat to moral integrity is not exclusive to 
cases of conscientious objection” – which means that moral integrity cannot therefore be 
the reason that conscientious objections are special.434 If we accept the Moral Conscience 
principle, and furthermore think that the justification for granting special legal 
accommodations to conscience beliefs is protecting moral integrity, then it turns out we 
might have to protect more than conscience beliefs. After all, non-moral projects may 
sometimes involve moral integrity as well – e.g., May’s case involving Chesleigh below. 
Second, May contends that, “when a person’s moral integrity is imperiled by the frustration 
of her non-moral projects, it has no weight as a reason for granting a volitional exemption” 
under the Moral Conscience principle because it fails to be imperiled as a result of a 
conscientious objection as such.435 So, we may unjustifiably exclude cases of imperiled 
moral integrity when we accept the Moral Conscience principle because these cases of 
imperiled moral integrity do not seemingly involve conscientious objections per se. As a 
result of these charges, May thinks that the Moral Integrity Response fails to explain why 
conscientious objections to the law require special treatment.  
To illustrate these claims, May has us consider the case of a fourth friend named 
Chesleigh:  
Like Chester, she is one of the country’s best chess players and wishes to 
compete at an international level. She also has no distinctly moral objection 
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to the antisecessionist war, but regards conscription as a severe impediment 
to her development as a grandmaster. Like Chester, she would prefer to 
spend three years in detention honing her skills. Chesleigh differs from 
Chester in that she has an additional motivation behind her chess ambitions. 
Whereas Chester is driven solely by his reverence for the aesthetic beauty of 
the game, Chesleigh also has an instrumental motive. She wants to play in 
international tournaments, not only for the sake of winning in itself, but also 
so that she can win as much prize money as possible. But Chesleigh does not 
want to win this money for purely selfish reasons. Instead, she feels obligated 
to earn enough money to repay her elderly grandparents for the many 
financial sacrifices they incurred supporting her chess career from an early 
age. When it became clear that she was especially talented, they spent the 
bulk of their retirement savings on her development. Because Chesleigh has 
the potential to compete at an elite level, she believes that her moral integrity 
demands that she help her grandparents enjoy the retirement they deserve 
before it is too late. If there were some other way to repay her debt—perhaps 
if she won the lottery—she would be less opposed to military service. 
Nevertheless, she would still opt for the detention camp for just the same 
reasons that Chester would.436 
The case of Chesleigh nicely illustrates the dilemma for the Moral Conscience 
principle described above: either this principle “includes Chesleigh within the scope of 
those entitled to an exemption (because her moral integrity is threatened) or it does not 
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(because she has no conscientious objection to military service as such).”437 By adopting 
the first horn of the dilemma, the Moral Conscience principle is threatened with 
implausibility – for once “an individual’s success or failure in realizing her non-moral 
projects is assigned to her individual sphere of responsibility, it does not seem to matter 
very much whether this success or failure has further consequences for her interest in 
leading a virtuous life.”438 Not only so, but adopting the first horn would give Chester 
strong grounds to complain of unfairness. After all, Chesleigh’s case “is only a slight 
variation of his—the sole difference is a threat to her moral integrity that makes no 
practical difference to her refusal to serve in the military.”439 Additionally, we might also 
worry that adopting this first horn may lead to even further feasibility problems: granting 
defeasible legal entitlements to non-moral projects that imperil moral integrity could lead 
to too many exemptions overall. 
Adopting the second horn is problematic as well. As May notes, the “threat to moral 
integrity created by a law is no longer a distinctive feature of conscientious objection since 
it can also arise in cases where the law frustrates an individual’s non-moral projects.”440 So, 
this means that, by trying to uphold the initial thrust of the Moral Conscience principle, we 
may end up undermining the Moral Integrity Response. That is, in denying 
accommodations to non-moral projects on the grounds that they are insufficiently 
conscientious in nature, we end up denying relevant threats to moral integrity. In terms of 
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moral integrity, Chesleigh’s case is not that different from Angelica’s or Biko’s. In fact, there 
seems to be “no reason why she cannot regard her moral obligation to repay her 
grandparents as no less stringent than they take their respective obligations to be.”441 Thus, 
if moral integrity is doing the justificatory work in granting defeasible entitlements to legal 
accommodations, then why treat Chesleigh differently from Angelica and Biko? May writes: 
The implications of the second horn for the moral integrity response may 
seem relatively insignificant if cases such as Chesleigh were very rare. The 
Moral Conscience principle might be adequately supported by a 
consideration that, in actual practice, arises only in cases of conscientious 
objection. But I do not think this observation bears out. Most people lead 
complicated lives in which their moral values and non-moral projects overlap 
and interconnect in intricate ways. It is often impossible to disentangle these 
commitments and show that only a person’s non-moral interests are 
threatened by a legal obligation. In these cases, when the state makes it 
harder for people to live as they would prefer, it thereby makes it harder for 
them to live up to their moral ideals.442 
C. Twofold Response to May 
In response to May, I argue two things. First, I argue that May is too hasty in his 
analysis of the four potentially distinguishing features of conscience. As a result, I think that 
May fails to see that volitional necessities and the categorical demands of conscience are 
not the same, that conscience is not the capacity that “reflect[s] on the ultimate meaning of 
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life,” and that moral commitments are dissimilarly central to one’s moral identity when 
compared to non-moral projects. Second, I argue that May’s dilemma for the Moral 
Conscience principle can be unraveled when we introduce Sorabji’s definition of conscience 
beliefs. As a result of May’s dilemma failing, I contend that the Moral Integrity Response can 
be vindicated. 
As noted above, I think May is too hasty in his analysis of the four potentially 
distinguishing features of conscience – and this causes him to overlook important 
differences between conscience and non-moral projects. First, May considers whether a 
person’s moral conscience is unique in that “it imposes categorical demands,” only to 
conclude that Chester’s ambitions similarly impose categorical demands on his life – 
“demands that he experiences as volitional necessities on a par with his moral beliefs.”443 
Unfortunately, May fails to realize that volitional necessities and the categorical demands of 
conscience are distinct. 
As noted in a previous chapter, the first major difference between volitional 
necessities and the categorical demands of conscience is that desire and duty are largely 
separable within the latter but not so separable within the former. Since conscience beliefs 
are perceived obligations, we can understand them as categorical demands that someone 
believes they must perform. However, conscience beliefs differ from volitional necessities 
in that the demands of the former must be satisfied even if the individual does not desire or 
“care” about performing the demand at all. Whereas conscience places categorical 
requirements on individuals independent of their desires, volitional necessities are just 
desires all the way down. 
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Moreover, because volitional necessities “can arise from anything at all that a 
person cares about,” it is possible for the object of the volitional necessity to be amoral or 
value-neutral.444 Another relevant difference thus arises: whereas the categorical demands 
of conscience cannot be value neutral, the demands of volitional necessities “need not have 
any connection to…value.”445 This second difference between the categorical demands of 
conscience and the volitional necessities of non-moral projects is important for the current 
discussion of moral integrity: if a volitional necessity is thwarted by law, it does not 
necessarily involve an imperilment to moral integrity because it is possible that no moral 
values were involved. But when a categorical demand of conscience is thwarted by law, it 
necessarily involves an imperilment to moral integrity because moral values must always 
be involved. Insofar as the categorical demands of conscience require that individuals do 
things that they otherwise might not want to do and necessarily involve imperilments to 
moral integrity, they are different from the volitional necessities of non-moral projects and 
perhaps deserve differential treatment before the law as a result. 
Moving forward, I also think that May is wrong to think – alongside Martha 
Nussbaum446 – that conscience is the capacity that “reflect[s] on the ultimate meaning of 
life.” As noted in an earlier chapter, this view of conscience is misguided for several 
reasons. First, this view is, historically speaking, overinclusive: it attributes to conscience 
not only beliefs about what actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the 
future, wrong or not wrong for us to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation, but also 
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beliefs about what is or is not broadly meaningful to an individual. Second, this view seems 
to reverse the role of conscience as the applier (and not supplier) of our values: conscience 
now seems to be the capacity that primarily supplies our values – or something like our 
answers to these questions of ultimate meaning. Additionally, this view of conscience 
seems much friendlier than conscience’s historical roles as the creator of categorical 
demands, judger, accuser, acquitter, and so on. Lastly, the historical notion of conscience 
produces more than just “emotions of longing” connected to a search for ultimate meaning, 
and includes emotions like guilt, remorse, pride, joy, and relief. Thus, I think May 
mistakenly attributes this feature to conscience in his analysis of potentially distinguishing 
features of conscience. 
Lastly, I think May fails to see that moral commitments are dissimilarly central to 
one’s moral identity when compared to non-moral projects. It is plausible that “Chester’s 
ambition to be world champion is no less central to his self-conception” or identity than his 
friend’s moral principles are to theirs.447 But I take his friend’s moral principles to be 
nevertheless more central to their moral identity than Chester’s ambitions to be a world 
champion chess-player. Angelica and Biko’s conscience beliefs at least partly constitute 
their moral identity – for it seems difficult to articulate someone’s moral identity without 
ever referencing what they believe to be morally wrong to do or not do. Chester’s non-
moral project, however, probably doesn’t have much to do, if anything, with his moral 
identity – especially when we consider that the object of his volitional necessities seems to 
be value-neutral. This distinction is likely important only insofar as considerations of one’s 
moral identity – which includes considerations of one’s moral integrity – may carry more 
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weight than considerations of one’s overall identity in legal accommodations cases. In other 
words, this distinction will make a difference only insofar as the law is disproportionately 
concerned with imperiling a citizen’s moral identity than a citizen’s value-neutral identity. 
Second, I think May’s dilemma for the Moral Conscience principle is ultimately 
unsuccessful. In particular, I think this dilemma can be unraveled when we introduce 
Sorabji’s definition of conscience beliefs. Remember that Sorabji contends that conscience 
beliefs are beliefs “about what actions or attitudes had been in the past, or would be in the 
future, wrong or not wrong for him to adopt or not adopt in a particular situation.”448 So, if 
this is true, then Chesleigh’s belief that she must “earn enough money to repay her elderly 
grandparents for the many financial sacrifices they incurred supporting her chess career 
from an early age” is plausibly a conscience belief. That is, Chesleigh’s belief that she must 
earn enough money to repay her grandparents is a belief about what actions she must 
perform in the future – and would be wrong of her to not perform. Thus, while it’s true that 
Chesleigh “has no distinctly moral objection to the antisecessionist war” per se, she 
nevertheless holds a conscience belief that indirectly grounds her conscientious objection. 
How might this point unravel May’s dilemma? Remember that May’s dilemma is for 
supporters of the Moral Conscience principle: this principle either includes Chesleigh 
within the scope of those entitled to an exemption because her moral integrity is 
threatened or it does not because she has no conscientious objection to military service as 
such. My response is that Moral Conscience principle would, in fact, include Chesleigh 
within the scope of those entitled to an exemption because she possesses a conscientious 
objection – just not to military service as such. Of course, merely advancing a conscientious 
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objection and advancing a conscientious objection worthy of accommodations is different. 
Though Chesleigh may possess a conscience belief and advance a conscientious objection – 
and would thus be, at the very least, granted the defeasible entitlement to legal 
accommodations under the Moral Conscience principle – her bid for accommodations may 
nevertheless fail. In fact, her conscience claim may fail to warrant a legal accommodation 
because it is, as May points out, “not a conscientious objection to military service as such.” 
The broader point here is that, in cases where someone’s moral integrity is 
threatened, there is likely some conscience belief that is being imperiled. Most basically, 
this is because imperilments to moral integrity usually involve asking individuals to do or 
not do what they otherwise believe would be wrong or not wrong for them in a given 
situation. Unfortunately, May argues in the other direction, claiming that threats to moral 
integrity are not exclusive to cases of conscientious objection. But if the example of his 
claim is Chesleigh’s case, then he has not given us good reason to believe his claim: after all, 
we’ve shown that Chesleigh’s threat to moral integrity involved a conscience belief – just 
not one against military service as such. Interestingly, we should also note that Chester’s 
case seemingly involves no threat to moral integrity because his case involves no 
conscience beliefs concerning what is morally required or forbidden – only beliefs about 
what is morally permissible. Overall then, this means that May’s second objection to the 
Moral Integrity Response also fails: when a person’s moral integrity is imperiled by the 
frustration of her non-moral projects, it is likely because some nearby conscience belief is 
similarly imperiled. If this is true, then that individual would, like Chesleigh, be granted a 
defeasible entitlement to legal accommodations under the Moral Conscience principle. Yet, 
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as noted above, merely possessing a defeasible entitlement does not guarantee legal 
accommodations; a bid for accommodations may still fail for a number of good reasons.  
If May’s dilemma against the Moral Conscience principle is unsuccessful, and moral 
integrity can be redeemed as the reason that conscientious objections are special, then the 
Moral Integrity Response is vindicated and the Unfairness Objection seemingly answered. I 
should also note that May’s Moral Integrity Response, if sound, helps to inform a response 
to how a state should determine whether to grant exemptions when permitted in general. 
In particular, the Moral Integrity Response would ground defeasible entitlements that the 
state not legally obligate individuals to act contrary to her moral conscience – religious or 
otherwise. Such a conclusion provides cursory support for the claim that the state has good 
reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to all conscience beliefs. When we 
this claim with the Egalitarian Response, we get the following conclusion: the state 
therefore has good reasons to grant a defeasible positive special legal status to all 
conscience beliefs – religious or otherwise. 
V. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I addressed several objections to the Egalitarian Response. In 
the first section, I addressed the multifaceted critique as advanced by Kathleen Brady. In 
particular, I addressed her claims that: religious conscience beliefs should enjoy special 
legal treatment on the grounds that they enjoy a distinct relationship with the divine; that 
accepting the Egalitarian Response will result for weaker protections for both religious and 
secular conscience beliefs; and that limit liberty more broadly and religious liberty in 
particular. In the second section, I addressed the Feasibility Objection and discussed 
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responses raised by Douglas Laycock and Nadia Sawicki. In the final section, I offered two 
responses to the Underinclusiveness Objection as raised by Simon May. 
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Religion is often singled out for special legal treatment in Western societies. This is 
certainly true in the United States where religion enjoys a special place in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution via the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Through 
Free Exercise guarantees, for example, the Supreme Court held in Wisconsin v. Yoder that 
Amish children were entitled to an exemption from compulsory school attendance laws 
after the eighth grade, emphasizing that this was a uniquely religious exemption that did 
not apply to everyone. Moreover, those conscientiously objecting to contemporary 
vaccination laws may find themselves with varying protections depending on which US 
state they live in. For example, if both an Atheist and a Christian conscientiously object to 
the mandatory vaccine laws in New York, a legal exemption may be granted to the Christian 
but not the Atheist under New York’s current legal framework. 
These cases and many like it raise an important question: what, if anything, is 
“special” about religious conscience beliefs that justifies their special legal treatment? In this 
dissertation, I argue that, because religious and nonreligious conscience beliefs are 
sufficiently similar in nature, there is no reason to treat them differently before the law. In 
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this way, I offer an Egalitarian Response to the question about religion’s legal specialness. 
In the first chapter, I highlight a few historical discussions concerning religion’s 
specialness. In the second chapter, I develop and defend a broad account of ‘conscience’ 
against competing notions in order to navigate questions concerning the comparative 
features of religious and nonreligious conscience more effectively. In the third and fourth 
chapters, I analyze several possibly demarcating features of religious conscience beliefs 
taken to be legally relevant by theorists in the field. At the end of these chapters I conclude 
that, when compared to the nonreligious conscience, the religious conscience fails to 
possess sufficiently differentiating features so that comparative special legal treatment is 
warranted. In the fifth and final chapter, I field lurking objections to the Egalitarian 
Response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
 My academic career has consisted of earning a BA, MA, and PhD in Philosophy from 
Wayne State University. Currently, I am a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of 
Michigan–Dearborn with research areas in ethics, law and religion, and bioethics.  
When I’m not engaged in teaching or research, I enjoy a variety of non-academic 
hobbies and interests as well. As an academic, I love to read of course, but I also play the 
electric bass, frequent the gym, enjoy tearing up a good foosball table, receive regular 
inspiration from the Star Wars franchise in my aspirations to become a Jedi Master, and 
regularly play through quality video games with my wife. In addition to all these activities, I 
also spend a lot of time volunteering at my local church where I work closely with college 
students. Lastly, as a Michigan native, I should confess my near neurotic fandom for the 
athletic programs at the University of Michigan–especially football and basketball. 
